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INTRODUCTION

Source: Jamaica Observer, 8 February 2005.

Research Rationale
In 2005, Neville Duncan, a noted Caribbean political scientist declared: “I
cannot see that the Caribbean has any other choice but to develop a relationship
with China.”1 This sentiment is echoed in the cartoon shown above, and both are

1

Inter Press News Agency, "Grenada Could Be Latest Convert to China," December 17
2004. http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/interna.asp?idnews=26719

1

indicative of a general mood across the Caribbean wherein China is seen as not
only an important player in the international system, but also one that the
Caribbean states2 should position themselves to reap some benefits from.

The decision by English-speaking Caribbean states to increasingly engage
with China is seemingly unproblematic, but upon close examination it will
become clear that there are important variations across the Caribbean in their
approach to China as seen in their support for the One China policy. Since the
1970s Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have consistently
recognized China and not Taiwan.3 On the other hand, countries such as the
Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia have vacillated between recognition
of China and Taiwan.

The English-speaking Caribbean states share a similar colonial history and
have similarly structured economies and political systems. In addition, since 1973
they have been participants in a free trade area, the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM), which identifies foreign policy coordination as an important
component of this integration initiative. If all the Caribbean states are so similar,

2

I will use the term ‘Caribbean states’ and ‘Caribbean’ interchangeably. The preferred
terminology is ‘Caribbean states’ as it better captures the subtle yet important differences
among the Caribbean states instead of depicting them as one homogenous group. My
definition of the Caribbean as used in this research project is provided in the next section.
3

Recognition of China is defined as support for the “One China Policy.”

2

why do we see variation in their interactions with China? This dissertation argues
that the variable explaining this divergence is resource endowment.

Resource endowment is typically understood to be related to natural
resources which by definition are simply factors of production that are provided
by nature.4 These include land, water and sea resources. This dissertation will
look at natural resource endowment, but will also include a less discussed
resource—sovereignty. A resource is simply, “anything that can contribute to
economic activity.”5 The identification of sovereignty as a resource is quite
unusual, but this dissertation will show that the rights associated with
sovereignty—especially in relation to the ability to vote in international bodies
and to recognize other states6—can be traded and this trade can in fact result in
economic gains.

Brief Overview of Caribbean-China Relations
In terms of the specifics of the relationship between Caribbean states and
China, it is useful to divide the various aspects of the relationship into economic,

4

John Black, Oxford Dictionary of Economics (New York: Oxford University Press,
2002).
5

Ibid., 403.

6

The dissertation will also explore other aspects of sovereignty that have also been traded
in the Caribbean. These include the sale of flags of convenience, the establishment of
offshore financial centers, and the sale of economic citizenship. These will be discussed
in some detail in Chapters 2 and 4.

3

cultural and political areas (see Table 1 below). Economically, the Caribbean
states that officially recognize China and support the ‘One China Policy’ are the
recipients of vast amounts of loans, grants, and technical assistance in areas such
as railway, irrigation, and water systems. The loans are provided to Caribbean
governments at low rates of interest and are devoid of explicit conditionalities that
have been the subject of much discontent in loans obtained from, for example, the
IMF or World Bank.

Table 1. A Typology of China-Caribbean Relations
Economic Relations
Political

Cultural

Loans

Voting in IGOs

Scholarships

Grants

Military Assistance

Language Teachers

Trade

(natural

resources Cooperation in Isolating Sport Exchanges

from the Caribbean and Taiwan
Chinese goods)

Geopolitical Strategizing

Technical Assistance
Ports

Despite the fact that these loans are devoid of any explicit conditionalities,
this study will highlight the existence of implicit conditionalities. For example,
the loan agreements do not mention the need for Caribbean states to support the

4

“One China Policy,” but in most official speeches that relate to China, Caribbean
government officials consistently invoke their unwavering support for the policy.
In addition, Chinese companies have been awarded several contracts for
development projects that are being financed by these Chinese loans and these
companies tend to import labor from China.7 These negative aspects of the
relationship with China will be explored in more detail in the case studies. It will
be shown that the net benefits accruing to Caribbean states are actually much
lower than it would initially appear.

Politically, there has been an increase in the number of high-level
governmental contacts between Caribbean states and various arms of the Chinese
government and the business sector. The Caribbean states have worked and
continue to work with China in many international fora and have also supported
various Chinese initiatives in these fora. For example, in 2005 Jamaica voted
against a motion to grant Taiwan observer status in the World Health Assembly,
something that was a high priority for China as it sought to continue the isolation
of Taiwan in international bodies. In addition, the Jamaican Prime Minister in
2004 declared Jamaica’s commitment to working with China in the reform of the
United Nations and the country’s support for China’s objection to the inclusion of

7

Given the implicit nature of the conditionalities I used the interviews to try to gauge the
extent to which implicit conditionalities exist. A more detailed discussion of implicit
conditionalities is provided in chapter 6.

5

Japan as a Security Council permanent member, which is also very important to
China.

The cultural dimension of the relationship is as interesting as the economic
and political realms. Cultural contacts include much collaboration at the
educational level. In addition to scholarships provided by the Chinese
government, there is China’s agreement in 2003 to send two Chinese language
teachers to the University of the West Indies free of cost. In this agreement China
agreed to pay the salaries of the teachers and all their relocation costs. The
Caribbean governments would only be required to incorporate Mandarin language
into the foreign language options in the Language Departments.8 Other cultural
contacts include the exchange of sport coaches. China has sent table tennis
coaches to several Caribbean states and Jamaica sent several track and field
coaches to China to assist in the training of Chinese athletes for the Beijing
Olympics.

8

The University of the West Indies is the regional university and is funded by the
English-speaking, former British colonies’ governments in the Caribbean. There are three
main campuses located in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago and there are also
distance-learning centers in all the other states. The governments participating in the
funding of the University are the ones that are the subject of this study. The governments
do not directly run the University, but given the level of subsidies provided by the
governments, they have significant influence over the universities. The agreement
between China and regional leaders vis-à-vis Chinese language teachers was negotiated
by diplomats without the involvement of University officials.

6

Research Questions
This dissertation aims to answer four important questions. The first and
central question is, why is there variation in the strategies employed by different
Caribbean states vis-à-vis China? Jamaica and Trinidad have had a consistent
foreign policy of recognizing China since 1972. Dominica, Grenada, and St.
Lucia on the other hand, have wavered on their commitment to the One China
policy. The dissertation locates the answer to this variation question in the
differences in resource endowment. Countries such as Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago have a significantly wider natural resource base than the smaller
Caribbean states such as Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia.

The argument that will be made is that where natural resources are scarce,
Caribbean states will become more reliant on their sovereignty as a resource. The
natural resource-scarce Caribbean states have therefore adopted a strategy of
using their sovereignty in order to reap some economic gain and their vacillation
between China and Taiwan can be read as their attempt to gain the most economic
gain from recognizing either country.

The dissertation aims primarily to explain Caribbean foreign policy vis-àvis China, but this study would be incomplete without an understanding of
China’s motivations in the Caribbean. It will be shown that China’s interest in the
developing world is increasing and the primary explanation for this expanded

7

interest relates to China’s resource search. The Caribbean states, with the
exception of Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, lack the natural and
strategic resources that China demands. The second research question is therefore,
what motivates China’s interest in the Caribbean?

It will be shown that there are three motivations behind China’s interest in
the region—economics, recognition, and prestige. At an economic level, China
regards the Caribbean as another market for its exports and it is attracted to the
natural resources in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Half of the
countries that recognize Taiwan are in the Latin America and Caribbean region.
An important motivator for China in the Caribbean is therefore the isolation of
Taiwan, which involves getting states that recognize Taiwan to switch recognition
to China. The third motivation is prestige or the signaling of China’s rise as a
great power. China needs votes in international bodies and more allies. The soft
power and economic aid strategies employed by China across the developing
world are therefore aimed at signaling China’s rise as a great power.

China has a trade surplus with almost every Caribbean state. Chapters 3, 4,
and 5 will treat those statistics in more detail, but it should be noted that the
deficit facing most Caribbean states is widening and this is exacerbating an
already negative balance of trade position. It should also be noted that not only
does China have a trade surplus with the region, but when China offers aid, FDI

8

and loans, they import Chinese laborers to fill positions that could be filled by
nationals of the Caribbean countries. This is in fact one of the implicit conditions
of Chinese aid. If China does not represent a real market for Caribbean exports
and China imports labor instead of using the vast surplus labor already available
in the Caribbean, why are these states still willing to engage with China on an
even closer level?

The third central research question is therefore, why do Caribbean states
engage with China when doing so does not yield unambiguous benefits? The
answer to this question is quite complex. At first glance, it would appear that the
decision to engage with China is a direct result of a “follow the leader” dynamic.
But the fact is that the articulated rationale for engaging with China has never
been about following the actions of other Caribbean states or other developing
countries. The central aim of Caribbean foreign policy is the attainment of
economic development, and China represents an option for the acquisition of aid
and investment. As will be shown, in especially the cases of Dominica and
Grenada, the trade surplus or the implications of increased market access for
Chinese goods, are never really discussed.

The argument that the dissertation makes is that the reason for the
continued interaction with China in spite of the apparent low net benefits is twofold. First, the Westminster political system that is seen in the Caribbean results in

9

a lack of scrutiny of agreements signed and very little public discussion of the
relationship between any government and China. Second, the aim of the
Caribbean states is the attraction of aid and investment. Given that the states are
currently experiencing significant economic problems, and aid from the US and
Europe has been curtailed, it follows that their primary goal is attaining
commitments for aid and investment and little thought is given to the actual or
expected long-run benefits.

This study will argue that the relationship between Caribbean states and
China is best conceptualized as a two-way trade. The Caribbean states are
currently on the international market with something resembling a shopping list,
which has the attraction of aid and investments at the very top. Caribbean states
have throughout their brief independent history tried several strategies to attract
economic aid and investments and are again seeking a new avenue for attracting
these economic goals.9

China is simultaneously engaged in a much discussed drive for natural
resources—especially oil and minerals, but less discussed items on its shopping
list are recognition as a rising and important power and support for its policy of

9

The various strategies that have been employed by Caribbean states to attract
investments will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

10

isolating Taiwan internationally.10 In view of this, the Caribbean states that have
minerals and oil—namely, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago—are trading them
for Chinese investments into their natural resource sectors along with receipts
from the sale of these resources to China.

Where no natural resources exist, Caribbean states are trading another
important, yet often overlooked resource—their sovereignty. As sovereign states,
Caribbean states have as a right the ability to recognize other sovereigns and to
vote in international bodies in which they hold membership. These happen to be
two rights that China is very interested in and that China is willing to pay for.
There is therefore a political market value for sovereignty.

There is, however, a fourth important question that is driving the study and
that will motivate the entire discussion, what are the implications of the
Caribbean’s strategy towards China for the study of small states in the
international relations discipline? Small states are understudied and when they are
studied, they are often misunderstood. This study does not aim at a general theory
of small state behavior, but instead aims to highlight important and interesting
aspects of small states and their international relations so as to enhance the
existing literature pertaining to small state foreign policies, in particular. The
10

For a brief discussion of the prevailing view that a significant component of China’s
relations with developing countries is related to its search for energy and minerals, see
David Zweig and Jianhai Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs Sept/Oct
(2005).
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answers to the first three questions will point to some of these implications. More
specifically vis-à-vis the fourth research question, the study aims to show that
small state foreign policy cannot be solely studied at the system level or solely at
the individual level, but must instead be studied from all three levels of analysis—
the system, state and individual levels.

Definition of the Caribbean
There are many definitions of the term ‘Caribbean’. The most common
one is based on geography. The simplest definition available is those islands
located in the Caribbean Sea. This definition is, however, inadequate as it
excludes countries such as Guyana and Belize and in some cases even the
Bahamas is excluded as it is a chain of islands adjacent to the main archipelago
and is therefore considered a part of North America.11

Another geographical approach is to view the Caribbean as the islands in
the Caribbean Sea plus “all those territories whose shores are washed by the
Caribbean Sea.”12 This would include Mexico, Belize, Honduras, Guatemala,

11

Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Modern Caribbean Politics (London: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1993).
12

Ibid., 1.

12

Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela. This definition of the
Caribbean is often termed the Caribbean Basin, but this is mainly an artifact of the
United States, and in particular the Reagan Administration.13 This definition is
also not useful as most of these states do not identify themselves as a part of the
Caribbean and the historical and cultural differences are enormous. In addition,
this definition omits the three Guianas,14 which identify themselves as a part of
the Caribbean.

Given the problems with geographical definitions, this paper will
therefore, similar to Payne and Sutton, define the Caribbean in terms of
geography, history, and identity.15 My general definition of the Caribbean is
therefore all the islands in the Caribbean Sea (including the Bahamas) plus the
three Guianas and Belize. All these states were similarly colonized with plantation
economies and importantly, view themselves as a part of the Caribbean.

13

In the 1980s the US offered Caribbean states preferential access to the US market
through an agreement titled the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). This is the first instance
that the term Caribbean Basin is used. This concept is therefore a US construct based on
its estimates of its national interest.
14

The three Guianas are Guyana (former British colony), Suriname (former Dutch
colony), and Guiana (former French colony). On the face of it, the three Guianas are
located in South America and have the Atlantic Ocean as their coastline, but they often
identify themselves as a part of the Caribbean.
15

Payne and Sutton, Modern Caribbean Politics.

13

Having established my general definition of the Caribbean, I will however
only be dealing with a subset of this region in this project—the English-speaking
Caribbean. This English-speaking group comprises the former colonies of Britain
and the dependent colonies of the US and Britain. I will, however, be ignoring the
dependencies of the US and Britain in this dissertation due to the fact that a
primary aim of this project is to explore how sovereignty is traded by Caribbean
states. The American and British dependencies are culturally and historically
similar to the independent states, but their lack of sovereignty make them
unimportant to this analysis. The group under study is therefore the former
colonies of Britain, which are included in my general definition of the Caribbean.
These countries are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.16

The use of this subset of Caribbean states is useful, as it will help me to
better develop an analytical framework to understand their behavior vis-à-vis
China, as I have taken out important differences of history and culture. The
countries chosen have a similar, history, culture, political system, identity,
population size, and development rank as identified in the United Nations

16

Belize, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines do not recognize China.
They will therefore not be included in this analysis. The Caribbean states being discussed
are therefore Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana,
Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago. Primary focus will, however, be placed
on Dominica, Grenada and Jamaica.

14

Development Program’s Human Development Index (HDI). Having isolated these
cases I can within reason treat these states as homogenous units with the primary
difference being their natural resource endowment. When the term Caribbean or
Caribbean states is used in this study, it is therefore only in reference to these
English-speaking independent states.

This study will, however, focus on three Caribbean states—Dominica,
Grenada and Jamaica. These three were chosen mainly because the central
argument that this dissertation will make is that the Caribbean states are trading
their resources (both natural and sovereign) for Chinese investments and the cases
selected therefore have diverse resource endowments. Jamaica has bauxite, which
China wants, and it also has its sovereign rights and influence with the other
Caribbean states. Dominica and Grenada are included because, unlike Jamaica
that has natural resources that are of interest to China, Dominica and Grenada’s
only resource attracting China is their sovereignty and the rights wrapped up in
this designation. The three Caribbean states selected are therefore sufficiently
similar—historically, culturally, and politically—while at the same time are
sufficiently different in relation to their resource endowment (the independent
variable in this study) to investigate the proposed hypotheses that are highlighted
below. The study will, however, show that the results obtained vis-à-vis the three
case studies are in fact generalizable and can be extended to analyses of the other
English-speaking Caribbean states that also recognize China.

15

METHODOLOGY
This dissertation in its exploration of Caribbean-China relations is
venturing into a new area. Discussions of China’s engagement with the Third
World are increasingly popular, but discussions of Caribbean-China engagement
are largely absent from the academic discourse. There are two possible
explanations for this absence. The first is fairly obvious; the topic is new. China’s
renewed engagement with the Third World has intensified since the 1990s as the
Chinese economy continued its boom and was more interested in the natural
resources that existed in the developing world. Given that the topic is new it is
understandable that there would be a relatively thin literature available.

Another reason for the possible academic silence in relation to the more
specific relations between Caribbean states and China relates to the fact that there
is very little academic work on the Caribbean in general. In fact, the references to
the Caribbean are usually intertwined with discussions of Latin America, but as
will be discussed in chapter 3, the Latin American engagement with China is quite
different from that existing in the Caribbean.

Given the paucity of academic literature on Caribbean-China relations, the
dissertation makes extensive use of newspaper articles published across the region
and extensive interviews conducted. The interviews were conducted with

16

government and private sector officials in Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica. All
interviews are confidential and the names of interviewees will not be given in this
thesis. The access gained to these individuals makes this study one of the first to
really explore the foreign policy decision-making process in the Caribbean in
relation to China.

In order to identify the specific motivations for the Caribbean’s links with
China, interviews were conducted with officials working specifically on Chinarelated issues at the Foreign and Finance ministries across the region. Analyses
were also done with respect to the aid packages received from China and the ways
in which Chinese loans are being used in the region. Given the increasing trade
links, it was also important to examine what the Caribbean is gaining or losing
from trading with China. This involved studying the trade data to gauge the
general trends in trade flows and the extent to which the trade gap between China
and the region is widening.

In terms of data collection on the China side, there is a small yet
significant body of work available on China in the Third World. This secondary
literature will be drawn upon in an effort to identify the links between China’s
general developing country policy stance and China’s policies in the Caribbean.
There is very limited work on China’s role in the Latin America and Caribbean
region and of the existing work, the focus is mostly Latin America, with a few
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passing mentions of the Caribbean. Given the paucity of secondary sources, this
analysis focuses on the texts of agreements signed between China and the
Caribbean. Interviews with Chinese ambassadors in the three selected states were
also conducted. This is limited, but again not worrisome insofar as the dissertation
is heavily biased towards an explanation of the Caribbean side.

Triangulation and Validity
Given the fact that accounts of various interviewees will invariably differ,
the methodological strategy of triangulation was employed.17 Triangulation
involves the use of multiple methods of data observation to increase the
credibility of the findings.18 In this study, the accounts of any one interviewee
were checked against reports in the media. In addition, where available, the
existing statistics and agreements were used to substantiate both newspaper
accounts and interviewee statements. The validity of the findings in this thesis
was therefore enhanced as a result of the use of methodological triangulation.
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Company, 1970).
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Hypotheses
There are 2 major hypotheses driving this study:
1. If a state has natural resources that are of strategic importance to China,
then it will have a consistent foreign policy vis-à-vis China;
2. If a state has no natural resources that are of strategic importance to
China, then its foreign policy vis-à-vis China will be inconsistent.

For the purposes of this study, the independent variable is therefore natural
resource endowment and the dependent variable is foreign policy consistency.
Natural resources are simply resources accorded by nature (for example, land and
sea resources). For the purposes of this study, the natural resources being
considered are those that China is particularly interested in. Resultantly, the
beaches and climate in the Caribbean would not be included as these are not
demanded by China at this time. Foreign policy consistency is represented by a
consistent policy of recognizing China (no change in recognition of China since
1972) and an inconsistent foreign policy is one wherein a country switches
recognition between China and Taiwan.

The year 1972 is selected for two important reasons. First, the Caribbean
states began gaining independence in 1962 and the foreign policies of Britain
were adopted en masse. The Caribbean’s attempts to define their own foreign
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policy really begins in the 1970s as they forged closer relations with other
developing countries and establish new sets of relationships outside of the
traditional relationship with the former colonizer and other great powers. Second,
prior to 1972 China did not have a seat in the UN. At the time of independence in
1962, the Caribbean states did not have a realistic option to recognize China as
their relationships were based on membership in the UN. China only assumed its
seat in the UN in October 1971. The choice of 1972 is therefore based on the
premise that prior to that year recognition of China was not a valid option for
these newly independent Caribbean states.

There is also one sub-hypothesis:
If a state has no natural resources that are of strategic importance to China,
then it will creatively sell rights accorded by sovereignty

In relation to the sub-hypothesis, the above definition of natural resources
applies. In addition, the sovereign rights being sold are votes in international
bodies and recognition of other states. Natural resource endowment is therefore
the independent variable and the creative sale of sovereignty is the dependent
variable in this sub-hypothesis.
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Extensions to Other Caribbean States
Table 2 below shows the expected results vis-à-vis resource endowment and the
consistency of foreign policy towards China. As shown below, there are three
countries that have natural resources that are of strategic importance to China.
These are Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. According to the stated
hypotheses these three countries would be expected to have a consistent policy of
recognizing China since 1972. The empirical findings do confirm this as all three
countries have recognized China since 1972 and have never changed recognition
since then.

Table 2. The Expected Relationship between Strategic Natural Resources and
Foreign Policy Consistency in Caribbean States that Recognize China
Country
Strategic Natural Expected Outcome Actual Outcome
Resources

of (Foreign

Interest to China

Policy

Consistent Towards
China)

Antigua

and NO

Inconsistent

Inconsistent

Bahamas

NO

Inconsistent

Inconsistent

Barbados

NO

Inconsistent

Consistent

Dominica

NO

Inconsistent

Inconsistent

Grenada

NO

Inconsistent

Inconsistent

Barbuda
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Country

Strategic

Natural Expected Outcome

Resources

of (Foreign

Interest to China

Actual Outcome

Policy

Consistent Towards
China)

Guyana

YES

Consistent

Consistent

Jamaica

YES

Consistent

Consistent

St. Lucia

NO

Inconsistent

Inconsistent

Consistent

Consistent

Trinidad

and YES

Tobago

Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia do
not have natural resources, and it is expected that they will have an inconsistent
foreign policy vis-à-vis China. In these cases the empirical findings do support the
arguments to be espoused in this dissertation. These five countries have in fact
had an inconsistent foreign policy wherein they have switched recognition
between China and Taiwan. The only case that does not neatly fit into the
discussion is Barbados.

Barbados does not have any resources that are of strategic importance to
China, but they have consistently recognized China since 1972. One possible
explanation for this relates to the fact that Barbados has traditionally been one
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country that has been less reliant on external aid. Barbados is in fact considered to
be a high human development country with a very high GDP per capita. In fact,
the average GDP per capita for the countries identified in Table 2 is US$10,280,
while Barbados’ GDP per capita is US$17,297, which is significantly higher than
the other countries in the sample. Barbados’ foreign policy is therefore less
concentrated on economic goals. What we do see from Table 2 above is that the
results that are obtained for the three case studies can in fact be extended to
analyses of the wider Caribbean.

Structure of Dissertation
At a theoretical level, this dissertation is squarely situated in the ongoing
debate relating to small states in the international system. In view of this, the
dissertation begins with a discussion of the development of the small state topic in
the international political economy literature in chapter 1. One of the major
lacunae in the existing body of work relates to explaining the foreign policy
behavior of small states. A primary aim of this dissertation is therefore to help
elucidate small state foreign policy behavior.

Chapter 1 will show that economics is a prime motivation for the foreign
policies of small states. The Caribbean states routinely argue that their small size
places them at an economic disadvantage and their attempts to gain concessions in
various international fora is, by extension, one of the leading foreign policy goals
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of these states. The chapter will discuss the literature pertaining to the features of
small states and will show that despite some negative attributes, small states do
perform quite well at an economic level. The literature relating to the foreign
policy strategies of small states will also be explored, and the lacunae with respect
to variations in small state foreign policies will also be highlighted.

Caribbean states place significant emphasis on the use of foreign policy to
attain economic development, but this dissertation demonstrates that there is in
fact some heterogeneity in the strategies employed by the Caribbean states under
study. Chapter 2 therefore highlights some of the important features of Caribbean
international relations and situates Caribbean foreign policy behavior in the
existing small state literature. This chapter makes the case that the Caribbean
states’ relationship with China is rooted in their search for economic survival and
the persistent need to locate this survival in an external power. It will therefore be
shown that China is simply the newest great power providing the Caribbean states
with aid and investment, and this pattern is similar to that seen in their relations
with Europe and the US in the past. The trading of resources—both natural and
sovereign—is merely the latest development strategy employed by Caribbean
states.

Chapter 3 moves the discussion to the Chinese side and explores the roots
of Chinese interest in the Caribbean. Beginning with a discussion of China’s
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wider Third World policy, the discussion aims to situate the current relationship
with the Caribbean into China’s wider international relations. It will be shown
that there are three motivations driving Chinese actions in the Caribbean—
economics, recognition and prestige.

The need to adjust or strategically reposition is a key motivation behind
the Caribbean’s renewed interest in China. For Caribbean states, especially
Dominica and Grenada, foreign policy is seen as merely another tool of their
adjustment process. Chapter 4 discusses the relationship that Dominica and
Grenada have with China. The major conclusion in these cases is that their lack of
natural resources results in an inconsistent foreign policy vis-à-vis China. This
inconsistency is seen in them switching diplomatic recognition from China to
Taiwan, and vice versa. Dominica and Grenada are examples of states that
creatively use their sovereignty by selling votes or recognition. This strategy is
employed because they do not possess any other natural resources to trade with
China.

Chapter 5 details the relationship between Jamaica and China. Jamaica is
discussed as an example of a natural resource-rich country in the Caribbean.
Jamaica has bauxite and China is interested in gaining increased access to this
important mineral. The Jamaican example is, however, very different from the
Dominican and Grenadian cases. Jamaica has had a consistent policy of
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recognizing China since 1972 and there have been no discussions of changing this
position. Jamaica’s foreign policy stance is therefore described as a consistent one
vis-à-vis China. It will also be shown that they do not solely rely on their
sovereignty as a resource, as they have a natural resource that can be traded with
China.

One point that the three major case studies points to is the importance of
foreign policy in the attainment of economic development. In fact, the economic
aim as expressed in the attraction of aid and investments is the main driver of the
foreign policies of all these states. The argument to be made in this dissertation is
that the creative use of sovereignty, which is a key strategy employed by several
small states, is relatively more important as a strategy for weaker states because
they traditionally have had fewer natural resources and suffer from other negative
results of their lack of size and power.

Chapter 6 will pull together the theoretical conclusions emanating from
the previous chapters. This chapter will return to the theoretical and historical
foundation laid in chapters 1 and 2 and will discuss the implications of the
discussion to the development of the literature on small state foreign policy
behavior. This chapter will highlight the fact that adjustment strategies will
undoubtedly take place at the foreign policy level, as economic development is a
prime motivation for small state international relations. It will also show how the
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existing political system in the Caribbean thwarts transparency and results in
Caribbean states endorsing agreements with China that are inconsistent with their
national interest.

The story that this dissertation weaves is therefore one of two-way trade
where the Caribbean states are selling resources (bauxite, market access,
sovereign rights) to China in exchange for aid and investment. It is also a story of
adjustment wherein Caribbean states are using their relationship with China as a
tool of economic adjustment. A state that has natural resources that are of interest
to China will sell it China, but where no natural resources exist, they will have to
rely on their sovereignty as a resource.
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CHAPTER 1
The Foreign Policies of Small States

The Caribbean states are all small states via any definition of small that is
employed. Not only are the Caribbean states small, but they have pursued a
foreign policy that is based on the premise that as small states they are uniquely
disadvantaged in the current international economic system and therefore need
some concessions from foreign governments and institutions. As will be
demonstrated in chapters 4 and 5, Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica expressly
identify their small size and the resultant vulnerabilities associated with this as
one of the motivations behind their closer relations with China. This chapter will
therefore discuss the evolution of the small states literature, with particular
emphasis on both the nature of the small state dilemma and the special
characteristics of the foreign policies of small states.

The chapter will begin with the issue that dominates the small state
literature—the definition of a small state and the special features of these states. It
will be established that the features highlighted in this literature, especially vis-àvis small market size, import dependence and economic vulnerability, are
consistent with the economic features of Caribbean states. Most of these analyses,
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however, fail to demonstrate the impact of size on economic outcomes such as
economic growth and the existing literature does not go far enough in explaining
the unique foreign policy strategies that are employed by these small states.

The discussion will then move into an analysis of the literature pertaining
to the ramifications of small size. There are conflicting studies in this regard.
Some authors argue that small size is debilitating while others argue that small
states have in fact performed quite well despite their less than favorable economic
features. It will be shown that Caribbean states can fit into both sides of the
debate. On one hand, they do in fact possess the negative attributes commonly
associated with small states such as small market size and diseconomies of scale,
and these features mean that their production potential is significantly lower than
that of larger states. On the other hand, they out-perform many larger countries as
is seen in their high level of human development. This chapter and the rest of the
chapters in the dissertation will demonstrate that despite these findings, Caribbean
states still perceive themselves as being at an economic disadvantage and the
foreign policies pursued are indelibly based on this assumption. There is no
literature that explains this phenomenon, but one clearly pragmatic explanation is
evident for this difference between rhetoric and actual performance. This
divergence can be seen as a strategy aimed at gaining more concessions from
external donors. It is clear that small states have unique features that can
potentially thwart their development and Caribbean states are essentially using
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this reality to gain trade and aid preferences. This reality will be discussed in
more detail in chapter 2.

The final section of this chapter will look at the literature relating to the
foreign policies of small states. It will discuss the major studies of Annette Baker
Fox, Maurice East and Jeanne Hey. All three, writing in different periods, make
the case that small state foreign policy is unique and very different from those of
larger, more powerful states. The existing studies do not, however, examine
explanations for variations in the strategies of small states. They generally
conclude that small states pursue a particular type of general foreign policy that is
limited in scope, addresses a small number of issues, and small states exhibit a
preference for neutrality. This dissertation will extend the scope of these analyses
by focusing on the specific foreign policies pursued by a seemingly homogeneous
group of small states in the Caribbean. It will show that their approach to China is
very heterogeneous in nature and the general small state foreign policy
taxonomies presented do not sufficiently explain why this foreign policy variation
is seen.

Conceptualizing ‘Smallness’
This study seeks to add to the existing literature on small states. One of the
primary preoccupations of this literature relates to the definition of a small state.
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There is no agreed definition of small in the political economy literature as
different authors employ a range of definitions. Definitions focus on, inter alia,
the size of the economy, the GDP, ability to influence the international system,
and population size. Countries such as Luxembourg, Switzerland, Zimbabwe, and
Grenada can be defined as small states depending on the definition employed.
Caribbean states are, however, ‘small’ along all of the usual measures of country
size.

But how useful is the distinction of smallness? Neumann and Gstohl argue
that of the almost 200 states in the UN, only a few dozen are in fact large states,
and large states are in fact more of an exception in the international system.19
Most academics would not go as far as Neumann and Gstohl, but the number of
small states in the world is disputed, with different studies employing a different
number. The number of small states in the world is ultimately dependent on the
definition of smallness used. The population size is the most preferred measure,
but even this is not uniformly employed. For example, the UN defines a small
state as one with a population under ten million, while the Commonwealth
Secretariat, on the other hand, defines a small state as one with a population under
1.5 million. But there is also the category of micro-states which is generally
agreed to be states with a population under one million.
19

Iver Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, "Lilliputans in Gulliver's World?" in Small States
in International Relations, ed. Christine Ingebritsen, et al. (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2006).
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Not only is there no consensus on the population of small states, but
Croward also points to the fact that the population definition of small states has
also evolved.20 In the 1950s and 1960s a state was considered small if it had a
population under 10 or 15 million. In the 1970s and 1980s the upper limit was
lowered to 5 million and in the 1990s, the limit was again reduced to between 1
and 1.5 million population.21 It should, however, be noted that these are merely
general trends, as scholars deviate from these conventions. Whatever the cut-off
point used in relation to population, it should be noted that population size is a
continuous variable and as such, any mark or position chosen as the breaking
point is arbitrary.22 The small state literature does focus much energy on defining
small states, but this dissertation will not focus on this issue. What is more
important for this discussion are the ramifications of small size.

Features of Small States
Several writers have attempted to highlight the key features of small
states, but some characteristics such as dependence, small market size, and
vulnerability recur in the literature. Maurice East, one of the earliest writers on the
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political economy of small states, identifies four characteristics of small states;
these are a small land area, small population, small GNP and a low level of
military capabilities.23 The literature pertaining to the economic and political
features of small states has, however, expanded since then.

Selwyn, for example, argues that there are seven key characteristics of
small states. These are: dependence on foreign trade; narrow natural resource
base; heavy dependence on foreign corporations; dependence on foreign
institutions; diseconomies of scale; and constraints in the use of import
substitution policies.24 A subset of these seven characteristics is evident in the
works of several other authors. For example, Paul Streeten who initially states
that, “we know a small state when we see it,”25 goes on to identify three major
characteristics of these states; that is the possession of a small land area,
diseconomies of scale, and the concentration of production in one or few areas.

This dissertation starts with the Streeten and Selwyn arguments that small
states have features such as a small land area and diseconomies of scale that can
in fact become economically debilitating. It will also be shown that these features
23

Maurice East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," World
Politics 25, no. 4 (1973).
24
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are important contributors to the Caribbean’s current economic woes and the
subsequent need for economic adjustment. These points will, however, be
discussed in more detail in chapter 2.

So far, the features of small states as identified by Streeten, Selwyn and
East are all depicting negative attributes. The fact is, however, that despite these
seemingly debilitating economic features, small states have demonstrated some
amount of economic and political success. Sutton and Payne pick up on this
reality and provide a more balanced description of the features of small states.26
The five features identified by Sutton and Payne are openness, resilience,
enclaveness, weakness and dependence. At first glance it would seem as if the
differences in the Sutton and Payne list is merely an exercise in semantics, but
most of the literature defining the features of small states tend to focus on
negative attributes and this is true of the existing literature pertaining to Caribbean
foreign policy. The inclusion of resilience as a feature points to the fact that
despite all the negative attributes, small states are in fact quite stable both
politically and economically. The Caribbean states in this study do in fact
demonstrate this resilience. It will in fact be shown that the Caribbean states have
been quite creative and have devised new methods for attaining economic growth
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and the sale of sovereign rights is one such innovation. This issue will, however,
be taken up in more detail later in this chapter.

Vulnerability and ‘Islandness’
There have also been two recent additions to the literature on the features
of small states—the concepts of Vulnerability and Small Island Developing States
(SIDS). The literature on Vulnerability was advanced primarily by Briguglio and
UNCTAD in the development of the Vulnerability Index in 1997.27 The
Vulnerability argument is that small states are more likely to be vulnerable to
exogenous economic, political, strategic, ecological, environmental and
meteorological factors. This vulnerability is linked to their narrow economic
structures and their openness to international trade. Caribbean states have
frequently employed these arguments in making a case for leniency in
negotiations with countries offering aid and in their negotiations with multilateral
agencies such as the IMF and World Bank. It will be shown in chapters 2, 4, and
5, that the changing international trading environment exacerbates their
vulnerability and this has necessitated some economic adjustment. China is seen
as an important dimension of this adjustment strategy.
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Many of the general characteristics of small states highlighted earlier also
pertain to small islands. The SIDS concept is also relatively new and Briguglio
was again a major developer of this approach.28 The Commonwealth Secretariat
also played an important role in the development and study of this concept as the
majority of SIDS are located in the Caribbean and a significant number are
members of the British Commonwealth. In terms of actually modeling SIDS, this
was first done by Briguglio where he added “islandness” as an important
additional variable constraining small states.29 His argument is that a small state
that is also an island is expected to be even more vulnerable and disadvantaged as
they are more susceptible to ecological problems.

More specifically, Sutton and Payne point out that islands possess, “near
common properties of remoteness, environmental precariousness, insularity,
rights to maritime zones, and military indefensibility.”30 The usual focus of the
analysis of SIDs relates to their propensity to be adversely affected by
environmental factors. In the Caribbean context this specifically means more
threats from hurricanes, beach erosion, the destruction of coral reefs, and floods in
low-lying areas. Chapter 4’s discussion of Dominica highlights the devastating
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effects of hurricanes as the infrastructure on the island was severely damaged by
Hurricane Ivan in 2004. It will be shown that the economic downturn that
followed this hurricane was indeed a major contributor to the Prime Minister’s
decision to switch recognition from Taiwan to China.

In Dominica’s presentation at the UN General Assembly Meeting in
October 2007, Charles Savarin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Labor,
echoes the view of other SIDs when he argues that they,
Are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change even though they
contribute the least to emissions of greenhouse gases. Sea level rise
threatens the territorial existence of SIDs, and low lying islands in the
Indian Ocean, the Pacific, and the Caribbean may simply disappear in the
next thirty years or less, as the melting of the polar ice caps and mountain
glaciers on all continents becomes the new reality of unchecked climate
change. The disappearance of beaches, coastal tourism plant and loss of
coastal communication infrastructure would devastate the tourism
economy of most island states … Rising sea temperature is causing death
and bleaching of coral reefs, which in turn are impacting negatively on
fish stocks, the major protein source of island states. . . . Rising sea
temperature also provides a fertile ground for the development of tropical
storms and hurricanes which affect the Caribbean every year. Climate
change is contributing to the frequency and severity of these storms every
year.
This concern is echoed across the Caribbean as hurricanes have become
more frequent and are resulting in more damage. These states are also grappling
with the destruction of coral reefs due to rising sea temperatures and pollution,
and this has exacerbated the effects of hurricanes in coastal areas. In addition,
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there are concerns about beach erosion and this will undoubtedly have a negative
impact on the fragile tourism industries in the region.

The small states political economy literature therefore highlights several
important features of these states. These include small domestic markets, limited
land area, poor natural resource endowment, limited labor force, greater social
homogeneity, and openness to international trade. Added to these are the
additional vulnerabilities associated with small states that are also islands. There
is much consensus on the important economic characteristics of small states, but
little consensus on the consequences or ramifications of these features.

Are Small States Economically Disadvantaged?
The general conclusion of much of the economic discussions of small
states is ultimately that their economic prospects are limited and this disadvantage
is largely a result of their size.31 In addition, it is argued that micro-states and
island states are even more disadvantaged. But Armstrong and Read highlight
important successes such as the Asian tigers and Western European states that
they argue discredit claims that small states are acutely disadvantaged.32 The
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empirical results in this dissertation are in accordance with the general
conclusions reached by Armstrong and Read.

Armstrong and Read correctly note that the critical issue in the political
economy literature pertaining to small size is not how to define small size or even
the characteristics of small states, but instead is, “the extent to which small size
affects fundamental economic ‘givens’ and so constrain domestic economic
activity in small states and adversely affects their growth performance.”33 In fact,
the results of some statistical tests have yielded inconclusive and contradictory
results as to the effects of small size on growth, as will be seen below.

One study conducted by Armstrong and Read on the economic
performance of European micro-states and autonomous regions found that their
economic development was in fact greater than that of adjacent EU members and
their unemployment rates were also lower.34 They found that the most successful
micro-states and autonomous regions were those that had a well developed
financial sector, or were endowed with natural resources, or had a strong tourism
sector. In a similar vein, Streeten shows that between 1973 and 1983, Malta’s
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GNP per capita increased on average by 8.1% and this represented the highest
growth rate in Europe.35

Streeten also found that at an aggregate level, small states have lower
growth rates than larger states.36 He, however, noted that when the data was
disaggregated based on geographic regions, differences in growth rates by regions
were significantly greater than the differences seen when country size was the
independent variable.37 The general consensus is that small states in many
instances out-perform larger states.

These results are also borne out by a cursory look at the ranking of
Caribbean states based on the UNDP’s Human Development Index which ranks
human development for 177 countries with the country ranked number 1 having
the highest level of human development and the country ranked number 177
having the lowest level of human development. Table 3 below highlights the fact
that some small Caribbean states have performed quite well. Barbados (number
31), the Bahamas (number 49). St. Kitts and Nevis (number 54), Antigua and
Barbuda (number 57), and Trinidad and Tobago (number 59) all rank as countries
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with high human development. All the other countries perform relatively well and
are classified as medium human development countries.38

Table 3. The Rank of Caribbean States on the HDI
Country
HDI Rank
Barbados

31

Bahamas

49

St. Kitts/Nevis

54

Antigua/Barbuda

57

Trinidad/Tobago

59

Dominica

71

St. Lucia

72

Belize

80

Grenada

82

St. Vincent

93

Guyana

97

Jamaica

101

Source: UNDP Human Development Index, 2007

The statistical tests and the anecdotal evidence emanating from a look at
the performance of Caribbean states on the HDI demonstrate that small size does
38
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Caribbean states—Grenada, St. Vincent, Guyana, and Jamaica.
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not necessarily result in poor economic performance. Despite this evidence, there
is still an argument that can be made that small states are more vulnerable. In the
small states literature vulnerability is essentially defined as an increased
susceptibility to exogenous shocks that emanates from a country’s small size.39

Armstrong and Read in another study specifically on the vulnerability
argument found that in the short-run vulnerability does not affect growth
performance. Their evidence however suggested that, “vulnerability is a timeseries phenomenon affecting long-run growth performance but is insignificant as
a determinant of cross-section levels of income per capita.”40 Vulnerability can
therefore be seen as an important long-run determinant of a small state’s
economic future, but the vulnerability variable does not explain differences in
performance between small states and larger states in the short run. In terms of the
empirical evidence on SIDS, Armstrong and Read also found that ‘islandness’ had
no real effect on growth performance.41

This conclusion is borne out in the Caribbean case as these states perform
quite differently. Barbados is considered to be closer to being a developed country
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than a developing country while Guyana is one of the worst performing countries
in the hemisphere. All the English-speaking Caribbean states have similar
histories, economic structures and political systems, but some have relatively high
GDP per capitas while others have low levels of GDP per capita. Smallness or
islandness is therefore not the sole source of underperformance. It is therefore
clear that there are other domestic institutional variables that explain this
divergence in performance.

This divergence is also seen in the foreign policies pursued by these
Caribbean states. This dissertation aims to show why these states have varying
policies towards China. It will be shown below that the answer is not found in
much of the work on the foreign policies of small states. The answer to the
foreign policy variation question is in fact similar to the answer to the economic
performance question. Variation is indeed a function of the prevailing domestic
institutional framework.

Quite similarly, Selwyn concluded from his study of the difference in
economic performance of Mauritius and Swaziland that the ‘island’ category
“seems illegitimate,”42 meaning that it is not particularly useful as an analytical
construct. Factors such as history, economics and institutions were seen to be
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stronger explanatory variables explaining difference in the economic performance
of both countries.

Dommen’s analysis of the social, political and ecological trends relating to
island states concludes that, “island countries are indeed different and indeed they
are particularly fortunate places, where life is longer and nature is bounteous
though the menu may be short. Politics is friendlier. Hurricanes are more
dangerous than social unrest.”43 Dommen’s description is quite simplistic and is
in fact a mis-description, as there are many citizens of small states that would
disagree with this characterization. But Dommen’s conclusion is consistent with
other authors who argue that there is social and political stability in most small
states.

The general consensus is therefore that the statistical tests do not support
the theoretical claims that small states are by virtue of being small, or even small
islands, at a long run disadvantage. Despite this, subsequent chapters will
illustrate that actual small state foreign policies in the Caribbean still reflect the
assumption that small size is debilitating. These discussions that relate to the
definition and features of small states dominate the small state literature, but they
do not provide any real framework for understanding the foreign policies of these
43
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states or to understand how economic adjustment takes place in these countries. In
order to understand this economic adjustment we must engage the literature on
small European states in the 1970s and 1980s.

Economic Adjustment in Small States
Maurice East argues that economic considerations are a key component of
the foreign policies of small states.44 This dissertation will argue that a key
motivator for the increased relations with China on the Caribbean side relates to
economic adjustment. The Caribbean states are increasingly finding that their
request for aid and concessionary packages in trade deals are dismissed. This has
led to significant economic downturns especially in some smaller Eastern
Caribbean states such as Dominica and Grenada. Katzenstein’s acclaimed analysis
of small European states provides a useful framework for understanding small
state economic adjustment.45 He does not discuss the nature of foreign policies,
but he does help us to understand why small states, despite much literature to the
contrary, perform so well economically.

Katzenstein’s analysis starts from the same premise as other authors on
small states—openness and vulnerability to external shocks. But from here he
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diverges significantly from other small state theorists, such as Kuznets,46 East,47
and Streeten,48 arguing instead that small European states exhibit a remarkable
ability to adjust and in the 1970s and early 1980s, were more adaptable than
larger industrial states to the oil shocks and the general international economic
slowdown during that period. Instead of locating the explanation of small state
behavior at the international level or external conditions, Katzenstein provides an
explicitly domestic explanation for this phenomenon. He argues that,
International factors affect political strategies and outcomes only
indirectly: they are funneled through domestic structures that are shaped
by different histories and embody different political possibilities. … while
external events induced convergence, internal events drive countries to
different responses.49
For Katzenstein, the ability of small European states to adjust is therefore
a function of their political and economic structure, which he describes as
democratic corporatism. Democratic corporatism has three key components: an
ideology of social partnership; a centralized system of interest groups; and
continuous

political

bargaining

between

various

interest

groups,
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bureaucracies and political parties.50 It is these three features that account for the
strong performance of the European small states even during the oil shocks of the
1970s and an international economic downturn. The constant dialogue and
bargaining accounts for much of the domestic stability witnessed in these states
and the ideology of social partnership provided the general framework for this
dialogue and bargaining to take place.

The details of the European cases are not important for the purposes of
this dissertation, what is useful in this thesis is the identification of the
explanation of small state behavior outside of the ‘system’ level of analysis and
the emphasis on domestic political structures in explaining the adjustment
strategies of these European states.51 The Caribbean political economy bears little
resemblance to the democratic corporatism associated with the small European
states, but the general premise that political structures and economic structures
determine adjustment strategies is generalizable. Katzenstein’s framework,
despite its European roots, can easily be modified for the Caribbean context. The
Caribbean states under study are all democracies and have strong democratic
traditions. More specifically, the Caribbean states have Parliamentary systems of
government modeled off the British Westminster system. It will be shown in
chapters 4, 5 and 6 that this political structure is very important in understanding
50
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how decisions are made and how relations are managed in the case of CaribbeanChina relations.

Having discussed the features of small states and the potential economic
effects of small size the discussion will now focus on the foreign policy strategies
pursued by small states. This dissertation argues that small states do not have a
homogenous approach to foreign policy decision-making and that resources are
key to understanding the variations in the foreign policy strategies of different
Caribbean states.

The Foreign Policy Strategies of Small States
Jeanne Hey provides a comprehensive list of the commonly cited foreign
policy attributes of small state behavior.52 Table 4 below reproduces this list. She
argues that small states have a foreign policy that is, inter alia, limited in scope,
principled, non-conflictual and dependent on external powers. One of the most
striking things about the list, in addition to its length, is that there is no ranking of
the features. The list is therefore more of a taxonomy, pointing to some of the
more popular features highlighted in the literature. All the points highlighted by
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Hey have been a feature of the foreign policies of Caribbean states at some point
in their history. Chapter 2 will make this point in more detail.

Table 4. Hey’s Characteristics of the Foreign Policy of Small States
o Low level of participation in world affairs
o Address a narrow scope of foreign policy issues
o Limit behavior to close geographical area
o Employ diplomatic and economic foreign policy instruments, as opposed
to military instruments
o Emphasize internationalist principles, international law, and other
“morally minded” ideals
o Choose neutral positions
o Rely on superpowers for protection, partnerships and resources
o Aim to cooperate and avoid conflict with others
o Spend a disproportionate amount of foreign policy resources on ensuring
physical and political security.
Source: Jeanne A. K. Hey, "Introducing Small State Foreign Policy," in Small
States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, ed. Jeanne A. K.
Hey (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003
The Hey taxonomy is quite similar to that of Maurice East.53 East
identifies seven key patterns associated with small state foreign policy; a low
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level of participation in world affairs, high levels of activity in IGOs, high levels
of support for international legal norms, avoidance of the use of force as a
technique of statecraft, avoidance of behavior and policies that tend to alienate the
more powerful states, a narrow functional and geographic range of foreign policy
concerns, and frequent utilization of moral and normative positions on
international issues.54

East, adopting a resource-based framework for understanding small state
foreign policy behavior, argues that it is the lack of political resources that
accounts for their unique foreign policies.55 Small states therefore try to minimize
the costs of conducting foreign policy by initiating more joint actions. In addition,
East argues that the foreign policies of small states are dominated by economic
considerations. This economic focus is seen in two respects—the heavy
involvement of economic bureaucracies and the greater utilization of “economic
techniques of statecraft.”56

It should, however, be noted that East’s conclusions have been challenged.
Duval and Thompson, for example, refute the conclusions raised by East on three
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grounds.57 First, they argue that his data set was biased and therefore not
representative of the total population of small states. Second, they argue that he
mis-specifies the independent variable by defining a small state as one with
limited economic surplus. Thirdly, and related to second reason, his
operationalization of size is faulty as he uses value of economic surplus to
measure smallness. Despite this criticism, the fact, however, remains that
numerous scholars have used East’s conclusions as a starting point for discussing
small state behavior. The criticism, however, demonstrates that care must,
however, be taken to not solely rely on East’s conclusions. East’s argument
relating to the importance of political resources in determining foreign policy will
be modified in this dissertation. The emphasis in this study is on natural and
sovereign resources, but East’s argument that resource endowment is important is
useful in the context of this dissertation.

Early Views of the Foreign Policies of Small States
The early literature on the foreign policies of small states focused heavily
on providing analyses of the inherent problems associated with their lack of
material capabilities. Rothstein defines a small state as “a small power which
recognizes that it can not obtain security by use of its own security, and that it
57
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must rely fundamentally on the aid of others.”58 But even in the early stages of the
development of the small state foreign policy literature there were voices arguing
that the small European states had unique foreign policies that sometimes yielded
success, despite a lack of comparable material capabilities. One of the first works
to treat this issue was Fox’s discussion of the policies of small states in WWII.59
Fox focuses on the alliance patterns of Turkey, Finland, Norway, Sweden and
Spain. She found that during the War, “Sweden, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, Eire,
and Portugal all avoided being drawn into the war and emerged from it
unwounded and, if anything, stronger than before.”60 This successful international
maneuvering is credited to their diplomatic prowess. Fox’s conclusion—and the
conclusion of this dissertation—is therefore that treating small states as just
pawns limits our understanding of their foreign policies.

This dissertation builds on the underlying premise of Fox’s work that
small states are not mere pawns in the international system, but in fact do have
quite interesting and problematic foreign policies that should be studied. The
Caribbean’s relations with China therefore demonstrates Fox’s argument that
small states are not just mere pawns in the international system, but are in fact
58
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creative states that have devised innovative strategies for dealing with the
disadvantages associated with their size.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s there was a debate in Britain and across
the world as the decolonization process proceeded. The British colonies in the
Caribbean region were set to be decolonized, but these states were considered to
be too small as political units to be viable.61 In fact, the initial British plan for
decolonization involved the granting of independence only if the former colonies
became a federation. The thinking behind this was linked to the earlier work on
small states, which saw them as having inherent administrative problems. It was
thought that this would have been even more exaggerated in the Caribbean states
as they lacked a history of self-government and would have to learn everything
related to foreign policy formulation and its conduct in a very short time. The
birth of the Caribbean states therefore took place amidst an important debate
about their viability as political units.

The early literature on the effects of size on foreign policy options and
strategies often focused on the lack of material capabilities, but even in the early
writings of Vital and Singer there was some attempt made to point out some
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possible options open to small states.62 Vital argues that not all small states are
equally disadvantaged, but instead variables such as level of development,
internal stability and geography can mitigate against some of their weakness.63

In a similar vein, Singer argues that analysts must distinguish between
“coercive power” and “attractive power”.64 Coercive power relates to one state
getting another state to do what it wants for example by threatening the use of
force if the other state does not comply with its demands. Attractive power on the
other hand is the power derived from some attribute possessed by a state that may
be useful to another state, such as the possession of an important strategic
resource. Small states tend to lack coercive power, but that does not preclude their
possession of attractive power that makes them attractive to external states and
that can be used to their advantage.

This distinction between coercive and attractive power is useful as it
shows that Caribbean states that do not have coercive power can exercise some
attractive power especially when another more powerful state is attracted to its
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natural resources or ability to vote in international bodies. As will be highlighted
throughout this thesis, in the China case, the Chinese government is attracted to
both the Caribbean’s natural resources and sovereign rights.

Theoretical Foundations: The Levels of Analysis Question
As noted in the introductory chapter, there are two major research
questions driving this study—why do we see variation in the foreign policies of
Caribbean states vis-à-vis China, and, why do these states align with China given
the disadvantages associated with this increased relationship? Both these
questions raise one common, but unresolved issues in international politics—the
levels of analysis problem.65

The answers to both research questions are found at the domestic level of
analysis. In relation to the first question, the answer posited is that variation in
foreign policy is attributed to differences in natural resource endowment. In the
second case, the explanation lies in the nature of the Westminster political model
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seen in the Caribbean. Both these responses deviate from the typical explanations
posited for small state foreign policy behavior.

What explains small state behavior? Where should we locate causality? As
highlighted by Elman and Hey, the usual explanatory variable used in small state
foreign policy analyses is the international system.66 Many authors argue that
small states are even more constrained by the international system due primarily
to their lack of resources (whether diplomatic, military, economic) and they are
therefore often in a reactive stance.67 They are subsequently unable to dictate the
rules of the international game. At a political level, they are often subject to the
whim and fancy of larger states and are treated as pawns, and at the economic
level, small states given their lack of natural resources cannot make the rules and
tend to be price takers because of their limited resource base and therefore cannot
dictate prices.

System level analyses are, however, not without fault as they overemphasize the inability of small states to maneuver in the international political
66
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and economic system. But as the works of Katzenstein and Armstrong and Read
discussed above show, there is some amount of flexibility available to these small
states and the international system is not the dominant explanatory variable
explaining their economic performance. As noted before, Katzenstein actually
identifies the domestic structure as the key explanatory variable. This is also one
of the conclusions that this work will make.

The other popular explanation for small state behavior rests at the
individual level. Many studies of the foreign policies of individual countries often
place causality at this level of analysis.68 In these studies differences in foreign
policy across time are attributed to the leader that is in power at any particular
time. The importance of leadership (the individual level of analysis) is a newer
addition to the small state literature. The leadership variable is especially
important in the Caribbean context as these states are governed under the
Westminster political system where power is concentrated in the hands of the
Prime Minister and—at his/her discretion—the Cabinet.

This thesis deviates from the usual emphasis on system level explanation,
pointing instead to domestic factors explaining the foreign policies of small states
and agrees with Elman’s declaration that, “political behavior can only be
68
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explained in the context of institutionally created incentives and available
options.”69 For example, Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner argues that the foreign
policy decision-making process in the Caribbean is highly “politicized.”70 This,
she notes, is a direct result of the Westminster political system and the weak
nature of the political system. Donato St. Aimee, building on Braveboy-Wagner’s
work, correctly notes that in the Caribbean, foreign policy is made at the level of
the political leader and, “the attitude of that individual will determine policy
choices and decisions without significant inputs from interest groups and
parliament.”71

Both system level and individual level analyses are therefore important in
understanding Caribbean foreign policy behavior vis-à-vis China. However,
subsequent sections of this chapter will show that it is in fact very hard to
determine which is the most dominant, but the dissertation ultimately concludes
that domestic variables such as political system and natural resource endowment
are in fact the key explanatory variables explaining the foreign policy behavior of
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Caribbean states. In addition, this dissertation will argue that understanding
Caribbean foreign policy is actually an exercise in understanding development
policy. The main motivator of Caribbean foreign policy is economic development
in the sense of the attainment of external capital flows that will ultimately result in
increases to GNP. The international economic system provides constraints to the
actions of Caribbean states, but the real driver of foreign policy in the region is
the search for resources necessary for domestic economic development.
.
From the above discussion, it is clear that this dissertation is therefore
breaking new ground, as there exists several holes in the discussion of the foreign
policy of small states. For example, there is limited discussion of variations in the
foreign policy behavior of small states. What we do have are individual studies of
individual states and a compendium of the general patterns seen in their foreign
policies. Discussions of differences in the substance and concerns of foreign
policy are largely missing. In addition—and even more important for this
dissertation—there is little discussion of the link between resource endowment
and foreign policy suffice to say that countries that have specific strategic
resources will use them in their foreign policy, but these analyses are also quite
limited. The next chapter will focus on the specific details of the foreign policies
of Caribbean states.
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CHAPTER 2
The Caribbean States: Small States in the International System

Smallness in the Caribbean is often discussed in association with concepts
such as vulnerability, dependency and survival.72 This thesis argues that in order
to understand the rationale behind the interest in China, the persistent role of
small size considerations is key. On October 12, 1492 Columbus arrived in the
Caribbean and claimed the Caribbean states as Spanish colonies. The British
gained control in the mid 1600s and remained the dominant foreign force until
decolonization between the 1960s and 1980s.73

For the Caribbean, the current relationship with China is actually rooted in
two important things: first, the search for survival as small states and second,
locating the source of that survival in some external power. Georges Fauriol states
72
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that the small Caribbean states do not have a foreign policy, they simply have a
policy of existence.74 If this line of thinking is to be followed, the conclusion
would be that as small states, the international relations of the Caribbean states is
therefore simply a story of survival. As has been noted in the previous chapter,
small states actually do much more than survive. They have been able to adjust to
external shocks and in many instances have outperformed much larger states at an
economic level.

The economic survival of the Caribbean has always been intertwined with
a great power—the Spanish, the British (and then the wider EU), the US and now
China. The need to survive and the identification of this means in an external
power are the hallmarks of Caribbean foreign policy and provide a good
explanation for the recent intensification of relations between the region and
China. This thesis will argue that the primacy placed on relations with great
powers is also due to the perception that their survival is threatened and great
powers represent a source of much needed aid and investments.

Chapter Outline
This chapter will begin with an overview of the foreign policy stance of
Caribbean states since the 1960s. It will show that the foreign policies pursued by
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Caribbean countries has changed over time, but the economic foundation of the
various foreign policies pursued remains constant over time. In addition, great
powers have always been an important component of Caribbean foreign policy. In
the 1960s it was the US and Great Britain, but the US eventually became the sole
major power. During the Cold War period, the US and the Soviet Union, to a
lesser extent, were the major great power players in the Caribbean. In the postCold War era the emphasis shifted to the US solely, but in recent years China has
become an important player in the region. The discussion will therefore
emphasize the relationship between economic development and foreign policy in
the Caribbean and the importance of great powers in the Caribbean states.

The chapter will then make the case that the current foreign policy stance
of increased relations with China is in fact due to the current economic downturn
being experienced by these Caribbean states. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of one of the primary theoretical discussions in the thesis—the notion
of sovereignty for sale. It will be shown that the creative use of sovereignty for
economic gain is a strategy that has been employed by Caribbean states in the past
through their sale of flags of convenience and economic citizenship, and the
establishment of offshore financial centers. The use of their status as sovereign
states to vote with China in international bodies and to recognize China is
therefore the newest phase of their creative use of sovereignty.
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Development and Foreign Policy: The Caribbean Context

The History of Caribbean Foreign Policies
The foreign policy story of the Caribbean is a story of great power
involvement in the region and the search for strategies to promote economic
development. The importance of great powers is depicted in the political system,
the economic structure and the foreign policy objectives of Caribbean states. In
order to understand the Caribbean’s relations with China it is therefore imperative
that we briefly discuss both the Caribbean’s experience with other great powers in
its history and the foreign policy strategies that have aimed at achieving economic
development.

The Caribbean’s foreign policy has been characterized by the influence of
external states especially the US and Europe. Erisman argues that the Caribbean
has historically been,
a cockpit of great power conflict … foreign nations have fought and
schemed to control the Caribbean from almost the very moment that
Columbus first came ashore on San Salvadore Island in the present-day
Bahamas.75
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There have been other important regional players such as Venezuela and Cuba
that have been influential, but the powers that dominate Caribbean considerations
have been the US and Britain.

The Caribbean states after discovery, were colonized by various European
forces and the European influence on the Caribbean would remain an important
part of Caribbean identity even after decolonization. Upon decolonization, the
agreements signed by the British and other European states were “grandfathered”
and the Caribbean states were obligated, upon the receipt of sovereignty, to
adhere to all previous agreements.76 The structure of the economy seen in the
1960s was also a European artifact and the Caribbean was intentionally set-up as
a provider of raw material to Europe (specifically sugar).

Table 5 below depicts the phases of Caribbean foreign policy since the
start of the decolonization process in the 1960s. It is important to note that since
attaining independence beginning in the 1960s these states have found it
necessary to declare allegiance to a particular state or cause throughout their short
history. This is related to the need to appease the reigning hegemon and to attract
foreign aid and investment. This, however, changed after the end of the Cold War
when political allegiances became seemingly obsolete. The fact is, however, that
76
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the notion that a more powerful benefactor state is necessary for the development
of the Caribbean still figures prominently in Caribbean foreign policy
considerations, but it should be noted that this runs contrary to the overtures of
foreign policy officials. China is the new benefactor in the post-Cold War era and
this indicates that very little has changed for these states.

Table 5. Caribbean Alignment with External Powers
PERIOD
INTERNATIONAL ALIGNMENT
1960s

Alignment with the West

1970s

Alignment with the South, but We Need
Aid from the Industrial Powers

1980s

Re-Alignment With the West

1990s-present

Alignment Doesn’t Matter?

1960s: Alignment With the West
The Caribbean states that gained independence in the 1960s were
Barbados, Trinidad, Guyana, and Jamaica. At this time the Cold War was already
underway and Cuba was already solidly in the Soviet camp. As a result, the
Caribbean was already identified as a battleground in the ideological battle of the
Cold War. The Cuban Missile Crisis (1961-62) occurred on the heels of the first
round of Caribbean decolonization, making it even more imperative that these
new states in the US’ backyard declare their ideological allegiance.
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The decade of the 1960s was therefore characterized as ‘Alignment with
the West.’ The slogan “We’re with the West” therefore epitomizes the need for an
ideological declaration. Alexander Bustamante made this statement immediately
upon Jamaica’s independence in 1962.77 This was similar to pronouncements
made in Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados. These declarations point to the fact
that external realities often dominate foreign policy considerations in the
Caribbean. ‘We’re with the West’ must therefore be understood within the
geopolitical framework of the 1960s. The Cold War had already started and both
sides were vying for the support of states across the developing world. The
declaration by Bustamante should therefore be seen as Jamaica and other
Caribbean states being solidly behind Western powers, and the US in particular.

At the start of the decolonization process in the Caribbean, Britain’s
decline as the world superpower was already a fait a compli. The United States,
which was geographically closer, had become the main force in the region. The
1823 Monroe Doctrine which declared the Americas as the US’ sphere of
influence and the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary which proclaimed the US right to
intervene militarily in the affairs of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
highlight the US’ view of the region. The frequent interventions by the US in the
affairs of Latin America really did not spill over to the English-speaking
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Caribbean until in the 1970s. In fact, up to the 1970s the Bahamas was the only
Caribbean state that the US viewed as a vital consideration. It is only in the mid1970s that the English-speaking Caribbean really becomes a part of the US’
backyard as reflected in the attention directed towards the region as a part of
general Cold War considerations. But despite the lack of attention on the US’
part, the Caribbean states were cognizant of the fact that the US was the leading
power (at least in geographic proximity) and was the leading economic force.
Even before decolonization, Caribbean economies were becoming aware of the
economic potential of the US market. US firms dominated the mineral industries
and the newly formed tourism sectors were heavily reliant on US nationals
seeking tropical vacations.78

1970s: Alignment with the South, but We Need Aid from the Industrial Powers
The 1970s are an important period in Caribbean economic and foreign
policy history. It is during this decade that most Caribbean states gained their
independence and it is also in this period that we see an important contradiction in
the Caribbean and its foreign policy—extolling the virtues of solidarity with
developing countries and opposition to industrialized countries, while
simultaneously seeking preferences from powerful countries especially Britain.
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The Lomé Convention was an example of this real contradiction. In the
aftermath of World War II and the commencement of the decolonization process,
the international community witnessed the emergence of several new states onto
the international stage. These former colonies were eager to have their voices
heard and almost immediately directed international attention to the
disadvantaged position they inherited in relation to developed countries and the
general ills of the international economic system. They consistently, and often
quite convincingly, argued that they needed development assistance and increased
access to the markets of developed countries on preferential terms. These efforts
were met with varying degrees of success. One of the most promising
development arrangements obtained by developing countries were the Lomé
Convention concessions given to a subset of developing countries. Under this
Convention, the European Community offered trade and development
concessions to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)79 countries that seemed to
encapsulate almost all of what the developing countries were demanding in the
United Nations and in other international fora.

The first Lomé Convention, signed in 1975, provided non-reciprocal dutyfree access to the EEC market. It also included significant amounts of
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development aid through the European Development Fund (EDF). This Fund was
aimed at facilitating the diversification of the ACP countries away from their
dependence on agricultural production and towards the establishment of viable
manufacturing sectors. The Lomé Convention was seemingly incontrovertible. It
was just what the developing countries said was necessary to mitigate against
their disadvantaged position in the international economic system and to facilitate
their economic development.

The Lomé Convention emanated from the accession of Britain into the
European Community and the moral obligation it felt towards its former colonies.
Prior to decolonization, exports of the British colonies had special access to the
British markets. This relationship continued after decolonization and Britain was
intent on maintaining this relationship even after it became a member of the
European Community.80 The first Lomé Convention provided non-reciprocal
trade benefits to ACP countries and also importantly a stabilization provision,
commonly referred to as the Stabilization of Export Earnings (STABEX),81 which
was aimed at guaranteeing a certain level of export earnings by compensating for
fluctuations in the export earnings of ACP countries in relation to their exports
into the European Community. Under Lomé I most agricultural goods would enter
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the European market duty free, but other goods that competed with European
goods would receive preferential treatment in the form of lower tariff rates than
those levied on goods from non-ACP countries.
One important aspect of the Lomé Convention was the stabilization
component of the agreement. Article 16 enshrined a commitment on the part of
the European Community not only to guarantee a market for ACP products, but
also to ensure stable earnings by these countries from exports of certain products
to that market. The STABEX facility stated:
With the aim of remedying the harmful effects of the instability of export
earnings and of thereby enabling the ACP States to achieve the stability,
profitability and sustained growth of their economies, the Community
shall implement a system for guaranteeing the stabilization of earnings
from exports by the ACP States to the Community of certain products on
which their economies are dependent and which are affected by
fluctuations in price and/or quantity. (Lomé Convention 1976)

The products covered under the article 16 STABEX provision included
iron, bananas, coffee, cocoa, coconut, tea and wood products. What more could
the ACP countries ask for? Their most critical exports had a guaranteed market
and in the event that export earnings fell below expectations due to any
unforeseen event,82 ACP countries would be compensated for the shortfall in
earnings. The Caribbean states accessed the STABEX funds on numerous
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occasions, especially in the aftermath of hurricanes. It is therefore easy to
understand why the Lomé Convention could have been viewed as almost a
panacea for ACP countries. This Convention is also one of the primary foreign
policy successes of the Caribbean region as the main negotiators were Caribbean
nationals.
The original Lomé Convention was succeeded by three other Conventions.
However, those successive Conventions made very few changes to the content
and benefits conferred on ACP members. Therefore from 1975 to 2000 ACP
countries continued to benefit from what seemed to be a perfect agreement. Lomé
II was signed in 1979 and the only major change was the inclusion of a provision
titled ‘System for Mineral Products’ (SYSMIN) which provided assistance to
developing countries dependent on mineral extractions. SYSMIN worked similar
to the STABEX provision for agricultural products. Lomé III was signed in 1984
and it shifted some focus from industrial development to the development of
industries that would prove to be self-sufficient and would not depend on the
provisions of STABEX or SYSMIN for support. Lomé IV was the first 10-year
agreement, running initially from 1990 to 1995, after which time there was a midterm review. After some minor adjustments the Agreement continued until
2000.83 This agreement proved to be a lifeline for Caribbean states and it will be
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shown in Chapter 3 that the loss of these preferences had detrimental effects in
several Caribbean states.

The NAM and NIEO
While negotiating for preferential agreements, the Caribbean states
became a part of the wider Third World movement aimed at identifying the
disadvantages of the international economic system during the 1970s. This was
primarily demonstrated in the Caribbean’s active membership in the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) and their support of calls for a New International Economic
Order (NIEO).84 In fact, the Lomé negotiation was a corollary to this activity. It
was the first instance that they were successful in getting some measures that
were seemingly aimed at countering the disadvantages of not only size, but also
their lack of development.85
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CARICOM: Another Antidote for Small Size
The Caribbean states have also identified regional integration as an
important antidote for small size.86 Recall that in Chapter 1 it was pointed out that
Britain initially recommended that upon decolonization the Caribbean states
establish a federation, but attempts at federation failed in 1961 when Jamaica in a
referendum voted to stay out of any Caribbean federation stating primarily that
the other Caribbean countries would stifle Jamaica’s own development. Trinidad
also followed suit and their Prime Minister Eric Williams, already skeptical of the
benefits of federation, made a famous statement that ‘ten minus one equals zero.’
The idea was that if Jamaica—the most developed state of the ten Caribbean
states seeking federation—pulled out, then there was no way that a federation
would succeed.

The next attempt at some form of regionalism came in 1965 with the
Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA). The establishment of a free trade area
was essentially a ‘fall back’ position, as it was believed to be easier to accomplish
because issues related to trade agreements are easier to negotiate than are issues
related to political integration. The aim was to establish a free trade area between
86
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the ten states that had attempted federation earlier. Tariffs were eliminated on
imports from member countries and the immediate results were quite good. IntraCaribbean trade doubled and the manufacturing industries primarily in Jamaica
and Trinidad flourished as a result of the increased access to other Caribbean
markets.87

In 1973 the Caribbean sought to deepen the attempt at integration as seen
in CARIFTA. The main impetus for this deepening of the relationship stemmed
from Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community (EEC). As noted
before, Caribbean exports enjoyed duty-free access to the British market and they
feared the loss of this access when Britain gained membership. The major
problem stemmed from the common external tariff (CET) provision of the EEC.
Britain could not unilaterally extend duty-free access to some countries without
all of the other EEC members following suit. The Caribbean states therefore
feared that Britain would end up being forced to eliminate its concessions to the
Caribbean.88
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The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was therefore established in
1973 primarily as a result of international realities. The Caribbean states realized
that they had to negotiate and lobby Britain with one collective voice and that the
preferences that they depended on were heavily threatened. The CARICOM
Agreement identifies three goals: first, the establishment of a common market
(similar to the European attempts); second, functional cooperation; and third, the
coordination of their foreign policies.

Functional cooperation involved collaboration on non-political issues. In
the Caribbean case these included a common examination body for secondary
schools (The Caribbean Examination Council), collaboration in running the
University of the West Indies, and the establishment of the Caribbean News
Agency. The rationale behind functional cooperation is quite simple; if countries
have a history of cooperation on even non-combative issues, this can set the stage
for further integration attempts such as an economic or political union.
needs of its colonies. The subsequent Yaoundé Agreements were non-reciprocal trade
and development concessions given to the African colonies and dependencies of
Community members under the Treaty of Rome. This system was based on France’s
perception that it had a moral and economic obligation to its overseas dependents and
colonies (Montana 2003). The first Yaoundé Agreement was signed in 1963 and the
second in 1969. The six members of the European Community established a system
whereby the exports of their dependencies would gain preferential access to their
European markets and the newly established European Development Fund would provide
other development assistance to these states in relation to their infrastructural
development. The Caribbean and the wider ACP grouping used this as the template for
the Lomé Agreements.
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1980s: Re-Alignment with the West
Reagan’s election as president solidified the Caribbean perception that the
region was now a part of the containment strategy of the US and highlights the
importance of the US in foreign policy decision-making. During the 1970s,
Jamaica and Grenada had socialist turns under Michael Manley and Maurice
Bishop respectively.89 In 1980 Jamaica moved away from the socialist rhetoric of
Manley with the election of Edward Seaga, but Grenada remained socialist. The
intervention of the US in Grenada in 1983 signaled Reagan’s determination to halt
the spread of communism in the US’ backyard.90

During the 1980s the Caribbean states, cognizant of the importance of
appeasing the US declared their allegiance with the US and stated their
repudiation of communist movements in the region. In fact, the invasion of
Grenada by the US was sanctioned by other Caribbean states including Barbados
and Jamaica.91 Across the region conservative governments were elected and the
region sought to increase its trade relations with North America primarily through
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) also referred to as the
CBI, which was signed into law by Reagan and was envisioned as the Caribbean
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version of the Marshall Plan. The CBI provisions provided duty-free access for
non-traditional Caribbean exports with the ultimate goal being a decrease in the
economic motivations for an alignment with the Soviet Union.

1990s: Alignment Doesn’t Matter?
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era for Caribbean states. Up to
this point, they had become used to some superpower rivalry and concessions
based on their perceived disadvantaged position in the international economic
system. The end of the Cold War meant no superpower fighting for the
Caribbean’s allegiance by providing economic aid and it also ushered in the era of
reciprocity in international trade. The establishment of the WTO would also prove
important to the economic prospects of the Caribbean states. As noted earlier, one
of the major foreign policy successes of the Caribbean was the negotiation of the
Lomé Convention. The WTO, however, ruled that the provisions vis-à-vis
bananas were contrary to the rules of the GATT and as such the entire Lomé
Agreement was called into question (see chapter 5 for more details).

In view of the loss of the European trade preferences and the decline in
importance to the main regional hegemon—the US, the Caribbean states sought to
cultivate new friendships. The relationship with Cuba deepened as Cuba joined
the Caribbean as a founding member of the Association of Caribbean states
(ACS) and other educational and cultural linkages were established. The
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Caribbean states also began to engage Latin American countries more as is seen
in the close relationship between the Caribbean and Venezuela and Mexico as
seen in the PetroCaribe Agreement and the San Jose Accords respectively which
both provide Caribbean states access to concessionary loans.92

The more globalized international economic system that was based on
neoliberal norms proved to be a big problem for the majority of Caribbean states.
It no longer mattered whom they declared their allegiance to—the only thing that
seemingly mattered was where their comparative advantage lie. The identification
of comparative advantages has proven to be one of the major problems facing
Caribbean states.93 It is in this vein that the Caribbean has chosen to engage
China. The US and Russia had ended their Cold War and were no longer willing
to compensate Caribbean states for their “ideological” support, but China was
willing to provide the aid that they were unable to access in the existing
international political and economic climate.
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Current Economic Climate in the Caribbean
The Caribbean states have increasingly struggled to find a prosperous
place in the international economic system given its current configuration. With
the exception of Trinidad that has sizeable oil reserves, the Caribbean states have
all struggled with economic downturns in recent years (see Table 6 below). One
major source of this downturn is the demise of their agricultural sectors that have
historically been a cornerstone of these economies.

Under British colonialism, the Caribbean states specialized in the
production of sugar and bananas for export primarily to the European market.
Even with the end of colonialism, these states remained heavily dependent on
their agricultural sectors despite their lack of competitiveness vis-à-vis Central
American agricultural producers and numerous attempts to diversify the
economies.

The decimation of the agricultural industry in the Caribbean was a result
of the more aggressive free trade nature of the international economic system. On
April 7, 1997, the WTO issued its ruling on the banana case between the US and
the EU, where the US challenged the legality of European preferences under the
Lomé Convention.94 The ruling in favor of the US and against the EU had
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significant ramifications for their preferential arrangement with the Caribbean
states and other ACP countries, but at more concrete level, it affected the
economic survival of Caribbean states dependent on banana exports to the EU.

Table 6 below highlights some key statistics relating to the Caribbean.
What is important to note at this juncture is the high rate of unemployment across
the region. Most of these states have double-digit unemployment rates and this
indicates serious underlying problems in the economy. In addition, Official
Development Assistance (ODA) has decreased significantly since 1990. For
example in Dominica, ODA in 1990 was 11.8 percent of GDP, but by 2007 that
figure had declined to 5.3 percent.95 As seen in Table 6 below, this decline in
ODA is mirrored across the Caribbean.96

Table 6. Unemployment and ODA Statistics for English-Speaking Caribbean
Countries
COUNTRY
Unemployment
Official Development ODA (%GDP)
Rate (2007)

Assistance (%GDP)

2007

1990
Barbados

9.8

0.2

-2.1
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COUNTRY

Unemployment

Official Development ODA (%GDP)

Rate (2007)

Assistance (%GDP)

2007

1990
Bahamas

10.2

0.1

---

St. Kitts/Nevis

5.1

5.1

0.8

Antigua/Barbuda ---

1.2

0.8

Trinidad/Tobago

10.8

0.4

0

Dominica

23

11.8

5.3

St. Lucia

18.9

3.1

1.3

Belize

12.0

7.3

1.2

Grenada

23

6.2

9.5

St. Vincent

12.5

7.8

1.1

Guyana

---

42.4

17.4

Jamaica

10.9

5.9

0.4

Sources: UNDP statistics; IMF Country Reports

The Caribbean’s decision to align with China can therefore be read as
merely the defensive actions of governments that are facing domestic problems of
unemployment stemming from the demise of the agricultural sector and the
increasing reliance on a seasonal and volatile tourism sector. This explanation has
prima facie appeal, but it ignores important political and prestige goals on the part
of Caribbean states.
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At a geopolitical level, Caribbean states have, consistent with Robert
Jackson’s portrayal, been quite happy to tout their disadvantaged economic
situation that essentially emanates from what Robert Jackson terms, their
“negative sovereignty”.97 Jackson describes most decolonized states as possessing
only negative sovereignty and not the traditional positive sovereignty. Building on
libertarian theory (in particular the work of Isaiah Berlin), Jackson defines
negative sovereignty as “a formal legal-condition” which simply means freedom
from outside interference.98 Positive sovereignty, on the other hand, “Presupposes
capabilities which enable governments to be their own masters,” and as such, it is
more substantive in nature than simply a legal condition.99

Negative sovereignty is therefore ‘freedom from’ whereas positive
sovereignty is ‘freedom to.’ The sovereignty of developing states (quasi-states) is
conferred on them without the possession of adequate political or economic
development—a situation very different from for example the European states.
Jackson points out that the doctrine of self-determination and the corollary
process of decolonization,
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Justified the independence of every colony which desired it and thereby
established a radically different basis of sovereign statehood on the excolonial peripheries of the world. It was now possible to possess juridical
statehood while as yet disclosing little evidence of empirical statehood. It
was also possible –as it never had been in the past—to make demands on
international society for assistance to become developed.100
Jackson’s argument is that many of the decolonized countries were not
really in a position to control their destiny, but instead were reliant on outside
assistance. Jackson expands his argument to the activities of these states in the
calls for a new international economic order and other calls for developmental
assistance. He argues that the result of granting ill-equipped states legal
sovereignty was the constant calls by these states for developmental assistance.

Jackson’s argument is in fact borne out in the Caribbean context.
Caribbean states have devoted much of their foreign policy attention to attaining
some economic preferences and this signals some dependence on outside
assistance. For example, the Caribbean states were quite active and vocal in
attempts to forge a NIEO in the 1970s and in gaining preferences from Britain and
the wider European Union. During the Cold War period, the Caribbean states also
negotiated the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) with the US. The CBI was similar
to the Lomé Agreement and provided Caribbean exports access to the US market
at reduced tariff rates. In addition, the Caribbean states were the recipients of
numerous aid flows from the US. But currently, in contrast to Jackson’s
100
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discussion, the international system is not as accommodating of the cries of these
sovereign Caribbean states as these states are increasingly required to provide
reciprocity in terms of trade agreements. In addition, aid flows are now the
exception rather than the norm.101

The economic situation is therefore quite precarious across the region and
any attempt to understand the increasing attempts to lure Chinese aid and
investments must take into account the current economic situation facing
Caribbean states. This, however, does not mean that economic self-interest is the
sole explanation as political motivations also play a role in explaining the
increased relations between the Caribbean and China.

The Caribbean Political System

The Westminster political system in the Caribbean is very similar to that
existing in Britain. In fact, the Parliamentary system existing in the Caribbean was
patterned off the British system. Munroe provides two explanations for this
patterning; first, it was the type of system that the leaders were accustomed to
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during the process of decolonization, and second, the British were only willing to
grant independence if this was the type of political system adopted.102 Munroe
notes that, “If there had been a proposal for an American type of government, the
British would likely have been doubtful. There was no real consideration at the
time of a presidential type of democracy.”103 Currently, the British-modeled
parliamentary system is the prevailing political system used in all Caribbean
countries, with the exception of Guyana. It should be noted that Guyana did
initially adopt the British-model, but in 1980 decided to institute a US-style
Presidential system.

In the Westminster Parliamentary System there is no separation of powers
between the Executive and Legislative branches of government. The Executive
branch is dependent on the Legislative branch, as the Executive is directly
selected from the Legislative branch. In the ‘first past the post’ system, the
political party that captures the majority of the seats in the parliament will make
up the Executive. The Prime Minister is essentially the person that commands the
support of the majority of the members of the Parliament. This means, in essence,
that the Prime Minister is the leader of the political party with the most seats in
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the Parliament. The Executive is comprised of the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet, and the Cabinet members are all members of the Legislature.

The fusion of the Executive and the Legislature has been identified as a
potential problem for countries adhering to this system. Munroe points out that
this political system concentrates significant power in the hands of the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet.104 In fact, the Prime Minister controls the legislative
agenda and can decide which laws are even considered. The opposition has no
control over this and cannot introduce a law on its own.

This concentration of power in the Executive and especially the Prime
Minister can, and often does result in a lack of transparency. The government
Ministries are led by members of the Legislature that are from the ruling Party
and decisions made in these Ministries are not usually debated in Parliament. For
example, there has been no debate about any agreement signed between any of the
three Caribbean governments and China in the Parliament. The Cabinet makes
decisions, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of Finance will sign
the subsequent agreement. This means that in many instances, members of the
opposition are not aware of the agreements that have been signed by the
government.
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Of equal concern is the fact that the citizens of the Caribbean states are
also not made aware of the substance of agreements entered into by the
government. They may see a press release stating that the Chinese government
has agreed to build a stadium, but they are not aware of the conditionalities or
terms attached to the building of the stadium.105 This is an important factor
explaining why countries across the Caribbean have signed agreements that are
not necessarily favorable to all the citizens and nevertheless remain unchallenged.

Caribbean Motivations: Sovereignty for Sale?
The motivations of the Caribbean states are best gauged via an analysis of
their current economic situation, which stems from both the configuration of the
international economic system and the domestic structure of their economies. The
previous section laid the groundwork for this by showing how precarious the
economic situation is in several of these states. The economic motivations on the
side of the Caribbean states are simply Chinese investments and/or aid. For
Dominica, an island whose banana industry has been decimated by the WTO
banana ruling and frequent hurricanes, exploiting China’s need for recognition
105
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was a plausible, and it could be argued, the best short-term fix for their economic
woes.

The other major option would be to go to the IMF or World Bank, but the
Chinese loans are provided sans explicit conditionalities. It is therefore
understandable that if given a choice, a state would choose China over the IMF,
particularly given previous experiences with the IMF in relation to the loss of
sovereignty and policy autonomy.106 In addition, as mentioned before, the chances
of the Caribbean states successfully hosting the Cricket World Cup without the
vital assistance of Chinese loans and grants would be slim.

However tempting it is to lump all the motivations on the Caribbean side
into the economic category, I will avoid doing so because the economic
explanation elucidates a significant proportion of the motivations, but there are
also other prestige goals on the Caribbean side that must be discussed. All states
seek prestige to some extent or another. China’s interest in the region is welcomed
not only because of the economic benefits it affords, but also because the
Caribbean states can again play the geopolitical game and view themselves as
important players to be wooed and courted as was the case in the Cold War era.
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But there is also possibly more going on below the surface.107 The cartoon that
opens this dissertation highlights a possible feeling in the Caribbean that
‘alignment’ with China is important because of China’s rise. It may very well be
the case that Caribbean states are bandwagoning with respect to China in the
expectation that China’s rise will confer benefits on them if they align now. This
also has implications for the relationship between the Caribbean and the reigning
hegemon.108

This view of the Caribbean motivations is consistent with BraveboyWagner’s analysis of the foreign policies of English-speaking Caribbean states.109
In her work, she identifies a tripartite motivation matrix—development, territorial
and political security, and prestige (in that order). This analysis, however,
deviates from Braveboy-Wagner in terms of omitting the territorial and political
security dimensions. This omission is due primarily to the fact that I do not
107
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believe that this is an important driver as these states are relatively secure in their
sovereignty especially in relation to territorial integrity. One recent volume on
small states pointed to the fact that for small states, “in most cases their physical
security is ensured”.110 Jeanne Hey also argues that, “the turn of the century is
probably the safest moment in history for small states”.111 In a similar vein, one
recent volume on Caribbean security issues focused on the issues of migration and
the drug trade as the primary security considerations.112 Omitting the security
variable in this discussion is therefore consistent with other works on small states.

Sovereignty for Lease?
As noted before, the argument to be made in this dissertation is that the
creative use of sovereignty is relatively more important as a strategy for
weaker/small states as they traditionally have had fewer natural resources and
suffer from other negative results of their lack of size and power. The use of the
concept ‘sovereignty for sale’ is not a true representation of reality. Caribbean
states are not selling their sovereign rights, but are instead using some of the
rights accorded by their sovereign designation to improve their economic
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prospects and to confer prestige upon themselves. This is not unique to Caribbean
states or small states. In fact, many states do it.

A more accurate description of the situation is therefore sovereign rights
for lease. Caribbean states are not selling their sovereignty. They are merely using
some of their sovereign rights for economic gain. They have therefore not given
their sovereignty permanently to China. They have simply afforded China votes
and recognition and at any time they can choose not to support China. This
decision would not be cost free especially in the short-run. Chapter 4 highlights
some of the costs involved in this diplomatic game as was played out in the
Grenada situation. In addition, these sovereign rights can be regarded as
renewable resources in the sense that they do not run out and states can employ
them over and over again.

The framework for this discussion of sovereignty as an economic variable
gets its inspiration from Ronen Palan’s work on the increasing phenomenon of
offshore financial centers and tax havens.113 Palan argues that the rise of tax
havens is fundamentally linked to structural problems in the global economic
system and represents a unique and vital developmental innovation for many
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microstates. This fits neatly into the arguments already espoused that the rationale
behind several Caribbean states intensifying their relations with China is linked to
their position in the international economic system as well as the economic and
developmental problems currently facing these Caribbean states.

But Palan’s analysis is most useful in addressing the question of what the
Caribbean has to give China in return for its aid and investments. This dissertation
will extend Palan’s discussion of the sale of sovereignty in relation to the
establishment of tax havens as the current relations between Caribbean states and
China can be seen as the employment of a development strategy that utilizes one
of their most treasured resources—their sovereignty.

For Palan, the “commercialization of sovereignty” is a viable and
understandable strategy. His study focuses on tax havens, which as an economic
strategy, entails the use of a state’s sovereign rights for economic gain. Quite
interestingly, several Caribbean states have employed this tax haven strategy and
these notable Caribbean states include Barbados, the Bahamas, the Cayman
Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Antigua, Belize, Dominica, Grenada,
Montserrat, Puerto Rico and St. Kitts and Nevis. Two of these states (Dominica
and Grenada) will be the subject of case studies in this dissertation. The
phenomenon of the commercialization and parcelization of sovereign rights is not
restricted to the use of tax havens, but also included in Palan’s analysis are export
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processing zones (EPZs) and flags of convenience, and here again Caribbean
states feature prominently.114 In relation to flags of convenience, Palan identifies
28 states in 2000 that are flags of convenience registries. Of the 28, 9 are in the
Caribbean.115

My own view is that the ‘commercialization of sovereignty’ does not
accurately describe the current relations between the Caribbean and China. These
states are not making sovereignty into a product to be traded. What is being traded
is in fact aspects of the rights accorded by sovereignty.116 It is therefore not the
ability to vote in international bodies that is being sold. Instead, the vote itself is
being sold (in this case voting in China’s interest) is the ‘commodity’ being
traded. I have therefore amended Palan’s analysis for use in this dissertation.
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This may seem to be a subtle distinction of no real consequence, but it is actually quite
important; see George DeMartino, “Global Economic Liberalism and the Fate of the
State,” ISS Research Series (2003). In the political economy literature is a common
conflation of autonomy, capacity and sovereignty. These three concepts are however very
distinct. For example, the argument is often made that globalization or the free movement
of capital constrains state sovereignty. I, however credit George DeMartino for pointing
out that what is in fact being constrained is not sovereignty (the right), but it is state
autonomy that is being constrained. By definition, sovereignty is the “right” to control
activities within a defined territorial space. The decision to go to the IMF and be
subjected to their conditionalities does not indicate that a state has lost its sovereignty.
The state actually exercised its right of sovereignty in going to the IMF and agreeing to
the conditionalities. What the conditionalities do result in is a curtailment of state
autonomy in the sense that it is forced to make policies that it would otherwise not have
chosen.
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In relation to the recent decision by Dominica and Grenada to recognize
China in return for significant amounts of aid, The Economist argues that, “trading
on their sovereignty is a well-established way for small states to make fast
cash.”117 Palan’s arguments can therefore be extended to a discussion of the
Caribbean states providing China—in exchange for investments and aid—votes in
international bodies and recognition of it as a sovereign state (and by extension
the denial of Taiwan of sovereign status). This selling of votes is no different
from the selling of flags of convenience and the establishment of EPZs as
discussed by Palan.

Caribbean states have employed numerous strategies and have achieved
inconsistent results. The first international economic strategy was their lobbying
efforts to obtain preferential trade arrangements with the EU and to work with
other developing states in the call for a NIEO. Geopolitical exploitation refers to
the strategy during the Cold War to seek aid from the US in return for the
alignment of Caribbean states with the West. Export processing zones and tax
havens (which can both be depicted as strategies that utilize sovereign rights in
innovative ways) are a feature of the 1980s and 1990s and all the Englishspeaking Caribbean states have pursued either one or both of these strategies.
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In the 1990s several Caribbean states, namely Jamaica and Guyana,
undertook neoliberal reforms as a result of conditionalities attached to IMF and
World Bank loans. Given the precarious economic position that many Caribbean
states currently find themselves, it is obvious that these strategies have not been as
successful as these states would have hoped.118 The trading of resources with
China—both natural and sovereign—is simply the latest development strategy to
be employed by Caribbean states.

The subsequent chapters will discuss the issue of adjustment in Caribbean
states and the fact that China is undoubtedly a node of their current adjustment
strategy. Across the Caribbean, leaders are lining up to gain as much financing
from China as they can obtain. Leaders overwhelmingly argue that China is the
most influential power outside of the US in the region and this power is largely
derived from China’s provision of aid and foreign investment.

The next chapter shifts gears a bit and focuses on the Chinese motivations
in the Caribbean. The Caribbean wants aid and China has been providing this aid
and investment. In order to gauge the price of Chinese economic assistance it is
important to look at China’s wider economic engagement with the developing
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world and China’s political and economic goals embedded in the push towards
great power status.
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CHAPTER 3
Chinese Motivations in the Caribbean: Economics, Recognition,
and Great Power Influence

Up to this point the discussion has focused on the Caribbean. This is
primarily due to the fact that the Caribbean is the primary subject of analysis, but
an examination of Caribbean-China relations would be incomplete without a
discussion of the motivations underpinning China’s interest in the region. China’s
engagement in the Caribbean region is consistent with China’s wider Third World
policy, with the exception being the relatively reduced importance of natural
resource extraction as a motivation on China’s side. This chapter identifies and
discusses the three key motivations driving China’s foreign policy in the
Caribbean (namely economics, recognition and prestige) and will show that these
are consistent with China’s foreign policy in other parts of the developing world.

China is increasingly becoming an important player in Latin America and
the Caribbean. Trade between Latin America and China in 2005 stood at US$40
billion, up from US$200 million in 1975.119 China has committed to $100 billion
of investments in the Latin America and Caribbean region over the next ten years,
119
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but most of this figure is related to resource extraction and will be allocated to the
Latin American economies and not the Caribbean.120 In February 2005 the ChinaCaribbean Trade and Economic Forum held in Jamaica gained much attention and
publicity and stimulated debate about China’s role in the region and the extent to
which China was now openly challenging the US’ hegemony in the region.

Much of the discourse on China in the region relates to China’s search for
natural resources in Latin America, and the Caribbean is included as an
afterthought in many of these analyses.121 This conflation of Latin America and
the Caribbean serves to ostensibly indicate that China’s interests in both areas are
the same. China, in fact, has somewhat different motivations in the Caribbean
region, as the search for natural resources is not a major driving force for Chinese
actions in the Caribbean as most of these smaller states lack traditional mineral
resources that are of interest to China.
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Chapter Outline
The arguments in this chapter are organized into five sections. The first
section argues that China’s Caribbean policy is consistent with China’s wider
Third World policy that uses soft power to advance China’s economic and
political rise. This section will also highlight the major difference between the
Latin American and Caribbean regions as they pertain to Chinese foreign policy.

The next three sections will discuss the three different (though mutually
reinforcing) motivations of Chinese foreign policy in the Caribbean—economics,
recognition, and influence. This thesis argues that China has a tripartite
motivation for its presence in the Caribbean—economics, recognition and
influence. The economics motivation is related to the search for natural resources
and markets. China is interested in the minerals found in Jamaica, and the oil and
natural gas in Trinidad and Tobago. But more importantly, Chinese interests at the
economic level relate to accessing the Caribbean markets as a destination for
Chinese exports. Recognition, for the purposes of this discussion, is defined as
support for China in its “One China Policy,” and it will be shown that this policy
is one of the primary drivers of China’s relations with the Caribbean. The third
motivation, and one of the leading determinants of Chinese Third World policy,
relates to Chinese influence. I will show that this variable is a two-fold goal that
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encompasses both the signaling of China’s rise, and the garnering of support for
the Chinese agenda in multilateral forums.

Each section will treat one motivation and will incorporate a discussion of
the specific strategies employed to advance it by China in the Caribbean. The
concluding section aims to show that China is in fact a pragmatic power and its
role in the Caribbean is solidly rooted in its calculations of its national interest.
China is therefore trying to obtain the best deal that it can get and the limited net
benefits that accrue to Caribbean states from this relationship must be understood
within this framework.

China in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Part of China’s Grand
Strategy in the Third World

China’s Evolving Third World Policy
China’s relations with the Third World have been an important component
of the foreign policy of China since the forming of the PRC in 1949.122 China’s
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One may question my use of the word Third World given the loss of currency in the
post-Cold War era. Given the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unipolarity
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seminal place in the coining and use of the Third World concept. Given this, I am aware
that this term includes so many countries that it is hard to make generalizations across the
board, but I still maintain the usefulness of the concept as it highlights China’s continued
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relations with the Third World is quite multifaceted, ranging from support for
liberation movements in Asia and Africa during the Cold War, to seeking the
support of these countries in gaining its UN seat in the early 1970s. China’s
embrace of the Third World was also evident in the post-Tiananmen period when
China faced censure and sanctions in many international bodies. Today it is seen
in China’s diplomacy aimed at garnering support for the isolation of Taiwan in
international organizations.

The schizophrenic nature of Chinese foreign policy vis-à-vis the Third
World is seen in the difference between the rhetoric of solidarity with the Third
World on one hand, and its reluctance to join two of the most important Third
World international organizations—the G77 and the Nonaligned Movement
(NAM), on the other hand.123 This duality is linked to China’s sometimes
conflicting view of itself. It is economically still largely underdeveloped,124 but

view of itself as in some way aligned with the nebulous conception of a Third World.
Third World is therefore used in the traditional Maoist sense of countries in Africa, Asia
(excluding Japan) and Latin America and the Caribbean that were not advanced
economies or a member of the Soviet bloc.
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The G77 is now referred to as the ‘G77 and China.’
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well below many Caribbean states.
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given its military power, economic advancement, and permanent seat on the UN
Security Council, it views itself also as a major power.

This contradiction is identified by Wu as “the dual-identity syndrome” in
Chinese foreign policy.125 China aspires to be a great power and to have influence
in the international system, but this quest for great power status is constrained by
its material capabilities. The final section of this chapter will argue that this
duality is reconciled in China by the pragmatic pursuit of its foreign policy. China
consistently espouses Third World solidarity, but its actions can be read in both
directions—solidarity with and against Third World interests.

China’s rhetoric regarding its place in the Third World, as argued by
Samuel Kim, is based on three points: first, China is a socialist country that
belongs to the Third World; second, Chinese support and solidarity with the Third
World is an important foreign policy goal; and third, even if China enters the
ranks of great power, it will still identify itself as such.126 As with many countries,
Chinese rhetoric is not always consistent with the actual foreign policies pursued.
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It is therefore imperative that attention be directed beyond official communist
party rhetoric towards an examination of actual governmental actions.

China’s Third World policy in the post-Cold War era is to a large extent
predicated on improving its international status. When China embarked on its
economic reforms in 1978, the Third World was neglected as China abandoned
the anti-establishment rhetoric of the NIEO and sought membership in the IMF
and World Bank, two institutions that China had vociferously opposed as inimical
to Third World development prior to 1978.127 It joined the IMF and World Bank
in the 1980s and the WTO IN 2001.128 In addition, China moved away from
challenging the international economic system as it had done under the aegis of
the NIEO and instead sought to integrate increasingly into the international
economy. China’s espoused solidarity with the Third World in terms of both
rhetoric and actual engagement therefore declined during the first decade of
reforms.

China’s increasing re-engagement with the Third World beginning in the
early 1990s is inextricably linked (at the political level) to the Tiananmen incident
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Indifference," in China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New
Millennium, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).
128
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in 1989 where the Chinese government violently suppressed student protests
aimed at propelling democratic principles in the communist state. China suffered
ostracism from many developed countries and in an attempt to regain some
legitimacy, sought to cultivate to a larger extent their relations with Third World
countries. Zhao argues that the reaction of the West to the Tiananmen incident
resulted in “a major foreign policy adjustment.”129

The US-EU arms embargo levied on China after the Tiananmen Incident
meant that sales of weapons to the PRC were banned. In addition, China feared
the threat of economic sanctions by the US and Western European states that
would have had the potential to seriously thwart the economic gains that China
had made up to that point. The intervention of Third World countries, especially
Asian investors in the newly-industrialized countries, aided immensely in China’s
ability to weather the storm as they expanded their investments in China despite
the sanctions and negative reports emanating in Western states.

It is after the Tiananmen affair that we see China moving at a faster pace
to solidify its relations with the Third World. This can be attributed to the threat
that China felt in international fora such as the United Nations as it increasingly
came under scrutiny for its human rights record. The increased interaction with
129
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the Third World at this point is also due to China’s continued economic growth.
As China increasingly integrated into the international economic system it needed
allies as there was a lingering distrust of the US and Western European states, and
the Third World provided a large pool of potential supporters. In addition, as
China’s economy improved, China was better positioned to employ a Third World
diplomatic policy.

One of the greatest needs of many Third World countries is economic aid,
and China was increasingly able to provide these concessions. It is therefore in the
aftermath of Tiananmen that we see the take-off of China’s ‘yuan diplomacy’
across the Third World.130 It should however be noted that this diplomacy
witnessed across the Third World is inextricably linked to China’s economic
expansion and the attendant expansion in the demand for natural resources.

China’s Third World policy is therefore based on economics and politics.
Economically, China needs natural resources and markets and this rationale is
present especially in its relations with Africa, the Middle East and Latin
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The term ‘yuan diplomacy’ refers to the Chinese version of ‘dollar diplomacy.’ The
aim of ‘yuan diplomacy’ is to provide aid in the form of grants and loans at a
concessionary rate to Third World countries as a part of China’s efforts to win allies. It is
interesting to note that the loans provided by China are not only provided at a relatively
low interest rate, but also lack many of the explicit conditionalities attached to loans
provided to developing countries by multilateral institutions and other developed
countries. This seeming lack of conditionalities will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
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America.131 Politically, China is very intent on cultivating allies and its aid and
diplomatic endeavors around the globe are indicative of this fact.

China’s Use of Soft Power
China’s engagement with the Third World is reminiscent of the US’ use of
soft power across the globe. This was especially seen in the importance placed on
the use of public diplomacy during the Cold War. Joseph Nye coined the word
soft power back in 1990.132 Building on the work of Robert Cox and the concept
of great power legitimacy, Nye draws a stark distinction between traditional hard
power and the mere co-optive soft power.

The soft power concept deviates significantly from the hard power often
discussed in the international politics literature. Hard power is simply military and
economic might and is manifested in either the use of inducements (carrots) or
threats (sticks). Defining power in such a tangible manner, however, misses the
important fact that, “power resources are not as fungible as money.” In fact, a
131
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state may be able to get others to do what it wants without as tangible a means as
carrots or sticks. According to Nye, this indirect and seemingly ideational way to
get others to do what you want,
has sometimes been called the ‘second face of power.’ A country may
obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—
admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of
prosperity and openness—want to follow it.133
Nye’s description of soft power is therefore very different from traditional notions
of power. The inclusion of the idea of admiration—the emulation of Chinese
values and economic success—is key in the Chinese context, especially in its
interaction with developing countries. Its use of yuan diplomacy is relatively
minute, but the Chinese economic miracle is admired by developing countries
around the world. It is this admiration that gives China some of the economic
influence that it has in the developing world.

Table 7 below recreates Nye’s diagram depicting the three types of power.
Military and economic power are the traditional types of power that employ
threats, the use of force, payments and sanctions.
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Table 7. Nye’s Three Types of Power
Behaviors
Primary

Government Policies

Resources
Military power

Coercion

Threats

Coercive diplomacy

Deterrence

Force

War

Protection
Economic power

Alliance

Inducement

Payments

Aid

Coercion

Sanctions

Bribes
Sanctions

Soft power

Attraction

Values

Public diplomacy

Agenda setting

Cultures

Bilateral

Policies

Multilateral diplomacy

and

Institutions
Source: Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.
(New York: Basic Books, 1990).

Soft power, on the other hand, involves getting others to want what you
want without using “sticks” such as military might or economic inducements, but
instead co-opts people rather than coerces them. Soft power is about the ability to
attract, and it uses public diplomacy to achieve influence. This soft power concept
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sounds somewhat similar to the notion of attractive power discussed in chapter 1.
The major difference, however, is that attractive power is something that weaker
states possess, while in Nye’s analysis soft power is employed by powerful
countries as a means of interacting with weaker powers.

China’s meteoric economic rise is seen as an image of the possibilities
available to other developing countries. Admiration of China runs very high
across the developing world. In fact, Nye argues that the US—a long user of soft
power—has declined in importance as it has stopped employing this dimension of
power. Kurlantzick, extends this line of thinking and argues that as the US’ power
wanes China has picked up the mantle of soft power to enormous success.134 He
points out that in polls conducted across the globe, citizens in Africa and Latin
America have more positive views of China than of the US.135

Kurlantzick defines Chinese soft power as things outside of the military
and security realms including the use of aid and investment and cultural and
public diplomacy.136 This use of soft power as described by Kurlantzick is quite
similar to that described by Nye in the US context. The public diplomacy and
engagement in multilateral fora is precisely what is depicted in Table 5 above. In
134
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a similar vein, Sanusha Naidu describes China’s soft power strategies in Africa as
one that,
entwines the use of political non-interference and economic incentives
coupled with the rhetoric of non-alignment and comforting words like
historical friendship, equality, common development, mutual support and
mutually beneficial co-operation that has endeared Beijing to a majority of
Africa’s leaders.137
The rhetoric of solidarity with the Third World is therefore another important
component of Chinese soft power strategies. In addition to the rhetoric of
solidarity and the use of public diplomacy, Chidaushe argues that China
intentionally portrays itself as the opposite of the US by avoiding the intrusive
political governance conditionalities associated with Western aid.138 China
therefore describes itself as protecting the principle of non-interference by
omitting the conditionalities that have been disliked across the Third World and
that have been associated with Western multilateral institutions.

In their speeches Chinese officials often place emphasis on some key
themes. These include, mutually beneficial cooperation, friendly relations,
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sincerity, equality, mutual support, and common prosperity.139 This is in contrast
to the perceived exploitation of Western countries and institutions.

Kurlantzick also points out that soft power can be directed towards the
elites in a country (high soft power) or can be directed at the wider public (low
soft power).140 China employs both high and low soft power. In addition, the use
of cultural tools (public diplomacy in particular) is an important dimension of
China’s low soft power strategy. In the Caribbean, this cultural exchange has
included the provision of Chinese language teachers across the Caribbean, tours
of Chinese cultural groups (for example acrobatic shows). One very interesting
dimension of this public diplomacy is the provision of documentaries on aspects
of Chinese culture to Caribbean television stations. These documentaries are
routinely included in the television schedules across the Caribbean.

It should, however, be noted that the Chinese use of soft power is not a
new phenomenon. Naidu argues that from as early as the Silk Road trade China’s
foreign policy was in fact aimed at encouraging influence rather than the use of
military conflict or colonization.141
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Kurlantzick correctly cautions that China’s use of soft power tools, “has
developed significant influence, though it is still in a honeymoon period in which
many nations have not recognized the downsides of Beijing’s new power.”142 The
fact is, however, that several academics around the world are beginning to
investigate the actions of China in its use of soft power especially in relation to its
donations of aid in Africa. Chapter 7 will deal with this issue in relation to the
Caribbean.

China’s Motivations in the Caribbean
The discussion will now move into highlighting the three motivations
underpinning China’s interest in the Caribbean—economics, recognition and
prestige. It should be noted that these motivations are consistent with China’s
wider Third World policy, but the issue of recognition is more pronounced in the
Caribbean context.

Distinguishing Between Latin America and the Caribbean
The motivations for China’s role in Latin America and the Caribbean are
consistent with China’s wider grand strategy as it pertains to the Third World.
Economics is important as is seen in China’s quest to acquire natural resources in
142
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especially the resource-rich Latin American countries. In addition, half of the 29
countries currently recognizing Taiwan are located in Latin America and the
Caribbean.

There are, however, major differences between Latin America and the
Caribbean. The Latin American economies are more natural resource-rich and are
there therefore more important in China’s quest for energy. The Caribbean, on the
other hand, has fewer natural resources than Latin America, with the exception of
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The natural resource-quest is therefore not as
important in China’s foreign policy in the Caribbean region, but economics
remains a motivation, as the Caribbean is the source of markets for Chinese goods
and this is witnessed in the burgeoning volume of Chinese exports to the region.

Politically, China is interested in gaining allies across the Third World.
This is also the case in Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition to the
Taiwan issue, China’s aims are the harvesting of support in multilateral forums
and status recognition. The region comprises many states that translate into many
voices and votes to support China in many international bodies. Despite some
similarities in China’s motivations in Latin America and the Caribbean, it is not
very useful at an analytical level, to group the two together as we would miss
some of the subtle differences in China’s strategies in the two areas.
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China’s First Motivation: Economics

China’s national interest is inextricably linked to its domestic economic
realities. Economic growth is a key interest of the Chinese Communist Party and
it is the most important component of its foreign policy direction. China’s rise is
predicated on its increasing integration into the international economic system and
the capturing and exploiting of its comparative advantage.

Apart from the aim of every country to advance economically, the
economic component of Chinese foreign policy is predicated on two important
rationales—reversal of the “century of humiliation” and the survival of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).143 The intention to reverse the “century of
humiliation” is an underlying motivation of much of China’s domestic and
foreign policies. During that infamous century, China saw a diminution of its
position in the international system and vis-à-vis its neighbors which were
traditionally seen as merely “barbarian” and tributary states. During that century
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China fell further and further behind some of its tributary neighbors and even
more behind the world’s powers, losing its distinction as the great Middle
Kingdom. China’s embrace of economic reforms and their subsequent success
have done much to improve China’s image and sense of importance. Economic
performance leads to wealth, power and influence—all of which China lost in its
humiliation period.

The second important facet of economics in Chinese foreign policy relates
to the maintenance of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Wealth is
one key driver of communist party policies because of their need to maintain the
respect and admiration of the wider Chinese population. In the view of Chinese
government officials, their legitimacy is inextricably related to their ability to
facilitate the improved economic prospects of the population. As one of the few
remaining communist states, the communist party is especially concerned with
legitimacy and in view of this, the continued growth of the Chinese economy is
vital to the survival of the communist party.144

China’s foreign policy is in fact highly economically motivated. At the
economic level, there is an increasing body of work relating to the increasing
membership and involvement of China in international economic institutions such
144
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as the WTO and IMF. But of critical importance, in addition to its involvement in
these institutions, are two very important components—the search for markets
and the simultaneous search for resources. These two motivations are important in
this discussion of China’s activities in the Caribbean region.145

Resources
The traditional discussion of China’s engagement with the Third World
places much emphasis on China’s search for resources. This is, however, not an
important source of motivation for China in the Caribbean region. The Caribbean
lacks many of the resources that China seeks. Only one country has minerals
(Jamaica),146 and only one (Trinidad and Tobago) has oil and natural gas. Jamaica
has large bauxite reserves and government estimates indicate that the existing 1.5
billion tones of bauxite reserves could last for another 150 years. Jamaica is the
8th largest producer of bauxite and the 7th largest exporter of the commodity in the
145

China’s increasing membership and activity in international economic organizations is
also linked to its strategies in the Caribbean region as it needs states to support its
initiatives in these bodies. This aspect of China’s economic motivations is discussed in
the section on influence.
146

Cuba has the world’s third largest reserves of nickel and its export is the major
revenue earner for Cuba. Cuba exports the majority of its nickel to China but China wants
even more as nickel, like bauxite, is an important mineral for China’s industrialization as
it is used in the production of a wide range of metal products, from automobiles and
trains, to cans and windows. In November 2004 Chinese President, Hu Jintao visited
Cuba and primary on the list of discussions was Cuba’s nickel. China wants to invest
more directly in Cuban nickel extraction and is interested in acquiring a Soviet nickel
mine that is unfinished. Hu Jintao, in that visit, also pledged to invest $500 million into
the Cuban nickel industry. See "China, Cuba Seek Closer Ties," BBC News, November
23 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4034149.stm.
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world.147 The amount of oil off the coast of Trinidad is not known, but estimates
indicate that in 2005 there was 34.86 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of oil, but estimates
in 2006 put that figure at 30.88 tcf.148 It should, however, be noted that despite
Trinidad’s possession of oil, China is currently not a player in the market as
Trinidad’s reserves are relatively small and Trinidad already has agreements to
supply oil to the US and other Latin American and Caribbean states and there is
no excess production to export to China.

Where there are resources, China is actively working to exploit these
resources. In Jamaica, for example, the Chinese are increasingly interested in the
bauxite industry. Bauxite is the chief ore of aluminum and is an important mineral
sought by the Chinese to facilitate the expansion of the industrial sector. In 2001,
the Alumina Partners Company (ALPART) signed an agreement pledging to
supply China with almost 450,000 tons of alumina to China’s Ming Metal
Company over three years.149 This figure represented 30 percent of the production
of ALPART. In 2005, while the Jamaican Prime Minister was on an official visit
to China, a more important agreement was signed between the Bauxite Institute
and the Jamaica Bauxite Mining Limited and China Min Metals Corporation to
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These bauxite figures were obtained from the United States Geological Survey.
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Linda Hutchinson-Jafar, "T&T's Oil Reserves Declining," Jamaica Gleaner 2007.
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"Alpart Signs Deal with China," Jamaica Gleaner, March 26 2001.
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20010326/business/business1.html.
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establish both a bauxite extraction facility and alumina refining facility aimed at
expanding the capacity of the bauxite industry.150

Markets
China’s economic growth necessitates markets for its exports. As China
continues its rapid production pace it increasingly needs access to greater
numbers of markets. The Caribbean states provide another market for Chinese
products. There is, however, some underlying conflict. China has a trade surplus
with every Caribbean country. The volume of trade between China and the
Caribbean is increasing and China’s trade surplus with the region is also growing.
The Caribbean represents a small portion of the Chinese market, but it is a market
nonetheless.

In 2006, Guyana imported products worth approximately EC$40.2 million
of Chinese products, while exporting only EC$36 million worth of goods to
China. This picture is echoed across the region with Barbados importing over
EC$129 million worth of goods from China in 2006 while exporting only EC$3.5
million. The disparity is even greater in the smaller Caribbean states. Grenada and
Dominica exported no goods to China, but they imported a significant amount of
Chinese exports.
150

"Jamaica Signs New Bi-Lateral Agreements with China," Caribbean Net News, June
23 2005. http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/2005/06/23/signs.shtml
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Table 8. CARICOM Trade Deficit/Surplus with China 2006
Country
Value of Exports Value of Imports Deficit/Surplus
to China (EC$)

from China (EC$)

with China (EC$)

Antigua& Barbuda

n/a

n/a

n/a

Bahamas

n/a

n/a

n/a

Barbados

3,547,445

129,811,314

-126,263,869

Dominica

0

17,561,259

-17,561,259

Grenada

0

42,362,714

-42,362,714

Guyana

36,042,574

40,240,533

-4,197,959

Jamaica

811,190,910

557,974,545

+253,216,365

St. Lucia

0

27,678,311

-27,678,311

Trinidad &Tobago

18,712,188

664,264,900

-645,552,712

Source: CARICOM Secretariat Database
The situation is however different in Jamaica. The gap between Chinese
exports and imports in the Caribbean region is increasing in most Caribbean
states, but it is narrowing and since 2003, Jamaica has recorded a trade surplus
with China. This difference in trade performance is due to the reality that Jamaica
as it is the only state with minerals (that is, bauxite) that China wants and is best
placed to capture some of the benefits accruing to China-Caribbean trade. Chapter
5 will discuss Jamaica’s trade figures in more detail.
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Many countries are eager to access Chinese markets, but Caribbean
countries have little to gain from trading with China. The traditional exports of
Caribbean countries include agricultural products and apparel. In fact, the
Caribbean states traditionally engaged in apparel production have lost significant
market share to China.151 China has therefore in its diplomacy tried to make the
surplus less a problem through the provision of aid and loans. All the countries in
the Caribbean that currently recognize China have been rewarded with numerous
aid and loan packages.152 But, as will be shown in chapters 4 and 5, these aid
packages do not compensate for the widening surplus. Why then do Caribbean
states still seek closer ties to China, given the potentially low net benefits? This
very important question will be taken up in chapters 4 and 5.

China’s Second Motivation: Recognition

China’s broad foreign policy is importantly centered on the Taiwan issue
and the “One China policy” is an important foundation of China’s general
international relations. This focus on Taiwan has been a feature of China’s foreign
policy goals and objectives since the forming of the PRC in 1949. China’s foreign
151

Mexico has spoken to many of these issues, arguing that its apparel industry is
negatively affected by China’s ability to supply the market with cheaper products due to
their lower labor costs. See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of the competition
between China and Mexico.
152

The large number of aid and low-interest loans are an important facet of Chinese
engagement in the region and will be discussed in more detail in the section on Influence.
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policy in relation to Taiwan has waxed and waned since 1949, with the emphasis
shifting from the threat of military force to the international isolation of Taiwan.
As it became increasingly clear that China would not be able to retake Taiwan
militarily, China began to incorporate the Taiwan issue into its general Third
World policy. China used its relationship with the Third World to advance its
agenda in the UN, which was in many instances aimed at the isolation of Taiwan.

As noted before, half of the countries in the world that continue to
recognize Taiwan are located in Latin America and the Caribbean. And seven of
those are in the Caribbean region under study. Given China’s increasing emphasis
on isolating Taiwan internationally, China’s engagement with countries still
recognizing Taiwan has become an important component of that strategy. Li
points out that with respect to South America, despite strong economic
motivations for China’s interest, the Taiwan issue is a strong motivation in
China’s engagement in the region.153

At the beginning of 2003, the countries in the Caribbean not recognizing
China included Belize, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis,
St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. China’s engagement strategy has
borne fruit in the region as the Bahamas and St. Lucia switched recognition from
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He Li, Sino-Latin American Economic Relations (New York: Praeger Press, 1991).
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Taiwan to China in May 1997 and September 1997, respectively. And two of the
states that recognized Taiwan at the start of 2003—Dominica and Grenada—
adopted China’s “One China Policy” and switched recognition by 2005. This
switch in recognition policy will be explored below.

Dominica and Grenada Switch Recognition154
Upon independence in 1983, the small island of Dominica with a
population of 70,000 in an attempt to gain economic benefits, chose to recognize
Taiwan instead of China. In return, Taiwan provided numerous grants of aid and
other technical assistance. As China became more economically advanced and
had more money to spend on diplomatic issues it shifted its attention to “yuan
diplomacy” especially as it pertains to gaining the respect and support of poor
countries. This strategy was especially adopted with respect to countries
maintaining their recognition of Taiwan. It proved successful because as The
Economist points out, for poor developing countries, “trading on their sovereignty
is a well-established way for small states to make fast cash.”155
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Please note that the specifics of the decision to switch recognition to China will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4.
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The Economist, "Easy Money: The Caribbean and Taiwan."
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In return for recognizing China and supporting the “One China” principle,
Dominica was rewarded in March 2004 with the promise of $122 million in aid
packages. This figure represents over one third of the Dominican government’s
revenue over 5 years. This aid package included money to build a new stadium,
roads, schools and hospitals.

Upon decolonization in 1974, Grenada decided to recognize China, but in
1989 China severed diplomatic relations with Grenada when Grenada decided to
withdraw its recognition of China and to recognize Taiwan instead.156

In December 2004, the Prime Minister of Grenada, Keith Mitchell, made
an official trip to China. At that time Grenada still officially recognized Taiwan.
Taiwan offered to give Grenada $47 million in aid and to rebuild their national
stadium but Mitchell hoped for more, following the example of Dominica.157

Diplomatic relations between China and Grenada resumed in January
2005 after Grenada publicly ended its relationship with Taiwan and recognized
China. In return for this switch China provided Grenada with monetary assistance
to expand the national stadium for the Cricket World Cup in 2007 and the
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Chapter 4 will discuss the specifics of this policy change in greater detail.
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"MOFA Has Pessimistic Outlook on Ties with Grenada," Taipei Times, December 22
2004. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/12/22/2003216209
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construction of 2000 housing units. In addition, China offered a $6 million grant
to Grenada to compensate for the loss of support from Taiwan and a $1 million
scholarship fund and a financial grant to the government worth $2.5 million.158

In all their official statements with China, Caribbean leaders emphasize
their commitment to the “One China Policy” and the Chinese officials in turn
continually highlight their gratitude for the Caribbean’s support vis-à-vis the “One
China policy”. The Jamaican Prime Minister’s speech at the opening ceremony of
the “China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Forum” highlighted the fact that more
and more Caribbean countries are committed to the “One China Policy,” and he
reiterated Jamaica’s commitment. This line of speaking was a feature of all the
speeches delivered at the opening ceremony by Caribbean government officials.
The rhetoric of Caribbean and Chinese officials is an important indication of the
importance of recognition as primary driver for China’s relation in the Caribbean.

China’s Third Motivation: Influence

As a rising power, China is cognizant of its place in the international
system and the need to cultivate allies. As one of the last vestiges of communism,
China is eager to cultivate friendships and to solidify its stature as a leading
158

"Whiteman Heading for Beijing," Grenada Today, April 2, 2005.
http://www.belgrafix.com/gtoday/2005news/Apr/Apr02/Whiteman%20heading%20for%
20Beijing.htm
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power. Given its new foray into multilateral fora, China is in uncharted territory.
It prefers bilateral relations to multilateral relations,159 but China has increasingly
joined international organizations that are economically, militarily and politically
based.160 Not only is China joining an increasing number of multilateral
institutions both regionally and internationally, but it is also becoming more
active in institutions that it holds membership. As a result, China’s foreign policy
is highly based on cultivating more friendly relations with states so as to get
support in international bodies. As it pertains to the Third World, China is
increasingly championing ‘Third World causes’ and pushing South-South
Cooperation as an attempt to get developing countries on its side in important
international institutions.

In addition to the need to cultivate friendships so as to get support in
international bodies, China’s goals are prestige related. As a rising power, it wants
to be perceived as such and this is also behind China positioning itself as the
champion of Third World issues. There is therefore an important prestige
component to China’s relations in the Caribbean region.161
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This preference for bilateral relations over multilateral relations is due to the fact that
in bilateral settings China would have more leverage.
160

For a discussion of China’s reluctance to participate in multilateral forums see, Wu,
"Four Contradictions in China's Foreign Policy Behavior."
161

I will not be focusing on the US dynamic in this thesis, but it is worth noting that
China’s embarking in the region is possibly also predicated on gaining a foothold in the
US’ backyard so as to implicitly challenge the US’ dominance. The growing military ties
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Deng points out that in understanding Chinese foreign policy behavior,
emphasis must be placed on the concept of international status.162 He argues that
in many instances, international status is cited as one of the most important values
in China. This is somewhat of a deviation from (but not a rejection of) the
traditional realist conceptions of hard power, which are merely economic and
militarily based. The concept of legitimacy is also important in Chinese minds.
This concept of legitimacy is also nevertheless linked to the concept of the
national interest because China equates status with an ability to act in the
international system in an influential manner.

Deng does not extend his analysis of the role of international status in
Chinese interactions to the developing world, but it is an easy extension to make.
As noted earlier, China is keen to have its issues raised in multilateral forums.
One key issue relates to the issue of non-interference in the domestic affairs of
other countries. China sees this as very important especially given that it is one of
the last bastions of communism and it feels threatened by criticism of its human

are important in this respect. Prestige is therefore limited to a discussion of ability to have
the respect of countries in the region and to garner support on important international
issues. Chapter 6 will, however, briefly discuss this issue in the context of Caribbean
states.
162

Yong Deng, "Better Than Power: International Status in Chinese Foreign Policy," in
China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, ed. Yong Deng and FeiLing Wang (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005).
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rights record by developed countries. This focus on non-interference is seen in its
veto of most UN measures aimed at sanctioning ‘rogue’ states.

In view of this, it is imperative that it has as much support as possible in
these multilateral bodies. The majority of states in the international system are
developing states and China hopes that its policy of aid towards these countries
will translate into votes that are ultimately necessary for the country to attain
international prestige. It is therefore evident that China’s quest for international
prestige hinges on the support of developing countries around the globe.

China’s donations of aid, loans and private FDI are therefore a part of their
attempt to gain international influence—whether by way of votes in international
bodies or the simple recognition by the international community of China as an
important world power.163 In view of this, China has been very keen to use soft
power strategies to attain this influence.

As noted in the previous chapter, the Caribbean states have had a hard
time in recent years adjusting to international economic integration. Most of the
economies are heavily agricultural-based and labor costs are higher in the region
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It should be noted that there are no available statistics detailing the amount of aid
provided by China around the world. Attempts were made to ascertain the actual value of
these loans and other aid, but no official in the Caribbean states studied were able to
provide this data. What is known is that Chinese aid is expanding, but I cannot provide an
estimate of the magnitude of this expansion.
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than in Central and South America, for example. In addition, there is an erosion of
traditional preferential markets as the international economic system has moved
away from preferences to necessitating equal access to markets. The banana
dispute in the WTO speaks volume to this phenomenon for Caribbean economies.
As a result of the WTO’s ruling, Caribbean traditional agricultural exports have
been on the decline with the loss of access to the European market. In addition,
the end of the Cold War signaled the diminution of the Caribbean’s geopolitical
importance vis-à-vis the US, and we therefore see a sharp decline in aid from the
US. China is cognizant of these problems in the region and has positioned itself to
take advantage of the Caribbean’s current situation. It has given the Caribbean
countries precisely what they want to gain their support.

For example, the Caribbean states were very proud of the region’s
selection to host the Cricket World Cup in 2007. One major component of hosting
the Games relates to improving the cricket facilities in the region. All the
Caribbean states that hosted games and recognize China have received grants or
loans to build new cricket facilities or to renovate existing ones.164

Tourism is increasingly the driver of economies in the region given the
decline of the agricultural sector across the Caribbean. Tourist expenditure as a
164

It is quite interesting that China is investing so much of its diplomatic resources in the
region in a game that they know very little about, but China is quite aware of the
significance of hosting the Cricket World Cup for the Caribbean and China’s funding for
cricket should be seen in this respect.
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percentage of GDP in 2006 was 35.8% in the Bahamas, 26.6% in Dominica, 44%
in Grenada, and 18% in Jamaica.165 These countries all have large tourism
industries with the exception of Haiti and Guyana. China has, in return for their
recognition and support, provided these countries with Approved Destination
Status (ADS). This means that Chinese tour groups can travel in the region
without prior approval from the government. Countries not recognizing China
have been kept out of this deal. China is an emerging market for tourists and it
currently ranks in the top ten source countries for international tourists. The
Caribbean islands, as highlighted in the economics section above, for the most
part do not produce products that China wants and so have an expanding trade
deficit with China. They all are however reliant on tourism and this export is one
of the few avenues that Caribbean states can exploit. It will, however, be shown
that the expected influx of Chinese tourists has not materialized. In fact, the
number of Chinese visitors is so negligible that they are lumped into a category
referred to as ‘visitors from the rest of the world’ that represents less than 5 % of
visitors to all Caribbean countries.

Congressman Dan Burton of the US is quick to point out that “there is a
cost to pay for Chinese assistance and that cost is diplomatic and economic.”166
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These statistics were obtained from the Caribbean Tourism Authority’s Database
which can be accessed at, http://www.onecaribbean.org
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Dan Burton, Chairman of the House Committee on the Western Hemisphere, in
“China’s Influence in the Western Hemisphere,” Hearing Before The Subcommittee on
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He points out that China’s aim is to get support in the United Nations and other
international bodies especially on the Taiwan issue. These attempts have provided
some results in for example the commitment of all the Caribbean countries
recognizing China in blocking Japan from the Security Council and more
recently, the blocking of Taiwan’s attempt to gain observer status in the World
Health Assembly.167

In terms of China’s increasing influence on the international scene,
China’s decision to send 155 police as a part of the peacekeeping effort in Haiti is
indicative of its expanding foreign policy goal of joining the ranks of great
powers. The Haiti mission was the first one in the Western hemisphere by China.
In fact, China is currently the leading source of UN peacekeepers, having the
most troops actively participating in UN peacekeeping missions of the five
permanent members of the Security Council.168 This is one of the more glaring
examples of China’s move from its traditional disdain for multilateral fora and
into an area that it traditionally was opposed to as peacekeeping efforts often
entailed the subversion of the sovereignty of countries. The mission in Haiti is
bearing some fruit. In fact, it is rumored that Haiti may switch from recognizing
the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, April 6, 2005.
167

This information was obtained by the author from a review of documents highlighting
the proceedings of meetings between Jamaica’s Prime Minister PJ Patterson and Chinese
officials on his state visit to China in June 2005.
168

Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World.
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China and this gives China more of an international presence that it so desires in
its rise.

China’s presence in the Caribbean is therefore a function of China’s
search for markets, natural resources, recognition, and international status. The
next section will discuss the role of pragmatism in China’s foreign policy strategy
in the Caribbean.

China’s Pragmatic Rise
China’s foreign policy is predicated on the pragmatic pursuit of its
national interest. It has increasingly demoted ideology as a central motivation of
its foreign policy.169 Communist ideology can less and less be employed as an
explanatory variable in explaining communist party behavior both domestically
and internationally. It is therefore more accurate to describe China’s foreign
policy as being rooted in pragmatism and not ideology.

169

The extent to which ideology has been an important consideration in Chinese foreign
policy is increasingly being challenged. Lau points out that even in the early foreign
policy decisions by China to enter the Korean War (see Scobell 2004) and not to pursue
the reclaiming of Hong Kong from the British (see Lau 2004) were very pragmatic
decisions.
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This Chinese pragmatism, according to Van Ness, is also seen in China’s
interaction with the developing world. Van Ness argues that, “despite Beijing’s
rhetoric to the contrary, China is truly a ‘fair weather friend’ of the Third
World.”170 I would probably refrain from this kind of analysis preferring to point
to the pragmatic pursuance of China’s foreign policy. Zhao argues that Chinese
pragmatic strategic behavior is “ideologically agnostic, having nothing, or very
little, to do with either communist ideology or liberal ideals. It is a firmly goalfulfilling and national-interest driven strategic behavior.”171

By pragmatic I am therefore following the Zhao framework in pointing to
the pursuit of strict national interest such as economic gains and political power.
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, China has a dual perception vis-à-vis its
interaction with the Third World. On one hand it espouses solidarity with the
grouping, but on the other hand it sees itself as an emerging power and often has
interests that contradict those of the wider Third World grouping. I would argue
that in situations where principle and interest come into conflict, national interest
will eventually win as this is an important element of China’s foreign policy
pragmatism. This therefore indicates that the Chinese pragmatic approach to

170
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York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004)., 4.

132

foreign policy is very realist in its orientation. It also follows that the Chinese
commitment to Third World solidarity is espoused and pursued to the extent that
they fit China’s national interest.

China’s aid and loan policies are aimed at harnessing allies and supporters
in international bodies and support for the “One China Policy.” China chooses to
align with the Third World when such actions serve to further their national
interests. As such, no policy on China’s part is purely benign or altruistic. This is
consistent with Dan Burton’s claim that, “there is a cost to pay for Chinese
assistance, and that cost is diplomatic and economic.”172 This view is also echoed
in Van Ness’ analysis of China’s wider Third World Policy. He argues that given
the focus on national interest, China’s Third World policy is subject to large and
frequent fluctuations and this is due to Beijing’s focus on achieving wealth and
power.173

Ian Taylor in his study of China’s relations with Africa concludes that the
African experience highlights the fact that, “Chinese foreign policy in Africa and
elsewhere is, like all other countries’ foreign policies, self-serving and based on
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economic and strategic considerations.”174 The relationship with China as
described thus far and that will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5 will confirm
Taylor’s argument.

China’s foreign policy in the Caribbean is therefore a part of China’s
wider pragmatic foreign policy and the motivations are both economic and
political. China in pursuing its interests in the region employs a mixture of ‘yuan
diplomacy’ and pledges of solidarity with the region. Given the interesting
dynamics of the countries in the Caribbean region, China has carefully adapted its
policies so that it can pursue its wider foreign policy goals in the region.

The chapter so far has shown that there are three motivations for China in
the Caribbean—economics, recognition, and influence. China’s engagement with
the Caribbean is consistent with its wider Third World policy of resource
extraction, trade expansion, the identification of new allies, and the isolation of
China. The specific policy in the Caribbean is different from other regions, but the
underlying foundation is the same across regions.
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Motivations Matrix: Two-Way Trade between China and the Caribbean

Having discussed both the Caribbean economic and political situation and
the Chinese motivations it is now useful to tie the two sets of motivations
together. The relationship between Caribbean states and China is best
conceptualized as a two-way trade. The Caribbean states are currently on the
international market with a kind of shopping list that has the attraction of aid and
investments at the very top. Caribbean states have throughout their brief
independent history tried several strategies to attract economic aid and
investments and are again seeking a new avenue for attracting these economic
goals.175

Table 9 below is a diagrammatic representation of this motivations matrix.
China’s motivations are markets, natural resources, prestige and influence, while
the Caribbean motivations are aid and investment flows. The interaction between
the Caribbean and China is in fact a two-way trade. China is cognizant of the
needs of the Caribbean states and is simply providing the items on the Caribbean
shopping list in exchange for the Caribbean providing China with the things on
China’s shopping list.
175

The various strategies that have been employed by Caribbean states to attracting
investments will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4.

135

Table 9. Motivation for Relations between the Caribbean and China
CARIBBEAN

PRICE PAID BY

CHINESE

MOTIVATIONS

THE

MOTIVATIONS

PRICE PAID BY CHINA

CARIBBEAN
•

Aid and

Votes in

•

Markets

Foreign

international

•

Natural

investment

fora

Resources

Trade

•

Recognition

Development

opening to

•

Great power

•

Prestige

Chins

•

Tourism

•

Infrastructure

•

Revenue

•

•

•

Aid, FDI, Preferential
loans

•

Engagement/Identification
with the Third World

influence

Recognition
of ‘One China
Policy’

Where no natural resources exist, Caribbean states are trading another
important, yet often overlooked resource—their sovereignty. As sovereign states,
Caribbean states have as a right the ability to recognize other sovereigns and to
vote in international bodies in which they hold membership. These happen to be
two rights that China is very interested in and that China is willing to pay for.
There is therefore a market value for the rights conferred by sovereignty.
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China is simultaneously engaged in a much discussed drive for natural
resources—especially oil and minerals, but less discussed items on its shopping
list are recognition as a rising and important power and support for its policy of
isolating Taiwan internationally.176 In view of this, the Caribbean states that have
minerals and oil—namely, Cuba, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago—are trading
them for Chinese investments into their natural resource sectors along with
receipts from the sale of these natural resources to China. They are also receiving
aid, technical assistance and other investments.

The next chapter will move into the more detailed case studies of
Dominica and Grenada. It will be shown that the rationale for closer relations with
China relates to the loss of preferential access to European markets, the absence
of natural resources that China is interested in, and the need to adjust to current
globalization pressures.

176

For a brief discussion of the prevailing view that a significant component of China’s
relations with developing countries is related to its search for energy and minerals, see
Zweig and Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy."
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CHAPTER 4
Dominica and Grenada: Economic Adjustment and the Trade of ‘Sovereign
Resources’ in Countries without Natural Resources

Dominica and Grenada are two microstates in the Caribbean. Both have
populations significantly fewer than one million—Dominica 67,000 and Grenada
106,000—and both are members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS).177 As highlighted in Chapter 1, Dominica and Grenada rank 71st and 82nd
respectively on the UNDP’s Human Development Index out of almost 200
countries, with number 1 being the highest level of human development, and both
countries have very similar economies. Both countries in 2004 and 2005 switched
recognition from Taiwan to China and both did this after suffering from
exogenous economic shocks, namely hurricanes and the loss of preferential access
to the European market for their agricultural products following the WTO’s 1999
banana decision. Even more important for the purposes of this dissertation, both
states lack any natural resources that are of strategic interest to China.

177

The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was formed in 1981 and its
members are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the British Virgin Islands, Dominica,
Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The OECS
is a monetary union and it also provides for the harmonization of the foreign policies of
its members. The discussion of the Caribbean engagement with China highlights the fact
that the foreign policy coordination mandate of the OECS is not pursued as Dominica and
Grenada decided to switch recognition to China independent of each other and St. Kitts
and Nevis still recognize China.
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Since the mid-1990s both Dominica and Grenada suffered a number of
economic setbacks. They lost their preferential access to the EU market, saw
significant declines in their tourism sectors as a result of the September 11 attacks
in the US,178 were blacklisted by the OECD due to money laundering concerns in
their nascent offshore financial sectors, and were adversely affected by numerous
hurricanes. In an attempt to reduce and counter their vulnerability to external
shocks, both countries embarked upon diversification programs aimed at reducing
their dependence on only one industry. The ultimate aim was economic
adjustment based on reducing the economic vulnerability associated with their
small size. This chapter will show that their engagement with China is an
important component of their adjustment strategy.

Chapter Outline
This chapter explores in detail the decisions to switch recognition from
Taiwan to China in 2004 and 2005. Both Dominica and Grenada cited economic
downturns and the need to source alternative funding as the rationale for their
engagement with China. This chapter will therefore explain the rationale behind
the identification of China as an important component of Dominica and Grenada’s
economic adjustment strategy.
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The use of sovereignty for economic gain will also be examined in this
chapter. Both Dominica and Grenada are lacking in natural resources that are of
strategic importance to China. The main export of Dominica is bananas and the
main export for Grenada is spices. These are goods for which there are many
producers in the global economy. Given that China’s economic ambitions do not
hinge on access to bananas or spices, I will show that China’s interest is instead
related to recognition in international fora and votes in support of these interests
in international fora. It will also be shown that given their lack of natural
resources, Dominica and Grenada are trading aspects of their sovereignty (which
can be described as another resource), for Chinese aid and investments.

Another important question that will be explored in this chapter is, why do
Dominica and Grenada seek increasing relations with China when doing so does
not yield unambiguous benefits? For example, the trade deficit with China is
widening and it is exacerbating their existing negative international trade balance.
As China has been given increased market access there has been no corollary
access to Chinese markets as neither country produces any products demanded by
China. In addition to the widening trade deficit, the loans and aid provided by
China come with implicit conditionalities such as the use of Chinese contractors
and the importation of Chinese laborers. These negative points are largely ignored
by the governments and it will be shown that this is largely due to the existing
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political system that limits opposition and general public knowledge of
agreements signed with China.

DOMINICA

Dominica’s Loss of Preferences
Dominica is heavily reliant on foreign assistance. Between 1979 and 1984,
aid flows to Dominica represented 30 percent of government revenue each
year.179 This was largely a result of geopolitical considerations and was consistent
with general Cold War activity in the Caribbean. The Caribbean states were the
recipients of significant amounts of aid, which was aimed at preventing them
from embracing communism. This reliance on aid, however, began to erode as the
Cold War came to an end and the Caribbean states were no longer attractive to
external aid donors (especially the US) as was highlighted in Chapter 2.

Table 6 (provided in chapter 2) indicates that in 1990, at the end of the
Cold War era, Dominica received official development assistance (ODA) totaling
11.3 percent of GDP. By 2005, ODA receipts were only equal to 5.3 percent of
GDP. The decline in aid had a negative effect on the economy as the Dominican
government was accustomed to using aid provisions to supplement their official
179
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tax receipts. In addition to the loss of ODA, Dominica was the Caribbean state
most affected by the loss of preferences under the Lomé Agreements.

Lomé’s Banana Protocol
The Dominican economy was built around the production and export of
bananas, which were termed “green gold.”180 In fact, it was Britain that
encouraged Dominica to enter into banana production. Prior to 1973, Dominica’s
banana industry benefited from preferential access to the British market as a
colony of Britain. As noted in chapter 2, in 1973 when Britain acceded to the EC
a new agreement—the Lomé Convention—was negotiated.

The original Banana Protocol signed in 1975 allowed for the duty-free
importation of bananas from the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries
into the European Community (EC). The rules governing the importation of
bananas from other non-ACP countries, however, varied from state to state.
During negotiations for the Single European Market it, however, became
necessary to institute a uniform regime for the importation of bananas into the
EU. In addition, there were numerous indications that Latin American banana
exporting countries were unhappy with the European banana policy as it
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discriminated against their exports and were contemplating challenging the
Agreement when the WTO began operating in 1995.

In 1993, in anticipation of challenges from Latin American banana
producers, the EU announced its ‘New Banana Regime.’ This regime mandated
that bananas from Latin America (also referred to as ‘dollar bananas’) would be
assessed a common external tariff of 20 percent;181 ACP bananas remained duty
free. This rate was seen as a compromise as the rate for all other imports from
Latin America was 170 percent. Several Central American countries did not see
this compromise as going far enough, but decided to support it nevertheless. In
1994 at the Summit of the Americas, the US also assured Caribbean leaders that
they would not challenge the EU’s new banana regime in the WTO.182

The WTO Ruling
On June 7, 1996, however, despite indications to the contrary, the
governments of the US, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico requested
that the Dispute Settlement Board of the WTO set up a panel to assess whether or
not the EU’s banana regime was contrary to GATT rules mandating nondiscrimination in trade. One interesting point to be noted is that the complaining
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parties (the US and other Latin American countries) and the EU were invited to
tender written submissions to the Panel. The Caribbean was not designated as an
interested party because the WTO’s criteria for interest was that a country
accounted for 10 percent of the EU’s imports of bananas. None of the Caribbean
states produced that many bananas. The Caribbean states therefore had to initiate
other legal proceedings in order for them to be considered a legitimate third party
to the dispute. The WTO eventually reversed its initial ruling and allowed the
Caribbean to be defined as a third party.

After the decision to define the Caribbean as a third party and therefore
allowing the region to submit a submission, the WTO then ruled that the law firm
hired by the Caribbean to represent it before the WTO was contrary to WTO
rules. The WTO’s argument was that the legal counsel hired by the Caribbean
group were not full-time employees of any of the Caribbean states. Again, the
Caribbean legal team had to initiate legal proceedings challenging this view,
pointing to the fact that the Caribbean states did not have the requisite legal
counsel in their very small countries. The Caribbean was subsequently allowed to
use the services of a legal team of their choosing. I should note here that the
problems associated with funding missions to the WTO and the unavailability of
technocrats with the requisite knowledge and training in trade law and other areas
is another important concern facing small states especially in relation to their
participation in international bodies.
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The lobbying of American multinationals that wanted greater access to the
EU market precipitated the WTO action on the US side. The US does not produce
bananas for export to the EU, but United Brands (Chiquita), Standard Fruit (Dole)
and Del Monte are American multinationals operating in Latin America that
export bananas produced by Central American growers. The WTO is comprised
of states; the US was not disadvantaged by the EU banana regime, but Dole,
Chiquita and Del Monte (American firms) were disadvantaged. These
multinationals could not bring a case against the EU in the WTO, and as such,
their only redress was to lobby the US government to initiate a case.

Carl Lindner, the Chairman of American Financial Group (the company
that controls Chiquita Brands), lobbied actively against the banana regime of the
EU. Sutton points out that Lindner paid about US$430,000 to the Republican
Party, US$525,000 to the Democratic Party, and US$55,000 to Newt Gingrich’s
GOPAC. He also recruited US Senator Bob Dole to support their cause in the
Senate.183 In September 1994 Chiquita and Hawaii Banana Association filed an
application under Section 301 of the US Trade Act claiming that the EU’s banana
regime was contrary to WTO rules and placed them at an unfair disadvantage. It
is this action that eventually led to the official filing of a dispute in the WTO.
183
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The WTO ruled that the European banana regime did violate GATT rules
and the European states would be required to bring their regime in line with the
principles of the GATT. Charles Savarin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade
and Labor in Dominica, stated that the WTO ruling,
Raises serious questions as to whether small countries can continue to
compete and trade under the WTO system. It seems we have no place in
the multilateral trading system, which is confining and consigning small,
vulnerable developing countries to the dustbin, forcing them to be
dependent on alms and handouts, rather than embracing them and enabling
them to forge their own path to development.184
Table 10 below shows that the decline in Dominica’s banana production
began prior to the WTO’s ruling as the country struggled to competitively
produce bananas especially given its small land area and relatively high wages in
the sector.185 Between 1992 and 1997 banana production fell from 59,000 tons to
35,000 tons, a decrease of more than 20 percent. By 2001, only one out of every
five growers in 1992 was still cultivating bananas. Banana revenues—critical to
the Dominican economy—plummeted.
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Bananas are produced at a much higher cost in the Caribbean than in Central America.
There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, the small land area means that banana
producers in the Caribbean are not able to benefit from economies of scale. Secondly, the
banana industry in the Caribbean is not mechanized, and thirdly, labor costs are higher in
the Caribbean as banana workers tend to be unionized. The only reason why Caribbean
producers remained in the industry was the preferential access available to the European
market.
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Table 10. Dominica’s Banana Production Before and After the WTO Ruling of
1999
Year
1992/3
1997
1999
2001
Production (tons)

59,000

35,000

28,000

18,000

Active Growers (#)

5,800

4,800

2900

1300

45 million

35 million

17million

Real

Exports

(Eastern 96 million

Caribbean $)
Source: Payne 2007.

Subsequent to the WTO ruling, “the EU and the USA struck a deal over
the heads of Caribbean leaders whereby a measure of protection would run on
until 1 January 2006, after which time there would be no quotas, only a flat-rate
tariff.”186 The Caribbean states were again left out of the meetings that ironed out
this compromise.

Payne argues that despite the fact that it was technically the EU that lost
the case, the Caribbean states were the real losers—not the European countries.187
It was indeed the Caribbean states that were most adversely affected because it
was their exports that were threatened by the ruling, and Dominica would
represent the Caribbean state that was most affected. The WTO ruling can be
186
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described as an external shock to the Dominican economy and as will be shown
below, this loss of preferences would be a major impetus for Dominica’s
increased engagement with China.

Adjustment in Dominica
“Dominica faces big problems.”188 According to Anthony Payne, a look at
the dramatic downturn in the Dominican economy is indicative of “the way in
which small and vulnerable countries like Dominica experience the contemporary
reality of neoliberal globalization.”189 Dominica’s experience with the loss of
preferences due to the US challenge in the WTO precipitated a decline in the
banana industry that was the lifeline of the Dominican economy. Payne argues
that for Dominica and other small states:
The challenge is not about riding for a little longer the ebb and flow of a
global political economy on which it has long been understood that the
country experiences a high degree of dependence. It is in effect to find a
new niche, or, more realistically and safely, a series of new niches, within
the global economic order.190
But where does this niche lie? Many Caribbean states rely on the tourism
sector, but in the Dominican case, the potential of the tourism sector is
constrained as the country lacks major hotels and the white sandy beaches that are
188
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the usual hallmarks of Caribbean tourist destination. In addition, Dominica lacks
an international airport. There are two small airports on the island, but neither is
equipped to deal with night flights and neither can accommodate jet landings.191

The Sale of Economic Citizenship
Chapter 2 discussed the idea of a creative use of sovereignty, whereby
sovereign rights are used for economic gain. Dominica provides a compelling
example of this use of sovereignty. One of the rights relating to sovereignty is the
conferring of citizenship to both individuals and corporations. Dominica in the
past used this provision to its economic advantage.

Beginning in the early 1990s, the Dominica government tabled legislation
that would offer “economic citizenship” to nationals of Taiwan and Hong Kong in
exchange for cash.192 Economic citizenship is simply where the government
grants citizenship to individuals who have invested in the country. Many citizens
saw this as the government essentially selling passports, but the government
argued that there was precedence for this action and the move would allow the
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government to garner necessary investment flows. Honychurch in the sole
published history of Dominica explains how economic citizenship works,
Dominican passports would be granted to those persons and their families
who deposited US$35,000 in an escrow account that would be considered
to be an ‘investment’ in Dominica, thus classing the ‘economic citizen’ as
an ‘investor.’ The vast majority of these economic citizens had no interest
in Dominica but desired a passport which enabled them to travel more
easily than a Dominican one.193
This attempt to gain investment was somewhat successful. By June 1993
approximately 466 Taiwanese and their dependents had successfully acquired
Dominican citizenship,194 and by 2000 there were 570 economic citizens.195 It
should, however, be noted that Dominica is not the only country involved in the
sale of economic citizenship. In the Caribbean, Belize and St. Kitts/Nevis have
also employed this strategy as well as other African countries, such as Ghana,
Nigeria and South Africa.

The popularity of this sale of citizenship relates to the need to have second
passports or to take advantage of lower tax rates. Dominica is a member of the
British Commonwealth and as such, Dominican citizens and holders of
Dominican passports can travel to any Commonwealth country without a visa. In
193
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addition, these Dominican passports can be used to travel to the US where visas
are routinely required. A second passport also provides a safety-net against
potential social or political unrest in the original country of citizenship. As will be
shown below, the sale of economic citizenship was seen as an important corollary
to the development of Dominica as an offshore financial center. Offshore
financial centers are known for their reduced tax rates and this feature would also
serve as another factor rendering economic citizenship useful.

Offshore Financial Centre
The development of Dominica in 1996 as an offshore financial center was
a direct corollary of the sale of economic citizenship. The services provided in the
Dominican offshore sector included international business companies, offshore
banks, international insurance, international trusts, economic citizenship, ship
registration, and internet gaming companies.196 By 2000 the sector comprised
6596 international business corporations (IBCs), 7 offshore banks and 20 internet
gaming companies.197 The sector seemed well on its way to providing Dominica
with a new economic development strategy after the decline of the banana
industry. The potential of the offshore sector was thwarted when Dominica was
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blacklisted by the OECD for having an inadequate regulatory framework in their
financial sector

The Financial Action Task Force in its initial report in June 2000 named
Dominica as one of the 15 offshore financial centers declared noncooperative.
This declaration did not carry with it any explicit sanctions, but the financial
sectors that were designated “non-cooperative” were under immense international
pressure and they risked banks and other financial entities in other countries not
doing business with them. The major reason for this distinction was the secrecy
provisions in the laws governing offshore financial institutions. After reviews, the
Bahamas and the Cayman Islands were removed from the Financial Action Task
Force noncooperative list, but Dominica remained on the list because of continued
problems relating to record keeping, information sharing and customer
identification.198

The offshore banking sector prior to the OECD action seemed to be
exactly what Dominica needed. The economic decline halted briefly and the
country had ostensibly found the solution to their economic woes. The major
feature of the offshore banking industry, as with most other offshore financial
centers, was secrecy. After the blacklisting of Dominica by the OECD in 2000 the
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Dominican government agreed to change its confidentiality laws to appease the
OECD, but that action served to eliminate the initial attraction of Dominica and
the value of offshore investments contribution to GDP declined by 5.3 percent
between 2001 and 2002.199

After losing its preferential access to the European market and the decline
of the much-heralded offshore finance initiative, the Dominican government was
unsure about what their next step should be. This situation was, however,
exacerbated by the 9/11 attacks. The government would eventually decide that the
only avenue available to them was to access IMF funds.

IMF Intervention in Dominica
The decision to go to the IMF was primarily as a result of a severe decline
of the economy after the 1999 WTO banana ruling. In 2000 the government faced
a fiscal deficit of almost 11 percent of GDP. In August 2002 the IMF approved a
one-year Stand-by credit for Dominica of SDR 3.28 million (US$ 4.3 million).
The IMF confirmed that the two external factors that led to this economic decline
were the loss of banana preferences and the global economic slowdown after the
9/11 attacks that led to a decline in export earnings.200
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In return for the IMF facility and a World Bank Partial Risk Guarantee
(PRG) provision, the Dominican government had to agree to enact several
structural reforms. These reforms included fiscal tightening and an extensive
privatization program. This privatization program involved the divestment of the
Dominica Marketing Corporation, two state-owned banks, and the government
shares in Cable and Wireless (the monopoly telecommunications company).
Additionally, the government pledged to remove all existing price controls.

Payne correctly notes that after two years of IMF intervention, “the
economy was doing no more than muddling along: it was not developing in any
particular direction, and could not realistically be expected to do so just because
the IMF had put the public finances in order.”201 Dominica therefore desperately
needed another solution.202 China would become the new answer to Dominica’s
economic woes.
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China as the Source of Adjustment
Almost immediately after gaining independence, the Dominican
government chose to recognize Taiwan instead of China. The decision was based
solely on Taiwan’s promise of aid.203 Between 1980 and 2004, Taiwan issued
numerous loans and funded several infrastructural projects including the building
of a hospital and road construction.

The decision to switch recognition from Taiwan to China was announced
in a nationally televised address to the nation by Prime Minister Skerrit on March
29, 2004. In his comprehensive address he outlined the reasons for the diplomatic
maneuvering. This speech is one of the best-articulated presentations of the
importance of foreign policy for the development of small Caribbean states.

Skerrit very early in his address argues that there must be some
congruence between domestic economic policy and foreign policy. Foreign
policies must therefore, according to him, be geared towards the attainment of
domestic economic goals. Skerrit notes that in the past this congruence was
ignored, but he would work to realign Dominica’s foreign policy, which had
become, “ineffective and often pursued in a manner that was irrelevant to the
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needs of our country.”204 Skerrit in his public address notes that this would entail
an analysis and re-evaluation of all existing relationships in view of the nature of
the current global environment.

This overhaul would begin with China, and Skerrit points out that this
decision would bring “a new realism to our foreign policy . . . which puts our
national interest, especially the developmental aspects of those interests, at its
centre.”205 In view of this, Dominica’s engagement with China was seen an
important component of attaining Dominica’s national interest.

Skerrit’s justification of his decision to recognize China was linked to
Dominica’s need to adjust to international realities. He specifically highlights the
fact that the banana industry was in decline due to the actions of the United States
and the WTO ruling. Another factor necessitating development assistance was the
OECD action against Dominica. The country was placed on the OECD blacklist
because the country was seen as a potential haven for money launderers. The
nascent offshore banking sector established to help the country recover from the
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banana ruling and to find new industries that it was competitive in, was adversely
affected by the OECD action.

In view of Dominica’s precarious economic position, Skerrit argues that it
was absolutely necessary that Dominica realign itself. Traditionally, the major
foreign influences were Britain and the United States, but the banana ruling
served to displace Britain’s influence and importance, and the US action in
initiating the WTO case indicated that the US was not a country that Dominica
could rely on to support its economic development. It is in this vein that Skerrit
states that,
Our friendship with the People’s Republic of China is valuable.
They understand the reality of what Dominica is going through. They have
a history of concern for and sensitivity towards the plight of small,
developing states. They caught our vision, having lived our dream.206
The “Memorandum of Understanding between the Commonwealth of
Dominica and the Government of the People’s Republic of China” had four
pillars. The first dimension of the agreement related to the rehabilitation of the
Windsor Park Sporting, Cultural and Recreational Stadium. This stadium was in
need of numerous upgrades to make it ready for the 2007 Cricket World Cup. The
Chinese government agreed to start the project within 90 days of the signing of
the Memorandum and the Chinese government would also provide the technical
206

Skerrit, Roosevelt, Address to the Nation by the Hon. Roosevelt Skerrit, Prime
Minister and Minister of Finance, on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between
the Commonwealth of Dominica and the People’s Republic of China, March 29, 2004.

157

team that would lead the rebuilding process. The stadium would cost US$17
million which represents about 3.6% of Dominica’s GDP in 2007.

The second pillar of the Memorandum of Understanding was an economic
cooperation agreement. Under this agreement the major road from Roseau (the
capital city) to Portsmouth would be upgraded and resurfaced. This would be a
positive development as the road is important for international trade and
commerce. Prime Minister Skerrit pointed out that, this project was envisioned
from the 1970s, but there were never any government funds available to
undertake the project. The Chinese government would facilitate this necessary
and quite overdue infrastructural upgrade.

The third pillar related to the upgrading of the island’s major hospital. The
Chinese government agreed to conduct a comprehensive upgrading of the
Princess Margaret Hospital with new state of the art medical equipment. This
upgrading would allow more persons to have access to the facility and would
improve health care provision on the island.

The fourth pillar hinged on educational development. The Chinese
government pledged to construct a new secondary school in Roseau. The school
would be modern and equipped with cutting edge technology. In addition to the
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construction of the school, China would furnish thirty full scholarships for
Dominican students to study in Chinese universities.

In addition to the four pillars as described by Skerrit, the Dominican
government would be given various grants. There would be an initial grant of
US$6 million in cash, which represents 1.3% of GDP. Of this sum, US$4 million
was deposited in a government account prior to the announcement to establish
diplomatic relations with China and it was agreed that the Dominican government
would receive US$1 million per year between 2005 and 2009. The Prime Minister
stated that these projects and other initiatives pledged by China, “would not cost
the taxpayers of Dominica one cent … not now nor in the future.”

China is therefore an important component of Dominica’s adjustment
strategy. It should, however, be noted that China is not the only country that
Dominica has targeted. Payne points out that Dominica has obtained aid from
several countries. These include, inter alia, Japan (fisheries and harbor
reconstruction), the EU (airport reconstruction) USA (private sector support),
Libya (school building), Venezuela (concessionary oil), and Cuba (health sector
assistance).207 This more active foreign policy on Dominica’s part serves to
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further explain the importance of China as a component of their adjustment
policy.

Private Sector and Citizens Views
Members of the opposition Dominican Freedom Party vehemently
opposed the switch from Taiwan to China, but the nature of the political system
meant that their cries would not be taken into account. As seen in Figure 5 below,
the Prime Minister made a secret visit to China on March 16, 2004. Two
confidential government officials that were interviewed pointed out that the visit
was indeed secret as neither the opposition nor the general public was aware of
the discussions with China. The decision to switch recognition was only known to
those very close to the Prime Minister.

Table 11. Key Dates in Dominica’s Relationship with China
DATE
EVENTS
o November 3, 1978

Dominica gains independence

o 1978

Dominica recognizes Taiwan

o 1983

Dominican troops participate in the invasion of Grenada

o 1988

Dominican government states its intention to develop an
offshore financial center
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DATE

EVENTS

o 2002

One year Stand-by Agreement signed with the IMF

o March 16, 2004

Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit makes secret visit to
China

o March 21, 2004
MOU signed between Dominica and China
o March 29, 2004
Dominica switches recognition from Taiwan to China
o March 29, 2004
Dominican public made aware of the switch in a
televised address by Skerrit

After being informed of the diplomatic switch, there was no consensus in
the private sector as to the efficacy of this move. There were many members of
the private sector who were friends of Taiwanese diplomats or who had
previously worked on Taiwan-financed projects. Many of these individuals were
not happy about the decision, but there were no channels available to object to the
move or to block the move.208 It should, however, be noted that there were some
in the private sector that argued that this switch could be something good for
Dominica, and especially given China’s vast markets. Most of those in favor of
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the decision argued that China would provide the necessary aid that Dominica
needed in their time of adjustment. As such, it was argued that it was in
Dominica’s interest to align with China as soon as possible. This view was,
however, a minority one as my confidential interviews and press accounts of the
period demonstrate.

The general public echoed the ambivalence on the part of private sector
members to the decision to switch recognition. There were both supporters and
detractors, and in many instances this fell along political party lines. Those
supporting the opposition party did not support the decision, while those
supporting the ruling party were in support of the switch.209

One frustrated Dominican in a letter to the editor signed ‘A disappointed
and perturbed citizen of Dominica’ states,
The obvious question that arises is why the secrecy. The Labor
Party promised openness in government. It now appears that the Prime
Minister and the Permanent Representative to the United Nations are the
only ones involve[d] in the comprehensive review of Dominica’s foreign
policy that the Prime Minister boasts of doing. The Cabinet appears to be
virtually unaware or involved.210
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The decision to switch recognition from one state to another is an
important one and this case shows that the decision was a closely guarded secret.
There were no debates in the Parliament relating to the efficacy of such a move
and there was no dialogue with the public prior to the decision being announced.
This supports the general premise that the nature of the Westminster political
system seen in the Caribbean states, grants enormous powers to the Prime
Minister and his cabinet and limits the voice of other interest groups in the
society.

Because of limits to debating this issue, decisions are sometimes made
without all the facts being on the table. For example, the text of the agreements
were not made public and opposition members, private sector officials, and the
general public are still not aware of the terms of agreements signed with China.211
It is because of this ignorance and lack of any serious debate that we see the
implementation of agreements that do not necessarily benefit the general
population.
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The Net Benefits of Dominica’s Relationship With China: The Trade and Labor
Data
One obvious negative aspect of the intensified relations between Dominica
and China relates to the balance of trade. Since 2001, Dominica has had a trade
deficit with China and this deficit is widening. This point should be viewed with
the understanding that the general international trade deficit is widening in
Dominica. Table 12 below provides the value of Dominican imports from China
between 2001 and 2006. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with
China in 2005, Dominica saw an almost 100 percent increase in the value of
imports in just one year. There is no column for exports to China precisely
because Dominica does not export any goods to China. As noted earlier,
Dominica’s main commodity exports are agricultural products (in particular
bananas) and China does not import bananas that are Dominica’s leading export
product. It is unlikely that this situation will change in the near future, as
Dominica does not produce anything that China is willing to import.

Table 12. Dominica’s Import of Chinese Goods (in Eastern Caribbean $)
Year
Value of Total Imports from Chinese
Imports

as

China

Percentage of Total Imports

2001

2,762,757

8.0%

2002

2,223,102

7.0%

2003

3,382,067

10.0%
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a

Year

Value of Total Imports from Chinese

Imports

as

China

Percentage of Total Imports

2004

5,006,292

13.0%

2005

9,654,155

19.0%

2006

17,561,259

29.0%

a

Source: CARICOM Secretariat Database

The Importation of Chinese Laborers in Dominica
In Dominica, the stadium provided by China was to facilitate their hosting
of the Cricket World Cup and this project was very important to the Dominican
government and the Dominican people. This admiration for the Chinese was,
however, strained when the Dominican populace witnessed the arrival of
numerous Chinese workers for the sole purpose of constructing the stadium.212
The Dominican workers were therefore not the beneficiaries of much needed
construction work,213 especially given the high unemployment rate in Dominica.
This inflow of Chinese labor served to reduce the potential benefits to the
Dominican economy accruing from the construction of the stadium.
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The Dominican example highlights the fact that the lack of natural
resources means that the only thing attracting China to the tiny island is their
sovereignty. Their small natural resource base also means that with increased
trade between Dominica and China, there is no real advantage to expanding trade,
as the only thing that will result is a widening of the trade deficit. In addition, the
trend of Chinese firms importing Chinese laborers is a major concern as it thwarts
the potential economic benefits accruing from the investments. These glaring
disadvantages associated with closer engagement with China are, however,
largely ignored and underemphasized as the political system suppresses
opposition to decisions made by the Prime Minister given the lack of debate
relating to the decisions made by the government. In addition, the secrecy
involved in the decision-making process precludes any worthwhile discussion of
the terms of agreements and the potential advantages and disadvantages
associated with these agreements.

GRENADA

Grenada’s Resource Base
The Grenada story is very similar to the one just discussed in relation to
Dominica. Grenada’s economy is currently structured around tourism and the
offshore financial sector. Grenada, as a member of the ACP, was also provided
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with duty-free access to the European market for exports under the Lomé
Agreements. Grenada’s primary exports are spices—giving it the name of the
Spice Island. Grenada produces 20 percent of the world’s nutmeg and also exports
spices including, inter alia, allspice, cinnamon, ginger, and cloves. The
government was, however, interested in diversifying the economy and decided
that given the lack of other natural resources, they would embark on an initiative
to develop Grenada as a potential offshore financial center.

Offshore Financial Sector
The government of Grenada set up the country as an offshore financial
center in 1997 via the passing of several Acts between 1996 and 1997. Offshore
services offered in Grenada include international business companies, offshore
banks, international insurance, international trusts, economic citizenship,
international betting, and companies management.214

By 2004, registered companies totaled 3400 IBCs, 44 offshore banks and
11 trust companies.215 In late 2001 Grenada, like Dominica, was added to the noncooperative list of the Financial Action Task Force. This action was partially due
214

Bardouille, "The Offshore Services Industry in the Caribbean: A Conceptual and SubRegional Analysis."
215

Suss, Wiliams, and Mendis, "Caribbean Offshore Financial Centres: Past, Present and
Possibilities for the Future."

167

to problems in the financial sector in 2000 when the First International Bank of
Grenada (an offshore bank) collapsed. In recent years supervision has expanded
and the Grenada Financial Services Authority withdrew the licenses of 17
banks,216 but the economic fallout from this blacklisting would adversely affect
the economy and would be the first factor leading to Grenada’s eventual decision
to switch recognition from Taiwan to China.

Grenada’s Decision to Switch Recognition to China in 2005
The economic meltdown in Grenada began with the OECD blacklisting in
2001. The economic downturn got even worse after Grenada was directly hit by
Hurricane Ivan (a category 4 hurricane) in September 2004. The hurricane
resulted in the deaths of 39 persons and 90 percent of Grenadian residential
homes were seriously damaged. There was also widespread damage to schools,
government buildings and hospitals. In the immediate aftermath of the hurricane,
the Grenada government approached Taiwan for assistance. 217

One major concern was the destruction of the cricket stadium that was
originally built from proceeds from a Taiwanese concessionary loan of US$6
million in 1997. The damage to the stadium was a major concern because it came
only a year and a half before the start of the Cricket World Cup and some cricket
216
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matches were scheduled in that stadium. If the stadium were not rebuilt, Grenada
would have to surrender its co-hosting duties and would lose its share of the
expected influx of tourists to the region. Figure 6 below provides some of the key
dates relating to Grenada’s relations with China and Taiwan.

Table 13. Important Dates in Grenada’s Relationship with China
DATES
EVENTS
o February 7, 1974

Grenada gains independence

o 1974

Grenada recognizes Taiwan

o October 1, 1985

Grenada recognizes China

o July 19, 1989

Diplomatic relations with Taiwan established

o August 7, 1989

China severs diplomatic relations

o 2001

Grenada added to the OECD’s noncooperative list

o September 7, 2004

Hurricane Ivan makes a direct hit

o December 12-16, 2004 Prime Minister Keith Mitchell and Foreign Minister
Melvin Nimrod visit China
o January 20, 2005

Diplomatic relations established with China

o December 2006

Taiwan sues the Grenadian government for US$59
million
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The decision to recognize Taiwan was made in 1989. The political party in
power at that time was the National Democratic Congress. The political party and
the wider Grenadian populace benefited immensely from the relationship and
close ties were forged between the two governments. In fact, the Taiwanese
modus operandi in relation to developing countries that recognize it is similar to
that discussed in chapter 2 with respect to China. The Taiwanese government
wined and dined the government officials of these states and routinely invited
them to Taiwan on official visits. At the same time, high-ranking Taiwanese
officials routinely visited countries that recognized Taiwan.

Given the strong ties between members of the National Democratic
Congress and the Taiwanese government, it was imperative that China establish a
relationship with the opposition New National Party. China therefore embarked
on a “charm offensive” aimed at the leadership of the opposition party.

The issue of political funding is very important in the Caribbean. This
concern really emanates from the actions of Taiwan and China in financing
election campaigns across the region. Both countries establish ties with rival
political parties and finance their respective campaigns. The party that wins the
election will inevitably choose to recognize the government that helped finance its
election victory.
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For example, this played out in Barbados in 2007. In the recent election
campaign in Barbados, the Prime Minister Owen Arthur accused Taiwan of trying
to influence the elections by funding the election campaign of the Democratic
Labor Party, which is the main opposition.218 It should be noted, however, that
Barbados has been consistent in its recognition of mainland China since May
1977.

Third Country Contact
Both Taiwan and China use third party supporting countries to court
opposition parties to their side. In the Barbados case, the Prime Minister accused
the opposition party of making contact with Taiwanese diplomats through the
island of St. Kitts where Taiwan is recognized. This was similar in the case of St.
Lucia. St. Lucia is another country in the Caribbean that lacks strategic natural
resources and is very similar to Dominica and Grenada.

St. Lucia gained independence in February 1979 and under the leadership
of the United Workers Party and Prime Minister John Compton made the decision
to recognize to Taiwan. The United Workers Party lost power to the St. Lucia
Labor Party in 1997 and switched recognition to China later that year. The next
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10 years ushered in some stability, but things began to unravel with the 2006
elections.

During the 2006 election campaign the opposition United Workers Party
was accused of secretly meeting with the Taiwanese government. The United
Workers Party while in government had recognized Taiwan and maintained very
close relations with Taiwanese officials. Very soon after winning the election and
moving from opposition to ruling party, John Compton (the Prime Minister)
declared, “A foreign policy must look at the interest of the country. A country has
no friends—particularly small countries, you have to look at where your interest
lies.”219

Only four months after winning the election, the United Workers Party
government invited the Taiwanese foreign minister to St. Lucia—a move that
angered the Chinese. The government did not sever the country’s relationship
with China. Instead on April 30, 2007 it announced its decision to resume
relations with Taiwan while indicating that it wanted to remain friends with
China. China was therefore left with the task of actually severing diplomatic
relations citing its non-acceptance of “double recognition.”220
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This frequent switching of recognition has become such a concern that
Kenny Anthony, the former Prime Minister of St. Lucia, added the issue of
campaign financing to the agenda of the CARICOM Heads of Government
Summit in 2006.221 To date there has been no CARICOM-wide action relating to
reforms of campaign financing, but individual governments are considering
implementing legislative changes.

Taiwan Fights Back
On December 1, 2006 Taiwan retaliated against the Grenadian decision to
switch recognition to China. The Taiwanese Export-Import Bank filed a lawsuit
against the Grenadian government (The Export Import Bank of the Republic of
China (ROC) on Taiwan v. Grenada) seeking the repayment of US$ 21.6 million
plus interest given to the Mitchell government. The lawsuit was filed in the
United States District Court, Southern New York District and was aimed at the
repayment of four loans provided to the Grenadian government while they still
recognized Taiwan.222 These loans were issued for the construction of the
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Queen’s Park stadium, development of the agricultural industry, road construction
and a ministerial complex at the Botanical Gardens.

The loans were issued to Grenada between 1990 and 2000. The loan
agreements specified the rate of interest to be charged (between 2 and 4.5 percent)
and the payment schedules. The government of Grenada failed to make payments
on numerous occasions,223 but the government was only sued after the decision on
January 20, 2005, to switch recognition to China, and after the Grenadian
government failed to repay the loans in full immediately. On June 15, 2005, four
months after Grenada’s diplomatic switch, the Taiwanese EX-IM bank issued a
written notification of default in relation to all four loans. The initial defaults
occurred in early 2004.

In January 2007, the high court judge that heard the case ruled that the
Grenada government did in fact owe the Taiwanese government almost US$21
million. A well-respected law firm represented the Taiwanese government,
whereas the Grenadian government defense was led by the Foreign Minister’s
wife, Donzell Tucker (a lawyer with limited international legal experience). The
Grenadian defense was quite simple. Their failure to repay the debt was due to the
economic downturn caused by Hurricanes Ivan (2004) and Emily (2005).
forum. This clause explicitly stated that the loan agreements were subject to the laws of
the State of New York. See Grenada Today for more details of the lawsuit.
223
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Needless to say, this explanation was not well received by the judge, as there was
no clause in the agreements allowing for the suspension of payments in the event
of a hurricane. Grenada was subsequently ordered to repay the loans in full. They
are in the process of arranging repayment.

The Net Benefits of Grenada’s Relationship With China: The Trade and Labor
Data

As discussed in the Dominica case, the disadvantages associated with the
intensification of relations between Grenada and China relate to both the
widening of the trade deficit and the tendency of Chinese contractors to import
Chinese laborers. Table 14 below shows that between 2001 and 2006, the value of
Chinese imports is consistently increasing in Grenada. As was the case with
Dominica, no column for exports to China is included precisely because Grenada
does not export any products to China. In 2002, according to both CARICOM and
Grenada statistics, Grenada did export a mere US$ 344 worth of fruits and
vegetables to China. The records show that there have been no other exports to
China between 2001 and 2006.
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Table 14. Grenada’s Import of Chinese Goods
YEAR
Value of Imports Chinese Imports as
from China (EC$)

a

Percentage

of

Total Imports
2001

4,185,218

7.0%

2002

6,233,022

11.6%

2003

8,790,958

12.8%

2004

11,258,274

16.5%

2005

29,271,407

22.5%

2006

42,362,714

31.5%

Source: CARICOM Secretariat Database

In terms of the actual decomposition of these imports of Chinese products,
in 2006, the majority of products imported from China by Grenada were textiles
and apparel and light manufacturing items. This was almost identical to that seen
in the Dominican case. There was relatively little food imports, but there were
large imports of plastic, rubber, iron and steel, and furniture products.

The Importation of Chinese Laborers
The labor concerns seen in the Dominican case are also evident in
Grenada. The Chinese-financed stadium was built with the help of 500 imported
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Chinese workers. The Chinese contractors argued that is was important to import
foreign laborers because the project had to be completed in a short period of time
and the Grenadian labor market could not provide the requisite laborers.

When the plans to build this stadium were announced there was no initial
discussion of the need to import workers. This issue was again not discussed in
Parliament and the public was not made aware of this aspect of the agreement.
The importation of the 500 Chinese laborers only became public after they
entered the country and began working on the stadium and Grenadians started to
voice their displeasure with this development.224

It should be noted that unions tend to be strong in the Caribbean, but
construction workers tend not to be unionized. They simply work on projects as
they become available. There is therefore no coordinated union voice lobbying on
behalf of these construction workers as one would see in the sugar industry, for
example. As such, there is no coordinated union lobbying against the influx of
Chinese of Chinese laborers.

224
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What Have We Learnt from these Two Cases?
The Grenada and Dominica cases elucidate the theoretical arguments
made in chapters 1 and 2. The relationship with China and the creative use of their
sovereign rights is an important component of their adjustment strategies. In
recent years the economic and political environments facing both countries have
changed significantly as both countries suffered significant economic decline as a
result. Both states have struggled to find the correct adjustment strategy, but what
is clear is that both states, in addition to domestic economic restructuring, have
used their foreign policy as an avenue for stemming their economic decline.
China has been viewed by both states as the key foreign entity that can provide
necessary economic assistance.

Dominica’s experience with the EU demonstrates that small states are
especially sensitive to changes in policies in states that they are dependent upon.
The loss of EU preferences served to decimate the Dominican economy and the
Dominican people have been struggling to place their economy on a more solid
footing since that time.

The experience of Grenada points to the fact that this diplomatic game is a
very delicate one. The case filed against the Grenada government by the
Taiwanese reflects the major pitfall of changing allegiance for economic gains
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and also the reliance on external entities. This case shows that there is indeed a
cost related to playing the game of diplomatic recognition.

Returning to the original motivations matrix in Table 9 (originally
provided in chapter 3 and modified here) we see that in both Dominica and
Grenada, their motivation is aid and investments. Because neither country has any
natural resources that China is particularly interested in, they are only able to pay
for this aid and investment with votes and recognition. Table 15 below depicts
this scenario.

Table 15. Modified Motivations Matrix for Dominica and Grenada
MOTIVATIONS

OF

DOMINICA AND GRENADA

PRICE PAID BY DOMINICA
AND GRENADA

VIS-À-VIS CHINA
√ Aid and Foreign investment

√ Votes in international for a

√ Infrastructure Development

√ Trade opening

o

Prestige

√

o

Tourism Revenue

Policy’
o

Recognition of ‘One China

Sale of Natural Resources to
China
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The Dominican and Grenadian cases show that their somewhat limited
interaction with China is due to their lack of strategic natural resources. China’s
provisions of aid and investment is linked to their sovereign resources which
allow them to vote with China on international issues and to recognize China and
not Taiwan. In addition, these two cases show that this use of sovereignty is not a
new development in either country as they have both employed strategies related
to offshore financial centers, flags of convenience and the sale of economic
citizenship. The sale of votes and recognition to China are therefore the newest
phase of the creative use of sovereignty.

The Dominican and Grenadian cases also highlight the importance of
economic considerations on their foreign policy agendas. The major aim of their
foreign policies is the attainment of economic growth. In addition, both have
identified this economic growth as being to some extent dependent on the
benevolence of external powers. In the past, this was Europe and the US. As they
lost preferential access to the European market and they lost aid flows from the
US, both countries sought another power that that would compensate for these
losses. China therefore represents the newest great power providing aid and
investment to these two states.

The next chapter will discuss the Jamaican case in some detail. One major
difference between the Jamaican case and these two cases is the fact that Jamaica
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does have a natural resource that China is interested in accessing. In addition,
there is much more academic literature available on the foreign policy tradition in
Jamaica. Jamaica has had a relatively active foreign policy and this is to some
extent a result of the leaders and their access to more funds available for
diplomatic endeavors.

The succeeding chapter will build on the existing literature to show that
Jamaica with a wider resource base has been less dependent on the use of
sovereignty in attracting aid and investment. There are, however, important
similarities with Dominica and Grenada as the political system is the same and the
problems associated with a lack of transparency are also evident in the Jamaican
case.
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CHAPTER 5
Jamaica: Trading Natural and ‘Sovereign’ Resources for Development and
Prestige

China is currently Jamaica’s fifth largest trading partner,225 and Jamaica is
China’s largest trading partner in the English-speaking Caribbean.226 Only ten
years ago there were no official statistics on trade between Jamaica and China, but
since that time the relationship has intensified and statistics are now available.

The relationship between China and Jamaica is, however, not new. In fact,
Jamaica’s first contact with China came in the 1800s when slavery was abolished
in the British Empire. As additional African slaves became unavailable due to the
outlawing of the slave trade, the British planters in the Caribbean needed
additional workers. This labor shortage was corrected by the importation of
indentured laborers from China and India.227 In Jamaica, the majority of
indentured laborers were Chinese and these laborers largely chose to remain in the
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country even after their term of service was completed. These Chinese indentured
laborers eventually became an important group in Jamaican society.

Jamaica was decolonized in 1962 and, as discussed in chapter 2, the
Bustamante government of the 1960s, consistent with other Caribbean states,
declared Jamaica’s allegiance with the West upon gaining independence. The US
recognized the government of Taiwan as the legitimate government for China and
as such, the Caribbean governments in Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad
and Tobago all recognized the Chiang Kai-shek government in Taiwan as the
legitimate Chinese government. This decision was aimed at showing solidarity
with the US’ position on the Taiwan-China issue. The Caribbean’s solidarity with
the US’ positions began to wane in the 1970s beginning in Guyana and Jamaica.
Both Guyana and Jamaica elected socialist governments and based on ideological
grounds, chose to rescind their recognition of Taiwan and to enter into diplomatic
relations with mainland China.

Jamaica’s modern relationship with China dates back to 1972 with the
election of socialist Michael Manley as Prime Minister. The relationship between
China and Jamaica has evolved significantly since 1972. But, unlike the cases of
Dominica and Grenada, Jamaica’s position vis-à-vis Chinese recognition has been
consistent. The relationship in the Jamaican case is less about creatively using
sovereignty and more about economic adjustment and the trade of a traditional
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natural resource—bauxite. As such, the explanation for Jamaica’s intensified
relationship with China is slightly different from that espoused in the previous
chapter. Hence, using the matrix presented in chapter 3, the Jamaican case is one
wherein both natural and sovereign resources are being traded.

Chapter Outline
This chapter will trace the development of the relationship between
Jamaica and China, highlighting the consistency with China’s general Third
World relations and locating the current relationship between Jamaica and China
in Jamaica’s political and economic history. It makes the argument that in the
Jamaican case, China does represent a source of economic adjustment, but
another motivation behind the intensification of the relationship is the Jamaican
government’s goal of enhancing the country’s international prestige.

The chapter begins with a brief overview of Jamaica’s foreign policy since
1962. This overview will show that Jamaica’s foreign policy stance has evolved
over time, but that it has always been motivated by economic goals. The
discussion will then show that the foreign policy goals in any period correlate
with the specific economic development strategy being pursued by Jamaica at that
time.
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The discussion will then trace the development of the relationship with
China. Since 1972 Jamaica has consistently recognized China and it will be
shown that it is only in recent years that China has become an important trading
partner. Prior to the 1990s, China was not a real source of aid for Jamaica and the
decision to recognize China was solely based on the grounds of Third World
solidarity in the 1970s and political expediency in the 1980s. In the mind of
Jamaica’s governments since 1972, it made no sense to switch recognition to
Taiwan as the international community had for the most part established that
recognition should be given to China and not Taiwan.

The chapter will show that since the 1990s the relationship with China has
intensified and Jamaica is benefiting from Chinese investments in the bauxite
sector and the sale of bauxite to China. The argument to be made is that the
possession of a strategic natural resource that is of interest to China means that
Jamaica has nothing to gain from switching recognition between China and
Taiwan for economic gain. In fact, as will be shown, the creative use of
sovereignty has not been employed in Jamaica, as they have not seen a need to
employ this strategy.
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Overview of Jamaica’s Foreign Policy Since 1962

Jamaica gained independence in 1962 and the Bustamante government
sought to re-align Jamaica’s foreign policy with the “shift of center of economic
gravity and military power from Great Britain to the United States.”228 The
governing economic and political ideology in Jamaica between 1962 and 1972
was therefore consistent with that seen across the Caribbean of alignment with the
West. Jamaica joined the IMF and World Bank in 1962 and focused its foreign
policy activities on attracting foreign investments to Jamaica.

Persaud notes that this re-alignment was based in concrete trade and
investment statistics. Trade with Great Britain dropped from 55 percent in 1953 to
39 percent in 1962, whereas the percentage of imports from the United States
increased from 33 percent in 1953 to 42 percent in 1962. The percentage of
exports to Great Britain dropped from 62 percent to 30 percent and grew in the
dollar area from 31 percent to 58 percent, over the same time period of 19531962.229

228

Randolph B. Persaud, Counter-Hegemony and Foreign Policy: The Dialectics of
Marginalized and Global Forces in Jamaica (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2001), 4.
229

Ibid., 78.

186

During the 1960s the voice of the Third World began to be heard in
multilateral settings. By the late 1960s most of the African, Asian and Caribbean
countries had been decolonized and the balance between advanced and
developing countries began to move in favor of developing countries at the UN
and as part of calls for a new international economic order in the 1970s. But the
voices of these developing states were largely absent from the academic literature.
This silence began to erode with the development of dependency theory.230 This
change signaled the beginning of what I termed in chapter 2 the ‘Alignment with
the South’ thinking.

Smaller and weaker states were of the opinion that the best way to be
heard was through strength in numbers. As such, alliance formation was a key
component of this thrust for change and the elevation of development as a key
international concern. This would undoubtedly necessitate challenging the
existing international political and economic order.

Politicians and academics in Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad, were the main
advocates of the dependency framework in the Caribbean.231 Political leaders in
these three countries, as well as in Grenada, made attempts to concretize and
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apply to economic and foreign policy the principles articulated by the dependency
school. This involved, inter alia, these Third World countries adopting a more
vocal and assertive stance in the international arena, and Jamaica and Guyana
featured prominently here. Collective action also became an important feature of
this more vocal foreign policy, as was seen in the calls for a new international
economic order.

After gaining power in 1972, Michael Manley and his People’s National
Party administration situated the issue of collective action along with the aim of
altering the international system as the centerpiece of Jamaica’s foreign policy.
Manley saw this collective strategy as not merely a Jamaican strategy, but a
“Third World strategy.”232

Throughout the 1970s the Jamaican government operated under an
expressed ideology of “Democratic Socialism,” which was similar to that seen in
Western Europe. This Democratic Socialism had both domestic and international
dimensions and both dimensions were seen as inextricably linked. Persaud argues
that Manley’s view was that “Jamaican foreign policy must be aimed at changing
the world, for it is only thus that real changes can be accomplished at the domestic
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level.”233 In short, it can be said that the aim of democratic socialism or the vision
behind the ideology was the creation of a more economically and politically
equitable country and indeed, world;234 and an important facet of this vision was
opposing the existing international order.

By pinning the country’s foreign policy to the ideology of democratic
socialism the newly elected government purposefully distanced itself from the
close relations that had been established with the West and opened itself to new
alliances with countries of the Third World. It is therefore in this light that
Jamaica established relations with China in 1972, as will be discussed later in this
chapter.

The PNP government adopted a high profile approach to participation in
multilateral organizations, in many cases assuming a leadership role. For
example, the country’s representative to the UN was selected by the SecretaryGeneral in 1975 to serve as a member of a group of experts charged with the
restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the organization. Along similar
lines, the Jamaican representative to the UN Economic and Social Council
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(ECOSOC) was elected president of that council in 1978.235 In relation to talks
relation to the Law of the Sea Convention, Kenneth Rattray, a Jamaican, was
appointed rapporteur for the UN conference held on this issue and Jamaica was
eventually selected as the location of the International Seabed Authority.

In keeping with the government’s pursuit of Third World “solidarism,”236
emphasis was placed on working with other “Southern” countries. For example,
Ambassador Don Mills, a high-level foreign policy official and academic, relates
that Jamaica was one of a small number of developing countries invited to attend
the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, held in Paris between
1976 and 1977, and a year later Prime Minister Manley presided over a meeting
in Jamaica which was attended by a number of heads of state to discuss the
situation regarding the New International Economic Order (NIEO) – this was in
fact, “the very first North-South Summit”.237

The Manley foreign policy approach also included participation in the
Non-Aligned Movement, with Jamaica holding a seat on the Coordinating Bureau
of the Non-Aligned Movement. Jamaica played an important role in the G77’s
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negotiations in UNCTAD and served as the chair or chief negotiator for the G77
countries.238

The Manley government’s activism in international fora was met with
some ambivalence. Mills notes that:
In many quarters outside of the country it brought, for the most part, very
positive and favorable reactions. But at home the government was
severely criticized by the JLP for some of its activities and policies and for
its alleged neglect of domestic issues”.239
This criticism of the government was widespread and the PNP ultimately
lost the election in 1980, ushering in a new era in Jamaica’s foreign policy.

Anthony Payne argues that Edward Seaga was the first Prime Minister to
explicitly acknowledge the importance of the United States in the Caribbean. As
such, Seaga clearly saw the United States as the focal point of Jamaica’s foreign
policy.240 Seaga’s “special relationship” with Reagan was so key that he was
referred to as “Reagan’s man in the Caribbean” and “America’s man in the
Caribbean”.241 In fact, Seaga was the first head of state to be invited to the White
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House by President Regan.242 Seaga was Harvard educated and Washington
believed that he would embrace the neo-liberal approach to attaining economic
growth and development and would therefore be a champion of structural
adjustment programs prescribed by the key multilateral institutions.243

The 1980s may have tempered Jamaica’s calls for a new international
order, but the foreign policy perception was still one predicated on the idea that
Jamaica was a leading voice in the Third World and in the Caribbean in
particular. During the 1980s, after establishing a close relationship with Reagan,
Seaga sought to lobby for a Caribbean-type Marshall Plan. The Reagan
government agreed with the premise of Seaga’s call and enacted the Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI). It did not go as far as Seaga wanted, but it did signal the
fact that Jamaica was still a leading voice in the Caribbean and the Third World.
Jamaica’s continued regional leadership was also witnessed in Seaga’s integral
role in the Grenada invasion. He was one of the most vocal advocates of US
action and sought to convince other Caribbean states to support the US invasion.

The re-election of the PNP in 1989 saw a return of Michael Manley, but
his Third World solidarity had changed as the international economic system had
changed. Manley and later Patterson embraced the ideas of free trade and general
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economic liberalization, and they both continued along the general policy
direction of the Seaga-led government of the 1980s especially in relation to the
acknowledgement of the importance of the United States and an acceptance of the
prevailing neo-liberal economic regime.244

Despite Jamaica’s efforts to adhere to the discipline of the neoliberal free
trade regime, Jamaica has, however, continued to make the case that small
developing countries need to be accorded ‘special and differential treatment.’ As
noted in chapters 1 and 2 before, Jamaica—and the Caribbean in general—have
consistently argued that small states exhibit more vulnerability and this argument
underpins the foreign policy goals of these states. The period from 1989 to the
present is an important one for Jamaica as it has witnessed the elimination of
many of the preferential agreements that it had relied on.

Economic Development as the Foundation of Jamaica’s Foreign Policy

In chapter 1, it was noted that small states tend to have a foreign policy
geared towards attaining economic development. The brief outline of Jamaica’s
foreign policy history suggests that this bias is also evident in the Jamaican case.
The foreign policies used to attain this goal of economic development have varied
over time, but it has always been the underlying goal of the government.
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Table 16 below incorporates the development stance of the various
government administrations with the foreign policies pursued. This table therefore
serves as a summary of Jamaica’s foreign policy history as it pertains to economic
development.

Table 16. Jamaica’s Development-Foreign Policy Nexus
PERIOD
DEVELOPMENT POLICY
FOREIGN POLICY GOALS
(VIS-À-VIS

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT)
1962-1972
1972-1980

FDI facilitation

•

Alignment with the West

•

FDI attraction

Self-reliance and Distributive •

Attempts to challenge the

Justice

existing

international

economic order
•

Enhancement of relations
with non-Western states (for
example, Cuba and China)

1980-1989
1989-present

State-directed Development
Neoliberal Reforms

•

Realignment with the West

•

Negotiation of the CBI

•

Lobbying to prevent the loss
of preferences

•

Engaging with new States
o China
o Venezuela
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PERIOD

DEVELOPMENT POLICY

FOREIGN POLICY GOALS
(VIS-À-VIS

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT)
o Brazil
Adapted from Diana Thorburn and Dana Morris, “Jamaica’s Foreign Policy:
Making the Economic Development Link,” CaPRI Working Paper (2007).
As noted in chapter 2, across the Caribbean the economic development
framework in the 1960s was one of FDI facilitation, which was aimed at
diversifying the economies away from the agricultural sector. In Barbados,
Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago plans were made to establish
manufacturing industries that would facilitate this diversification. Because of the
shortage of domestic capital, an important aspect of achieving diversification was
through the attraction of FDI. As depicted in Table 16, the domestic goal of
diversification of local economies was directly linked to the foreign policy goals
of attracting foreign investors. The ‘We’re with the West’ declaration also
indicated that potential investors need not worry about their investments in
Jamaica, as the leaders were declaring their support for capitalism.

The 1972-1980 period as noted earlier, was a period of social change
wherein the Manley government embarked on a program of self-reliance and
distributive justice that was consistent with the ideals of democratic socialism.
The broad economic objectives were an expansion in social programs and
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ultimately a decline in the existing income inequality. The foreign policy direction
of this period was therefore understandably one of closer relations with other
Southern countries such as Cuba, and participation in the NIEO movement. All
these actions resulted in a decrease in investor confidence as the government
sought to reject some of the tenets of capitalism.

The 1980s saw a less explicit socialist policy, but social transformation
remained at the heart of the Seaga administration. Seaga’s main goal was the
restoration of investor confidence and as such, he worked to realign the country
with the US and Western Europe. This realignment was seen in his leading the
negotiations for the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

Since 1989, the Jamaican government has embarked on a program of
neoliberal reforms primarily as a result of the conditions of loans from the IMF,
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). These included the
privatization of state entities and the decline of social programs. It is also during
this period that Jamaica, like Dominic and Grenada, saw the decline of
preferential access to the European markets. Jamaica exports mainly sugar and
bananas under the Lomé Agreement and given the loss of these markets the
foreign policy stance has been geared towards finding new markets, and this
process to a large extent entails establishing relationships with new state actors.
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The intensification of the relationship with China is in large part due to the
changing nature of the international economic order where Jamaica cannot rely on
preferential treatment. The official unemployment rate in Jamaica is 10.9 percent
(see Table 6) and economic growth has been stagnant over the past 15 years.
Given the need to identify new markets and to get out of the economic slump,
Jamaica has embarked on a foreign policy that is aimed at attracting new investors
to the country through increased contact with the governments such as China and
Venezuela. Jamaica, like Dominica and Grenada, is also in a process of economic
adjustment, and is using its deepened relationship with China to assist in attaining
adjustment. The next section will examine the relationship between Jamaica and
China in more detail.

A Brief Overview of Jamaica’s Modern Relations with China

1970s and 1980s
On November 21, 1972 Jamaica established diplomatic relations with
China. This move had little to do with the rapprochement between the United
States and China as seen in the Nixon visit to China, or with the fact that China
was socialist. It was simply the decision of Michael Manley, who argued that it
was imperative that he independently determine Jamaica’s international partners,
and the decision was therefore a part of the general challenge of the West as seen
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in his government’s active role in the NAM. Recall that in chapter 1 it was noted
that 1972 is the date selected because it is really the time that China gains its seat
in the UN and the Caribbean states start defining their own independent foreign
policies away from those prescribed prior to decolonization. Table 17 below
highlights some of the important agreements signed between the Jamaican and
Chinese governments.

Table 17. Jamaica’s Relations with China, 1972-present
DATE
EVENTS
November 21, 1972

Jamaica recognizes China

September 1976

First official Jamaican visit to China

1990

Construction of the Cotton Polyester
Mill

1991

Michael Manley visits China

October 1999

Agreement signed between Jamaica and
China re the Avoidance of Double
Taxation

February 2004

China agrees to build the Trelawny
Cricket Stadium

February 2005

China contracts to rehabilitate the water
system in Jamaica
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DATE

EVENTS

February 2005

Jamaica granted Approved Destination
Status

June 2005

China commits to assisting Jamaica in
the rehabilitation of the railway system

December 2005

China agrees to build the Sligoville
Stadium

The first official delegation to China was sent in September 1976. The
major outcome of the visit was the Chinese government’s donation of 5,000 tons
of rice. Jamaica was not experiencing a shortage of rice at that time, but this was
the only form of aid that China could afford at that time. Despite, Jamaica’s Third
World activism during the period, there were only a few other official visits
during this decade. This is consistent with the discussion of China’s Third World
policy presented in chapter 3. In the 1970s, not only was China limited in terms of
the lack of diplomatic resources available to use in its Third World diplomacy, but
also China was also more concerned about its own domestic economic
development.
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1980s
Contacts between Jamaica and China during the 1980s were also limited
with only Hugh Shearer (former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs)
leading a delegation to China in 1985. As noted earlier, Edward Seaga, a
seemingly neoliberal who was quite close to Ronald Reagan was elected Prime
minister in 1980 and campaigned on a platform declaring an end to the misguided
socialist policies of Manley and a move to more sound liberal principles. Seaga
did not, however, switch recognition from China to Taiwan as by that time China
had solidified its international standing and there was nothing to be gained from
switching back to Taiwan.

1990s and Beyond
It is not until the 1990s that government-to-government contacts between
Jamaica and China become significant. During the 1990s the first joint venture
between China and Jamaica was the launching of the Polyester Cotton Mill in
1990. In 1991 Michael Manley (who had been re-elected Prime Minister in 1989)
became the first Prime Minister to visit China. During this visit the Chinese
government provided a donation of general goods to the Jamaican people. There
were also numerous other high-level visits with even Edward Seaga (the leader of
the opposition party at that time) visiting in 1996. In 1998 the Vice-Premier of
China visited Jamaica and signed an agreement for the first grant from the
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Chinese government to Jamaica and in that same year PJ Patterson visited China
and signed a preferential loan agreement.245

It is in the new century that Jamaica’s relations with China mushrooms.
China’s economic growth allowed China the opportunity to significantly increase
its offering of loans, foreign direct investment, and other aid. Since the year 2000,
China has granted numerous loans to the Jamaican government. These include
loans for importing container cranes, expansion of Jamaica’s bauxite mining
capacity, rehabilitating the railway system, building two new stadiums, the
provision of audiovisual equipment to the National Archives, and the construction
of a parking complex at the University of the West Indies, among others.

One of the more controversial aspects of the relationship with China was
the decision of the Jamaican government to open an embassy in Beijing. The
Chinese government opened its embassy in Jamaica in 1973, but the Jamaican
government, lacking diplomatic resources, chose not to open an independent
embassy at that time, opting instead to have the Ambassador to Japan act as its
diplomatic representative in China. As China’s international role expanded and
China’s interest in the Caribbean became obvious it was deemed necessary to
open an embassy in China. However, the same problem of a lack of resources
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obtained and the government decided that it would eventually open an embassy,
but not immediately.

This conundrum was solved by China, with the Chinese government
offering to provide a building for the Jamaican embassy to be set up in China at
no cost to the Jamaican government. In addition, the government would not need
to pay any utility bills and the Chinese government would also provide some of
the necessary staff. The only thing that the Jamaican government had to provide
was an Ambassador. On July 18, 2005 Jamaica opened its Chinese-financed
embassy with Wayne McCook as the Ambassador.

The opposition Jamaica Labor Party objected to this three year rent free
embassy, as they viewed it as representing some loss of Jamaican sovereignty as
the government was essentially transferring some of its international diplomatic
responsibility to China. In fact, Bruce Golding (the leader of the opposition party
at that time) declared the arrangement to be “an unacceptable national
embarrassment.”246 This view also outraged many other citizens, but the
government insisted that it was the economically expedient thing to do. In fact,
the government pointed out that China had established similar arrangements with
other countries including South Africa.
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This brief discussion of Jamaica’s relationship with China is consistent
with that presented in chapter 3. China’s use of its “soft power” and yuan
diplomacy really only start in the late 1990s. The intensified relationship is
motivated on the Jamaican side by the need for economic restructuring,
developmental assistance and the search for new markets. As noted earlier,
Jamaica is the only Caribbean state that has a trade surplus with China and this
has been consistently the case since 2003. The next section will briefly examine
the importance of a natural resource in the Caribbean’s relations with China.

The Bauxite Trade
As noted earlier, Jamaica represents one of the few resource-rich countries
in the Caribbean. Chapter 3 pointed out that Jamaica is the 8th largest producer of
bauxite and the 7th largest exporter of the commodity in the world, and China is
especially interested in accessing Jamaica’s bauxite. Jamaica has been exporting
bauxite to China since the 1990s, but the level of exports has increased
significantly since 2000. On June 20, 2005 an agreement was signed between the
Chinese government, Jamaica Bauxite Institute, Jamaica Bauxite Mining Limited
and China Minmetals Corporation aimed at the establishment of a bauxite refinery
in Jamaica that is projected to produce 1.4 million tons of bauxite per year.
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Given that Jamaica does have a resource that is of interest to China, it is
expected that the trade statistics would be much better than those seen in
Dominica and Grenada. Recall that Dominica did not export anything to China
and between 2001 and 2006 Grenada exported only US$344 worth of fruits and
vegetables to China in 2002. Jamaica on the other hand, has a trade surplus with
China. As shown in Table 18 below, this surplus has been expanding since 2003.
The major export to China is bauxite, but Jamaica also exports coffee and tobacco
to China.

Table 18. Jamaica’s Trade with China
Year
Value of Imports from Value of Exports to China
China (EC$)

(EC$)

2001

167,975,515

94,158,658

2002

163,322,004

117,014,450

2003

224,642,205

260,519,913

2004

311,606,490

448,659,180

2005

382,735,277

289,996,490

2006

557,974,545

811,190,131

Source: CARICOM Statistical Database
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Like Dominica and Grenada, the main imports from China to Jamaica are
manufactured products, textile and fabrics, iron and steel, apparel and clothing
accessories, and footwear.

It should be noted at this point that there does exist a local clothing
industry, but members of the industry argue that the influx of cheap Chinese
products has undermined the development of the industry.247 The products
imported from China are much cheaper than those produced in Jamaica, primarily
due to the reality that labor costs in China are significantly lower than those in
Jamaica. As will be shown below, these considerations are not debated prior to
embarking on a closer trading relationship with China and form the foundation of
the disadvantages seen in Jamaica’s closer relations with China.

The Net Benefits Accruing from Jamaica’s Relationship with China

Whenever China provides a loan for use on a particular project it
invariably results in the contracting of a Chinese and the contractor often imports
Chinese laborers to the Caribbean. Chapter 6 will discuss the implicit conditions
of Chinese loans in more detail, but it is worth noting at this point that there have
been some expressions of dissatisfaction with the importation of Chinese laborers.
247
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Jamaica, like Dominica and Grenada, obtained a loan from China for the
construction of a cricket stadium for the World Cup. Jamaica already had a cricket
stadium in Kingston, but the government decided to build another stadium in
Trelawny (referred to as the Greenfield Stadium) to host both the opening
ceremony of the Cricket World Cup and some practice matches.

While the Greenfield Stadium was under construction in Jamaica, there
was actually one demonstration that was orchestrated by Jamaican workers on the
construction site. The Jamaican workers were protesting what they perceived to
be an influx of too many Chinese workers.248 Several Chinese laborers were seen
working on the project without any notice given to the local workers or any
indications given to the wider public that they were short of the requisite number
of construction workers. The project manager, however, argued that the workers
were only brought in when work fell behind schedule.249 The workers eventually
returned to work and there were no further protests, but this situation again points
to the reality that Chinese laborers are often imported to work on Chinesefinanced projects. The building of the Sligoville Stadium in Jamaica would again
uncover other problems associated with Chinese loans.
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The Role of Political Considerations in the Building of the Sligoville Stadium
In 2003 the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, K. D. Knight,
approached the Chinese with the idea to build a stadium in Sligoville, Jamaica.
Sligoville is a rural area that is largely underdeveloped. The Minister argued that a
multi-sport facility would boost employment in the area and would provide a
livelihood for the residents. The only problem was that Sligoville was a part of the
Minister’s constituency and it could easily have been read as political
maneuvering. Recall that the Chinese government had just provided a loan to
Jamaica for the construction of the Greenfield Cricket Stadium in Trelawny. This
stadium was built solely for the purposes of the Cricket World Cup and since its
use in the event it has stood idle. In addition, there was already a National
Stadium facility in Kingston and smaller sporting facilities dispersed across the
island. The building of another stadium was therefore not a pressing
developmental priority.

In addition to the dubious developmental potential of building another
stadium was the fact that this project was not debated in the Parliament. The
building of the stadium did proceed and was completed in June 2007, but nine
months after completion Chinese officials publicly expressed dismay at the fact
that the stadium had not been used. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, when
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asked about whether or not the project was a white elephant, responded, “You
can’t move it. It is there, and that milk is spilt if you think so.”250

This issue again highlights the fact that the existing political system
thwarts transparency and debate of agreements prior to their implementation. The
Sligoville stadium was built in a remote, hilly area that is not easily accessed. In
fact, there were many other more populous areas where a stadium could be more
useful. In fact, one resident of Sligoville argued that the money would have been
better spent on a skills-training centre.251

Both the Sligoville stadium and the Trelawny stadiums were financed with
Chinese loans with interest rates of 3 percent. This interest rate is quite
reasonable,252 but the questions raised by the opposition relating to the efficacy of
building stadiums that would not be used is valid and these questions are never
raised or answered prior to the start of building because of the lack of
transparency fostered by the existing Westminster political model.

The rise of China as an important economic partner provides a window
into the political economy of small states such as Jamaica. The Chinese loans and
250
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aid are seen as crucial for the continued development of Jamaica. One high-level
official at the Ministry of Finance noted that the only real foreign government
investors in Jamaica are China and Venezuela. In numerous interviews across
various sectors (namely the manufacturing and construction sectors) of the
country there is admiration for the Chinese investments and there is very little
discussion of the potential pitfalls or conditionalities attached to Chinese loans.

The Jamaican relationship with China, in addition to being much longer in
duration than Dominica and Grenada, points to the fact that where natural
resources exist China will have a more intensive policy of engagement. China has
expressed its interest in Jamaican bauxite and is working to exploit these
resources, but China is also investing in numerous areas such as irrigation
systems, the railway system and other construction projects.

While Jamaica does engage in a policy of voting with China in
international bodies, it is less dependent on this aspect of the relationship. The
sale of bauxite to China is much more important than the sale of votes or
recognition. It is also important to note that Jamaica has a consistent policy of
recognizing China, and its decision to recognize China in 1972 has not changed
since that time. This consistency can be partially explained by the lack of a
reliance on the trade of sovereign resources as Jamaica has a more diversified
resource base than Dominica and Grenada.

209

Jamaica’s foreign policy is not solely based on economic gains. As
highlighted in the decision to recognize China in 1972, Jamaica’s foreign policy is
also prestige and ideologically based. Government officials routinely argue that
the relationship is not solely about economic gains, but it is also about principle,
and Jamaica is unwilling to engage in the policy of switching recognition between
Taiwan and China simply for economic gains.253

This chapter has demonstrated, however, that despite the underlying
prestige and ideological foundations of Jamaica’s foreign policy, the primary
motivation has always been an economic one. In the 1970s, as Jamaica pursued
the most ideologically-based foreign policy seen in its history, the economic
motivation was still the most dominant motivator for the country’s foreign policy.
This is also true for Jamaica’s relationship with China. The goal of the Jamaican
government is to export as much bauxite to China while facilitating Chinese
investments into the country.

Returning to the motivations matrix presented in chapter 3, Jamaica has
the most complex relationship with China. Table 19 below depicts a modified
motivations matrix for Jamaica. In addition to the goals of aid and foreign
investment and infrastructure development, Jamaica’s relations with China are
253
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also guided by a search for prestige especially in relation to it being regarded as
an important player and voice in the Third World and in multilateral bodies. In
terms of the price of this relationship, Jamaica in addition to opening up trade and
voting with China in international bodies, also sells its bauxite to China. This
relationship is therefore more elaborate than that seen in Dominica and Grenada.

Table 19. Modified Motivations Matrix for Jamaica
MOTIVATIONS

OF

PRICE

JAMAICA VIS-À-VIS CHINA
√ Aid and Foreign investment

√ Votes in international for a

√ Infrastructure Development

√ Trade opening

√

Prestige

√ Recognition of ‘One China

o

Tourism Revenue

Policy’
√

Sale of Natural Resources to

China

The next chapter will use the case studies presented to examine the
research questions and hypotheses posed in chapter 1. The theoretical
implications of the three case studies will also be discussed in detail.
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CHAPTER 6
THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CARIBBEAN’S
RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA FOR THE STUDY OF SMALL STATE
FOREIGN POLICIES

The discussions of Dominica, Grenada and Jamaica yielded some useful
information about not only their relationship with China, but also the nature of
small state behavior. This chapter will return to the four research questions posed
in chapter 1:
a. Why is there variation in the strategies employed by different Caribbean states
vis-à-vis China?
b. What motives China’s interest in the Caribbean?
c. Why do Caribbean states engage with China when doing so does not yield
unambiguous economic benefits?
d. What are the implications of the Caribbean’s strategy towards China for the
study of small states in international relations?

This chapter will be organized around answering these four research
questions based on the information garnered from the three case studies. The three
hypotheses presented in chapter 1 will also be examined. These were:
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1. If a state has natural resources that are of strategic importance to China, then it
will have a consistent foreign policy vis-à-vis China;
2. If a state has no natural resources that are of strategic importance to China, then
their foreign policy vis-à-vis China will be inconsistent; and
3. If a state has no natural resources that are of strategic importance to China, then
they will creatively sell rights accorded by sovereignty.

Chapter Outline
The chapter will begin with the first research question: Why is there
variation in the strategies employed by different Caribbean states vis-à-vis China?
The discussion will show that the case studies demonstrate that resource
endowment is the key variable explaining this variation in policy towards China.
in view of this, it will therefore be argued that the three cases studies presented do
in fact accept the main hypotheses presented at the start of the study.

The discussion will then move to the second research question: What
motives China’s interest in the Caribbean? It will again be demonstrated that there
are three motivations driving China’s interest in the region. These are economics,
recognition, and prestige. It will also be argued that China’s actions in the
Caribbean are consistent with their general policy towards the Third World.
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Why do Caribbean states engage with China when doing so does not yield
unambiguous economic benefits? This chapter will pull from the evidence
presented in the case studies and will again show that the answer to this third
research question is primarily the nature of the Westminster political systems in
the Caribbean. This is, however, not the sole reason for signing these less than
positive agreements. The chapter will also discuss other factors such as the fact
that China often does not follow through on its promises and as such Caribbean
states expected to receive more aid than they in fact obtained. Another reason for
signing these agreements with China relate to the time inconsistency problem
wherein politicians are more concerned with the short term goal of attracting aid
and capital flows and are less interested in the long run consequences of their
decisions.

The fourth research question will dominate the rest of the chapter. What
are the implications of the Caribbean’s strategy towards China for the study of
small states in international relations? This dissertation had one primary thing in
this area, and that was to show that small state foreign policy behavior cannot be
solely understood by focusing on system level explanations. This dissertation has
shown that in the three case studies the domestic and individual levels were more
important determinants of the foreign policy direction of these Caribbean states.
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The chapter closes with a brief analysis of alternative explanations for the
Caribbean’s foreign policy towards China. It will be shown that explanations of
balancing and bandwagoning do not really fit this analysis. In addition, analyses
that focus on the attainment of economic power are problematic and do not
readily fit the Caribbean scenario that is presented. The dissertation concludes that
the Caribbean’s embrace of China and their divergent policy towards China is
therefore mainly about the need for economic adjustment.

Question 1: Why is there variation in the strategies employed by different
Caribbean states vis-à-vis China?

Resource Endowment and Caribbean Foreign Policy vis-à-vis China
One of the primary arguments in this thesis revolves around the use of
sovereignty for economic gain. It should be noted that for the purposes of this
dissertation sovereignty is conceptualized as a resource endowment.

As

highlighted in chapter 4, both Grenada and Dominica prior to their recent
engagement with China had used sovereignty as a means of attaining economic
adjustment. This is primarily seen in their establishment of offshore financial
centers that were characterized by low tax rates and secrecy. In addition,
Dominica’s use of sovereignty was even more overt in their institution of a very
unique strategy of selling economic citizenship to foreign nationals.
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As demonstrated by Palan,254 these strategies have been seen primarily in
the microstates with populations well under one million. This may indicate that
these are the states more prone to using this strategy given their lack of other
natural resources. This reality is borne out across the Caribbean. The three states
that have not tried establishing offshore financial centers are Guyana, Jamaica,
and Trinidad and Tobago. These are in fact the three most resource rich countries
of the English-speaking Caribbean. Guyana has vast quantities of timber and fish,
Jamaica has bauxite, and Trinidad has oil and these resources are demanded by
China and other large states.

The smaller Eastern Caribbean countries are not endowed with any of
these more attractive and strategic natural resources. It is therefore this lack of
natural resources that leads smaller states in the Caribbean to be more creative. As
noted before, this creative use of sovereignty includes the sale of economic
citizenship and flags of convenience, and the setting up of offshore financial
centers. This thesis argues that the creative use of sovereignty witnessed since the
1990s is therefore a direct function of both the lack of other natural resources and
the loss of trade preferences. In Dominica and Grenada’s current interactions with
China, the creative use of sovereignty entails the selling of votes and recognition
as we have seen in chapter 4.
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It should be highlighted that this creative use of sovereignty is not
unanimously supported across the Caribbean. In many instances citizens in states
without strategic natural resources have complained about this sale of
sovereignty. High-level officials across the Caribbean have also expressed some
concern about this strategy. Owen Arthur, the Prime Minister of Barbados, echoes
much of this sentiment when he accused Caribbean states that recognized Taiwan
of being,
Countries that have been making themselves available to be purchased
lock, stock and barrel. There are some countries that have no pride in
policy and they are waiting there to be taken to by the highest bidder.255
The fact is, however, that this strategy has been providing much needed
aid and investment, despite the fact that the long-run net benefits may be small. In
the absence of alternatives, it is quite possible that this activity will continue
especially in the smaller Caribbean states that are desperately trying to find an
avenue for achieving economic adjustment.

Chapter 5 highlighted the Jamaican experience with China and one of the
conclusions of that discussion was that the creative use of sovereignty was not as
important in their context. Jamaica does indeed vote with China on various
initiatives and does recognize China, but these are not the primary bases for
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increased engagement with China. In fact, as it pertains to recognition, Jamaica
recognized China in 1972 when there were no economic benefits to be gained by
doing so and Jamaica has remained consistent in its recognition of China.

The reason for the reduced emphasis placed on the creative use of
sovereignty in the Jamaican context is the fact the country has natural resources
that are of interest to China. Jamaica exports its bauxite and coffee to China and
the country has been engaged in the expansion of the manufacturing and tourism
sectors of the economy for export to other states. This wider resource base means
that it is less dependent on the sale of its sovereign resources.

This, however, does not mean that Jamaica does not in any way trade its
sovereign resources. The policy of supporting China in international bodies is
inextricably linked to Chinese aid and investment. The voting position of Jamaica
is therefore influenced by China’s aid. This is, however, not the sole resource that
Jamaica trades with China as Jamaica does export significant quantities of bauxite
to China.

Tables 20 and 21 below attempt to synthesize the major empirical findings
emanating from this discussion vis-à-vis natural resource endowment and the
creative use of sovereignty. Table 20 highlights the fact that all three countries
have sovereignty as a resource desired by China, but Jamaica also has bauxite and
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given its international activism and stature in CARICOM also has some
international influence. It is this fact that leads to divergent foreign policies
between Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica. Jamaica’s stance on Chinese
recognition has been consistent, but this has not been the case in Dominica and
Grenada.

Table 20. The Relationship between Resource Endowment and the Consistency of
Foreign Policy towards China in the Caribbean
Country
Resource Endowment (of Consistent
Foreign
interest to China)
Dominica

o Sovereignty

Policy (vis-à-vis China)
(votes, NO

recognition)
Grenada

o Sovereignty

(votes, NO

recognition)
Jamaica

o Sovereignty

YES

o Bauxite

What this discussion suggests is that the creative use of sovereignty is a
strategy for smaller resource scarce countries that previously used sovereignty
creatively. This use of sovereignty for economic gain results in an inconsistent
foreign policy vis-à-vis China, as these states, in their interactions with China, are
more focused on short-term economic gains and not long-term strategic
considerations. Table 20 below shows that the countries that are more dependent
on their sovereignty are indeed the ones with limited strategic natural resources.
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Table 21. The Relationship between Resource Endowment and the Creative Use
of Sovereignty in the Caribbean
Country
Resource Endowment (of Creative
Use
of
interest to China)
Dominica

o Sovereignty

Sovereignty
(votes YES

and recognition)
Grenada

o Sovereignty

(votes YES

and recognition)
Jamaica

o Sovereignty

In Some Cases

o Bauxite

The dissertation therefore demonstrated that the variation in strategies employed
by Caribbean states vis-à-vis China is explained by their resource-endowment,
and more specifically, the possession of resources that are of strategic importance
to China.

Question 2: What Motivates China’s Interest in the Caribbean?

This dissertation focuses on the Caribbean states, but the analysis would
be incomplete without an analysis of the Chinese motivations in the region. China
has showed a renewed interest in developing countries around the world. This
interest is often framed in relation to China’s quest for resources. This is indeed a
primary motivation for China’s policies in the Middle East and Africa, as well as

220

Latin America. As was shown in chapter 3, this not a primary motivation for
China in the Caribbean region. As highlighted throughout this dissertation, the
Caribbean is quite an eclectic array of countries, comprising independent, semiindependent and colonies of industrialized countries. Even in terms of the former
British colonies, there are major differences in culture, political systems and
natural resource endowments. With the exception of Guyana, the major resource
similarity between Caribbean states is their sun, sand and beaches. Given the vast
differences between Caribbean states, especially vis-à-vis natural resources, it is
obvious that China’s interest in the region is motivated by factors other than the
resource-search motivation.

The dissertation demonstrated that China has a tripartite motivation for its
presence in the Caribbean—economics, recognition and influence. The economics
motivation is related to the search for resources and markets. China is interested
in the minerals found in Jamaica and Guyana, and the oil and natural gas in
Trinidad and Tobago. But more importantly, Chinese interests at the economic
level relate to accessing the Caribbean markets as a destination for Chinese
exports. As was demonstrated in chapter 3, this has proved successful as
demonstrated by the increase in the import of Chinese goods and the subsequent
widening trade surplus that China has with the Caribbean. Recognition, for the
purposes of this paper, is defined as support for China in its “One China Policy,”
and it was shown that this policy is one of the primary drivers of China’s relations
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with the Caribbean. The third motivation, and one of the leading determinants of
Chinese Third World policy, relates to Chinese Influence. I conceptualized this
variable as a two-fold goal—the signaling of China’s rise and support for the
China agenda in multilateral forums.

China’s actions in the Caribbean are consistent with China’s general
modus operandi with respect to aid in developing countries wherein China
employs diplomatic strategies aimed at facilitating its economic and political rise.
Third World leaders often see China as a benign power, but as was identified in
the Caribbean case studies, and in Latin American and African context, China’s
goal is solidly related to achieving its national interest, however defined. China’s
aim is therefore its economic development and not necessarily the development of
these developing countries.

Hu Jintao’s multi-country visit to Latin America in 2005 was met with
much enthusiasm and publicity. At every stop Hu signed various economic aid
agreements and agreements for various investment projects. But the lingering
question on the mind of pundits was, how much of the promises would really
materialize? Miguel Broda of the Estudio Broda think tank highlights an
important, yet often overlooked point,
The ultimate loans are unlikely to take the form of direct capital outlays by
Chinese companies…[i]nstead, China may offer a ‘tied loan’, at very low
interest rates, for projects whose execution is then assigned to Chinese
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state enterprises. Some way would have to be found to bypass an
Argentinean law that mandates open bidding for state contracts.”256
Peter Hakim shows that after Hu’s visit to Argentina and Brazil in
November 2004, both countries anticipated significant increases in investments
from China. But officials in both countries indicated that these expected
investments had not materialized.257

In addition to a lack of actual investment projects in Latin America, those
that are embarked upon are characterized by an influx of Chinese workers after an
agreement has been signed for a particular project. The Chinese project managers
prefer to import workers rather than to access the available pool of domestic
workers.258

Kurlantzick argues that China employs a “maxi-mini” strategy as it relates
to its provision of aid.259 In a quite rational manner, China aims to get the
maximum return for the minimum cost. Furthermore, China often opts to provide
aid for high-profile projects such as stadiums or parliamentary buildings. This was

256

"Magic or Realism?," The Economist, December 29, 2004.

257

Peter Hakim, "Is Washington Losing Latin America?," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1
(2006).
258

Dreyer, "From China with Love: P.R.C. Overtures in Latin America."

259

Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World.

223

mirrored in the Caribbean. The major contribution that China has made to the
Caribbean relates to the building of stadiums that are less costly than
infrastructure projects such as roads and schools. Relatively little funds have been
provided for infrastructural development or assistance in the provision of health
or educational services as promised in the agreements signed with Dominica,
Grenada and Jamaica. The next section will more closely examine why Caribbean
states have sought closer engagement with China when the net benefits are so
limited.

Question 3: Why do Caribbean states engage with China when doing so does
not yield unambiguous economic benefits?

The three case studies showed that the net benefits accruing from the three
states’ interaction with China may in fact be quite low. Table 22 below presents
the expected benefits from the increased engagement with China and also
highlights the actual costs that have been associated with the Caribbean’s
relationship with China.
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Table 22. The Costs and Benefits Associated With the Caribbean’s Relationship
with China
EXPECTED BENEFITS
ACTUAL COSTS
Lack

of

Explicit

Neoliberal Inflow of Chinese Laborers

Conditionalities
Speedy Pay-out of Chinese Aid

Widening Trade Deficit with China

Labor Absorption
Infrastructural Development

The Expected Benefits Associated with Chinese Aid
The benefits of an intensified relationship with China, as articulated by the
interviewees across the three states, were similar. Four key benefits were
highlighted: a lack of conditionalities; speedy pay-out of Chinese aid; labor
absorption; and infrastructure development.260 I will briefly discuss each point.

Lack of Explicit Conditionalities
In relation to the lack of explicit neoliberal conditions, the argument made
is that Chinese aid lacks the traditional conditionalities attached to World Bank
and IMF loans. This dissertation will, however, argue later in this chapter that the
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Other benefits were put forward by the interviewees, but the four that are highlighted
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Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica.
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lack of conditionalities is really a lack of traditional neoliberal conditionalities
and does not imply a lack of all conditionalities.

Taylor argues that after the civil war in Angola, the Angolan government
started negotiating a loan with the IMF aimed at placing Angola back on track for
economic growth and development.261 The IMF insisted on the inclusion of
transparency and good governance clauses that were aimed at stemming the
rampant corruption existing in the Luande government. The Angolan government,
however, decided to suspend its negotiations with the IMF after receiving a $2
billion loan from the EXIM Bank of China.262 The Chinese loans ostensibly lack
the onerous conditionalities of the IMF and World Bank. This scenario is also
witnessed in the Caribbean as there are no conditionality clauses attached to
agreements signed between Chinese and Caribbean government officials.

Speedy Pay-out of Chinese Aid
Another advantage of Chinese aid is also that the Chinese government
starts construction or pays over funds to the government in a very short period of
time. For example, Stephen Marks argues that one positive outcome of China’s
explicit omission of conditions is that it can “move faster to produce visible
261
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results on the ground.”263 Recall that in Dominica, work on the cricket stadium
began only 90 days after the signing of the agreement with China. This lack of
institutional bureaucracy is a far cry from what obtains with loans from
multilateral agencies such as the IMF and World Bank as there is very little
bureaucracy and explicit conditionalities to overcome in China’s case.

Labor Absorption
As China promises to invest more into these countries, the expected
outcome is one of labor absorption wherein the new infrastructural projects would
necessitate the employment of workers (both skilled and unskilled) in the
production or building process. In the three case studies there was in fact
significant employment of Caribbean nationals in the construction of cricket
stadiums and roads, but as will be discussed later in this chapter, the labor
absorptive potential of Chinese-funded projects was thwarted as there was an
influx of Chinese workers employed on these sites.

Infrastructure Development
The final benefit that was discussed by interviewees in all three states
related to China’s commitment to assist in infrastructural development especially
vis-à-vis the building of roads, hospitals, and schools. China has made
263
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commitments to these states, but these projects have been few. If China does
honor its commitment then the Caribbean will be in a better position both
economically and socially. The fact is, however, that as with the other three
benefits, this benefit has not really accrued as China has made commitments that
it has failed to follow through on.

The Actual Costs Associated with Chinese Aid
Inflow of Chinese Laborers
One of the primary criticisms of China in Africa relates to Chinese firms
importing Chinese laborers. Despite the more favorable agreement, Taylor further
points out that this Chinese loan angered many members of the business
community in Angola as one condition of the loan was that only 30 percent of the
work would be contracted to Angolan firms. The other 70 percent would go to
Chinese firms.264 This reality is mirrored across Africa and indeed, across the
Caribbean as we have seen in the discussion of Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica.

While there are no explicit 30-70 provisions, the Chinese companies
awarded contracts in the Caribbean region have in all instances imported a high
percentage of Chinese laborers.265 In the case of the cricket stadiums in Jamaica,
264
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an Israeli company was hired along with the Chinese company to build the
Trelawny stadium and to refurbish the stadium in Kingston.266 Both companies
imported workers and as a result, the employment-creating potential of these
projects were thwarted.

The unemployment rate in Jamaica is 10.9 percent, in Dominica it is 23
percent, and in Grenada it is 12.5 percent (see Table 6 in chapter 2). These
countries are therefore not short of unskilled construction workers. In fact, in
Jamaica construction workers are encouraged to seek work abroad due to the
surplus of these workers. As noted in chapter 5, there was one protest involving
Jamaican construction workers expressing their displeasure at the influx of
Chinese workers and in both Dominica and Grenada, there was public outrage
expressed in the press at the use of imported Chinese laborers.

In the Caribbean context, the major explicit conditionalities seen in
relation to Chinese loan agreements relate to the awarding of contracts to Chinese
companies and the importation of Chinese laborers. These two realities are,
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however, compounded by the widening trade deficit between the Caribbean and
China.

The Caribbean’s Widening Trade Deficit with China
Table 23 below highlights the value of imports from China and exports to
China between 2001 and 2006. The statistics show that the Caribbean’s trade
deficit with China is widening. As these states search for new markets after the
loss of preferential access to the EU, China does not represent a real alternative.
In fact, Jamaican exports of bauxite represent the majority of the exports to China.
As noted in Chapter 4, Grenada and Dominica do not export any products to
China, but the imports of Chinese goods is rising at an exponential rate each year.
As shown in Table 23 below, the 2006 deficit represents an almost 270 percent
increase from the deficit in 2001.

Table 23. CARICOM-China Trade, 2001-2006
Year

US$ Value of Exports to

US$ Value of Imports

Percentage Change

China

from China

in Trade Deficit
from
Year

2001

$36,351,201

$200,553,703

230

--

Previous

Year

US$ Value of Exports to

US$ Value of Imports

Percentage Change

China

from China

in Trade Deficit
from

Previous

Year

2002

$46,824,661

$205,162,059

-3.6%

2003

$101,341,039

$275,159,800

9.78%

2004

$169,481,594

$367,764,280

14.07%

2005

$116,964,490

$492,693,537

89.49%

2006

$321,964,490

$761,733,016

17%

Source: CARICOM Secretariat Database

Given that countries such as Dominica and Grenada do not have any
resources that are of vital interest to China, the one area that would serve to close
the trade deficit and contribute to improvements in trade performance would be
tourism. One much discussed aspect of the China relationship with countries in
the Caribbean relates to the granting of Approved Destination Status (ADS).
Chinese tour groups must obtain government approval when traveling outside of
China and as a result, are only allowed to conduct tours in countries that have
been given ADS by the Chinese government. China agreed to grant all states in
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the Caribbean that recognized the One China policy and argued that this would be
economically beneficial to the Caribbean.

Most Caribbean states are heavily reliant on their tourism sector. This is
the case for all the countries under study. The large Chinese population is quite
attractive to leaders of these Caribbean states as the Chinese market represents a
potentially lucrative source of tourists as over 19 million Chinese tourists travel
overseas annually.267 In fact, the Chinese government lists Approved Destination
Status (ADS) as one of the primary advantages of supporting China and the
governments across the Caribbean have bought into this thinking.

The reality, however, is that this influx of tourists may not materialize. At
present, the Caribbean is not a prime destination for Chinese tourists. In addition,
the costs involved in traveling from China to the Caribbean are out of the reach of
ordinary Chinese nationals. In order for the expected increase in tourist arrivals
from China to accrue, China must continue on its current path of development so
that an increased number of Chinese citizens are able to improve their standard of
living and to therefore be able to afford Caribbean vacations. The commitment of
more Chinese tourists is therefore highly contingent on the continued growth of
the Chinese economy, a decrease in the cost and inconvenience of traveling from
267
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China to the Caribbean, and importantly, the successful marketing of the
Caribbean to the Chinese populace. It is therefore clear that China’s granting of
Approved Destination Status to the Caribbean will not reduce the Caribbean’s
existing trade deficit with China.

Why then do Caribbean states engage with China when doing so does not yield
unambiguous benefits?

One criticism often espoused in relation to Chinese projects in the
Caribbean relates to the lack of transparency in the awarding of contracts and the
terms of the agreements signed with the Chinese government and Chinese firms.
In an interview with one executive member of the Chamber of Commerce in one
of the countries under study, it was revealed that they do not really know the
terms of the actual agreements signed between their government and the Chinese
government. This sentiment was echoed in interviews conducted across the three
Caribbean states.

This would seem surprising in such small insular countries, but this lack of
transparency has been a feature of the foreign policies of these small Caribbean
states since decolonization. This lack of transparency is in large part a function of
the prevailing political system. The Westminster system of government
concentrates significant amounts of power into the hands of the ruling political
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party and especially the Prime Minister,268 and this concentration of power results
in non-transparent decision-making processes.

The ability of the Prime Minister to control foreign policy has been
demonstrated across the Caribbean and this is evident in this exploration of the
Caribbean’s relations with China. Skerrit, the Dominican Prime Minister has been
accused on numerous occasions of being too secretive. As discussed in chapter 4,
the decision to switch recognition from Taiwan to China in 2004 was essentially
made by one individual—the Prime Minister. There were no parliamentary
discussions and no assessments made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Skerrit
made the decision by himself and the members of his own government and the
wider population had little power over the decision.

In St. Lucia, after John Compton’s United Workers Party (UWP) indicated
that they were considering switching recognition to China the opposition St. Lucia
Labor Party tried to get the issue debated in parliament, but the ruling government
refused to do so.269 Given the government’s control of the parliamentary agenda,
the opposition party had no way of placing its concerns on the agenda.
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The details of recent loan agreements signed between Jamaica and China
are also not publicly known. As noted in chapter 5, not only are the terms of
agreements not debated, but also the projects embarked on are proving to be of
limited benefit to the Jamaican people. The construction of the Sligoville and
Trelawny stadiums, for example, highlight the fact that the loans are not being
channeled to their most productive ends. The nature of the Westminster political
system is therefore one important explanation for the Caribbean’s continued
interaction with China despite the low net benefits.

There are, however, other possible explanations that also explain the
Caribbean states’ seeming pursuit of bad deals with China. One possible
alternative explanation relates to the fact that was previously highlighted that
China often does not follow through on its promises. The Caribbean states
therefore expect more benefits that actually accrue. This was seen in both
Dominica and Grenada where promises of hospitals and schools did not
materialize.

Another possible explanation for the signing of these less than promising
agreements with China relates to a simple time inconsistency dilemma wherein
politicians are more concerned about short-run gains and therefore pay scant
regard to long run implications that may or may not materialize. Caribbean
politicians, and politicians across the world, are often accused of being primarily
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concerned with getting re-elected. As such, the short-run political interests of
politicians do not necessarily coincide with the long-run interests of the country.
This fact is expressly seen in the Caribbean context. The Jamaican example of the
Sligoville stadium is one prime example of this. The agreement to build the
stadium was primarily aimed at political ends and not the long-run economic
development of Jamaica.

Another reason for signing the less than favorable agreements with China
is the fact that the Caribbean states have become so dependent on some form of
external assistance, whether in the form of direct aid or preferential trade
agreements. With the deterioration of both ODA and the general international
trading environment, these states are desperate for some external entity to assist in
their process of economic adjustment. China is in fact one of only a few countries
that is willing to provide developmental assistance to these Caribbean states. It is
therefore for this reason that these states do not scrutinize the agreements that
they have signed with China.
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Question 4: What are the implications of the Caribbean’s strategy towards
China for the study of small states in international relations?

Small States and the Levels of Analysis Question
What does the preceding discussion suggest for our general study of small
states? Chapters 1 and 2 highlighted the fact that in the political economy
literature, small states are often understudied and misunderstood. This discussion
has so far pointed to two important features of small states. First, small states are
not homogenous. The Caribbean cases highlight this fact quite convincingly as
there is some variation in the foreign policy approach depending on the resource
endowment of the small state. Second, this study has shown that economic goals
are the main drivers of small state foreign policies. There is, however, a third
important facet of the small state academic discourse that this dissertation points
to, and that is the perennial levels of analysis question.270

Small states have been analyzed at all three of the traditional levels of
analysis—system, domestic and individual levels. It was pointed out in chapter 1
that all three levels of analysis are useful in understanding Caribbean foreign
policy. The case studies have also made this point clear.
270
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Analyses of small states at the system level focus on the extent to which
the prevailing international system affects behavior. The argument is that small
states because of their lack of power are more affected by systemic realities that
are often outside of their control. Changes in the structure of the economic system
have had direct effects on the economies of all the Caribbean states and this is
precisely the rationale behind their need to adjust. This is also the root of the
notion that the foreign polices of small states tend to be reactive in nature.
Because of a lack of power and therefore lack of influence in the determination of
rules and general power and economic configuration, small states can only adjust
to the prevailing order because, for the most part, they cannot exercise control
over their international reality.271

The case studies in this dissertation also point to the importance of state
level variables in explaining foreign policy behavior. In particular, this thesis
highlights the dimension of the political system. The countries studied have all
adopted the Westminster parliamentary style of government and this system leads
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to some interesting findings vis-à-vis foreign policy formulation. One of the major
points highlighted was the lack of transparency in the decision-making process
given the fact that the ruling political party had complete control over the
legislative agenda.

The Prime Ministers in all three cases were integral to foreign policy
decision-making. The only other individuals having any control over the process
are members of the Cabinet who are also selected by the Prime Minister. This
points to the importance of the individual level of analysis in studies of Caribbean
foreign policy. But as might already be clear, the importance of the individual
level of analysis really rests on the domestic level of analysis (the political system
in this case). It is because the countries being studied adopted a Parliamentary
system that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet wield such an inordinate amount
of power in such systems.

These case studies therefore indicate that all three levels of analysis give
useful insight into Caribbean foreign policy decision-making and their current
adjustment strategies. The system level is useful in explaining the constraints
facing the Caribbean states. The constraints and need for adjustment come from
the reorientation in the international trading system away from non-reciprocal
preferences to one where reciprocity and non-discrimination predominate. At the
individual level, or level of the actual leaders, this study shows that leaders are
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crucial in choosing the adjustment strategy to be pursued. The domestic level or
the state level in this discussion related to the political system in the Caribbean. It
was demonstrated that the domestic level (political system) allows us to
understanding how decisions of leaders are translated into actual polices. This
study therefore built on the framework of Katzenstein in employing a multi-level
analysis of small state foreign policy behavior.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
This dissertation has argued that the prime explanation for the Caribbean’s
increased relationship with China is the need for economic adjustment. It was
shown in chapter 2 that the Caribbean states have traditionally been dependent on
both aid and non-reciprocal trade agreements with developed countries. With the
decline in ODA and the loss of preferential access to the European market,
Caribbean states are engaged in a process of economic adjustment and their
foreign policy is a key tool used in this process. China should therefore be seen as
simply one aspect of the Caribbean’s adjustment strategy.

It should, however, be noted that the dissertation not only aimed to
provide an explanation for the Caribbean’s increased engagement with China, but
it also aimed to explain why we witness foreign policy variation across a
seemingly homogenous set of countries. As noted in previous chapters, some
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Caribbean states such as Barbados, Guyana and Jamaica have consistently
recognized China, while others such as Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia have
moved back and forth between recognition of Taiwan and China.

The arguments presented in this dissertation can be challenged from
several directions, but one possible challenge would be a realist one. Waltz argues
that great powers balance and weak states bandwagon.272 The concepts of
balancing—teaming up against a rising power and bandwagoning—jumping on
the side of the rising power, are important concepts in international relations, but
they do not fit neatly into this analysis. Realists see the increased relationship with
China as merely the Caribbean states bandwagoning with the new rising power—
China.

This explanation is somewhat valid as the Caribbean states are indeed
looking for an alternative to the US’ hegemony in the region and this is seen in
their current embrace of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and China. The search for an
alternative hegemonic power is, however, not the prime motivator in the
Caribbean case. In interviews conducted specifically with foreign service officials
in the three case studies they consistently noted that their countries had not
considered the implications of their intensified relationship with China for their
current relationship with the US. They admitted that challenging the US’
272
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hegemonic dominance in the region is one underlying motivator, but the primary
goal especially in Dominica and Grenada was to get developmental assistance and
not to challenge the US.

The bandwagoning argument predicts a similar outcome as the
explanation proffered in this dissertation. Both arguments would predict that
Caribbean states would increasingly engage with China. The difference, however,
is that the bandwagoning argument cannot really explain why some Caribbean
states would choose to recognize Taiwan and not China. China is the rising
superpower—not Taiwan. As noted before, some states in the Caribbean
recognize Taiwan and many actually switch between recognizing China and
recognizing Taiwan. The bandwagoning argument cannot explain why this
foreign policy variation is seen.

In a similar realist vein, critics could also argue that the argument
presented in this dissertation is simply one where the Caribbean states are merely
seeking more power in the international system. Small states do not have the
capabilities to alter the existing international order and are therefore seen as mere
pawns. In their international economic relations, realists argue that they will,
much like every other state, pursue a strategy of relative gains.
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Krasner in fact sees the weak developing countries’ attempt at establishing
a NIEO in the 1970s as a relative gains strategy aimed at catching up with the
stronger, more developed states.273 In fact, Krasner argues that the concept of
sovereign equality where each state, regardless of size, power, or wealth has a
vote equal to all other countries, serves to magnify the power of small states.
China is indeed aware of the idea of sovereign equality and, as was demonstrated
in chapter 3, a key goal of China is to garner Caribbean votes in international
bodies. Krasner is correct in arguing that sovereign equality increases the power
of small states, but his analysis does not adequately explain the variation seen in
foreign policy behavior across different Caribbean states. In the Caribbean
context, traditional power-seeking behavior is largely absent from their foreign
policies.

Along similar lines, Lake argues that the NIEO was a “part of a larger
class of mercantilist strategies employed by various countries at particular
moments in history to redress politically important economic imbalances.”274 He
argues that the NIEO was not a challenge to capitalism, but instead was a
movement aimed at allocating more of the benefits of the existing international
trading and economic system to developing countries. Lake further concludes
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that, state goals should be equated with the pursuit of economic power.275 Lake
therefore argues that a key aim of the NIEO was the facilitation of more capital
inflows into developing countries and this would prove useful in diversifying
these economies and would ultimately result in a mitigation of their economic
vulnerabilities. Extending this argument to the Caribbean states seems quite
plausible as attracting aid and capital inflows from China can be seen as an
attempt to not only close the gap with developed states, but also to reduce the
vulnerabilities accruing from their small size.

Again, the problem with this argument is that the actions of the Caribbean
states and the interviews conducted do not show this as a motivator in the
Caribbean case. The Caribbean states are indeed seeking economic gains, but they
are not thinking in terms of relative gains. As has been demonstrated throughout
this dissertation, the Caribbean states are primarily engaged in a policy of
economic survival and their foreign policy is one that is geared towards surviving
and not maximizing economic power. The game that Caribbean states are engaged
in is therefore not a relative gains or zero-sum one, but is simply about absolute
gains and the achievement of economic prosperity.

Another alternative explanation could be that the increasing engagement
with China is linked to a lack of interest on the part of Western industrialized
275
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countries since the end of the Cold War. This argument actually fits into the
analysis provided. The decline in ODA to Caribbean states means that they have
to find new donors. China represents one such donor. This explanation could also
explain why Taiwan is also engaged with as it could be argued that Caribbean
states are simply trying to gain as much assistance as they can and they choose
between China and Taiwan based on an evaluation of which country would
provide the most assistance. This seemingly strong argument relating to the lack
of interest of the West cannot, however, explain why some of these states do not
vacillate between recognition of Taiwan and China. Guyana is just as in need of
assistance as Dominica, but Guyana has remained consistent in its recognition of
China and Dominica has not.

There are therefore several possible competing explanations for the
Caribbean’s increasing engagement with China, but they all exhibit some
problems. This dissertation was aimed at showing both the reason for the
increased engagement and the reason for the variation in foreign policies seen.
The alternative explanations presented here are more useful in explaining the
increased engagement, but they cannot adequately explain why the approach to
China varies across these Caribbean states.
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This chapter has demonstrated that natural resource endowment is the key
variable explaining the variation in foreign policies seen in the Caribbean vis-àvis China. Dominica and Grenada are both lacking natural resources that are of
interest to China and this results in their focusing on their sovereign resources and
the concomitant rights of voting and recognizing other states. This focus on using
their sovereignty means that their foreign policy is more based on economic gains
and the primary way to gain economically from the relationship with China is to
sell their votes and their recognition. The discussions in chapter 4 showed that in
both cases it is therefore evident that they will continue to play the diplomatic
game of switching recognition between China and Taiwan with a view to gaining
the maximum level of aid and investment that is available.

In terms of the limited net benefits, it was shown that the implicit
conditionalities attached to Chinese aid are the major reason for these low net
benefits. This situation is exacerbated by the nature of the domestic political
systems in the Caribbean. The argument presented is therefore that the intensified
relationship with China is pursued (despite these low net benefits) because of the
nature of the domestic political system which results in a non-transparent pursuit
of agreements with China and the lack of both Parliamentary and public debate
relating to the details of the agreements signed with China. Other factors such as
time inconsistency wherein the short-run benefits are privileged and the fact that
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China is one of only a few countries that are providing aid to the region are also
contributors to the signing of agreements that provide limited net benefits.

The cases discussed therefore highlighted some interesting aspects of the
foreign policies of a group of small states. The discussion shows that analyses of
small states are in fact much more complex than a cursory evaluation would
reveal. The next chapter will point to some important extensions of the discussion
provided in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this concluding chapter is to enunciate the major findings
emanating from this study and to point to possible extensions of this work. As
highlighted in the introduction, one of the primary aims of the dissertation was to
explain the variation seen in the three Caribbean states’ approach to China. The
three Caribbean states selected are seemingly homogeneous entities with similar
political systems, history, geographic location, and vulnerabilities. Dominica and
Grenada have both switched recognition between China and Taiwan, but Jamaica
has remained consistent in its recognition of China since 1972. This dissertation
posits the argument that in order to understand this foreign policy divergence, one
must focus on the resource endowment of these countries.

Jamaica has a significantly wider natural resource base than Dominica and
Grenada, and in addition, Jamaica has bauxite, which is of strategic importance to
China. This dissertation, however, did not limit the discussion of resources to
merely natural resources. The idea of sovereign resources was introduced
primarily because the states that are less endowed with natural resources can use
their sovereignty for some economic gain.
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In addition to highlighting the importance of resource endowment for
foreign policy decision-making, this dissertation provides important insight into
the nature of small state foreign policies. All the Caribbean states are small, and
all have identified their small size as an important impediment to the attainment
of economic growth and development. This argument is linked to the
vulnerabilities that are associated with small size. Chapter 1 showed that the
empirical evidence does not support the premise that small states are inherently
disadvantaged, as they tend to perform quite well across a broad range of
economic indicators. In addition, Table 3 (provided in chapter 2) showed that
most of the Caribbean states have a higher HDI rank than China and in fact
perform better than many other developing countries. Despite evidence to the
contrary, these states have a foreign policy based on the underlying premise that
their survival rests on access to trade concessions and aid from other countries.276

The relatively high HDI rank does not, however, in any way detract from
the basic argument that the Caribbean economies are currently facing potential
economic crises as they have lost access to the preferences previously available
under the Lomé Conventions and are trying to adjust to the changing international
economic realities. Having lost their guaranteed market, they are vociferously
276
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trying to find new industries to enter and new partners to trade with. The
increasing engagement with China is therefore in large part a component of their
repositioning strategy.

Caribbean Repositioning and the Role of China
As noted in chapter 1, the economic situation in the Caribbean has
changed significantly over the last ten years. In the past, Caribbean states were
accustomed to significant allocations of aid,277 preferential access to European
and US markets, and a general acceptance that small size brought unique
challenges that necessitated some concessions from developed states. In addition,
there was general consensus--and an international acceptance—that small island
developing states (SIDs) faced even more vulnerabilities, in large part due to their
susceptibility to natural disasters and ecological changes.

Consistent with Jackson’s depiction of quasi-states’ dependence on
external assistance and aid, the economic performance and survival of Caribbean
states have always been linked to access to external assistance. As this external
assistance started to diminish and the international trading system became one
277
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more solidly predicated on the principle of reciprocity in trade, the 1990s became
a period of rethinking the Caribbean’s place in the prevailing international
economic and political system.

Richard Bernal, CARICOM’s lead negotiator, argues that in view of
pressures from globalization and the dictates of neoliberal institutions such as the
IMF and World Bank, Caribbean states must embark on a strategy of “strategic
global repositioning.”278 For Caribbean states this strategic global repositioning is,
The process of repositioning a country in the global economy by
implementing a strategic plan. Such a plan is designed to consolidate and
improve existing production while reorienting the economy by creating
new types of economic activities. In most small developing countries, this
means structural transformation, not structural adjustment.”279
Bernal’s argument for a transformation or the need for some type of
repositioning is accepted across the Caribbean. All the Caribbean states studied in
detail in this dissertation have embarked upon economic diversification projects
aimed at moving away from the heavy dependence on agricultural exports and the
fragile tourism industry. In addition, all three countries have commissioned
studies aimed at evaluating the usefulness of their foreign policy with respect to
gaining economic development.
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For Bernal, the process of strategic global repositioning includes
envisioning new development perspectives, macroeconomic stability, improving
competitiveness and productivity, modernizing international marketing, and
forging strategic corporate alliances. These points are all relevant, but I would
also add to Bernal’s list the importance of the strategic restructuring of the foreign
policies of Caribbean states. This has in fact been one key area where strategic
repositioning is most evident and as has been documented throughout the thesis,
the increasing relationship with China is in fact a key aspect of the foreign policy
repositioning of Caribbean states.

China is Primarily Seen as a Possible Agent of Aid and Thus Adjustment

China, in the view of the countries studied, is not simply seen as another
country with which to have diplomatic relations or merely another trading partner.
As highlighted especially in the cases of Dominica and Grenada, both states lack
natural resources that are of interest to China. Both Dominica and Grenada are
seeking a new source of aid to compensate for the shortfall witnessed since the
end of the Cold War.
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As highlighted earlier, the Jamaican case is a bit more complex. Jamaica
does in fact possess a traditional natural resource that is of interest to China and
the country is quite willing to supply China with this commodity. The expansion
in bauxite mining will have a positive effect on the economy and is contributing
significant amounts to the GDP of the country. This increase in mining exports is
actually compensating for the sharp decline in agricultural exports emanating
from the loss of preferential access to the EU market.280

Discussions with numerous Jamaican officials interviewed point to the
fact that the island is engrossed in what is popularly known as “China-mania.”
The government is in constant dialogue with the Chinese representatives on the
island and several government agencies are using Chinese assistance to fund
numerous development projects (See Chapter 3). The relationship with China is
thus seen as an important component of the development strategy of the Jamaican
government.

Extensions of this Analysis
Table 2 presented in the Introduction pointed to the most obvious
extension of this analysis—an extension to all English-speaking Caribbean states.
As noted at that point, a cursory look at the other Caribbean states reveals that the
280
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pattern of their relationship with China is similar to that of the three case studies.
It would therefore be useful to extend this framework to these additional
countries. This dissertation, however, also points to other important areas of
extension. Two possible extensions of this work relate to first, the nature of the
conditionalities attached to Chinese loans and aid and secondly, to the
implications of Caribbean’s increased engagement with the China for the
Caribbean’s relationship with the US.

Chinese Conditionalities
The preceding chapter demonstrated that there are implicit conditionalities
attached to Chinese aid and loans and other chapters provided evidence of this as
well. In most instances these are not explicitly placed into the contracts, but there
does exist an implicit assumption that Chinese firms will be contracted and that in
many instances, Chinese laborers will also be imported. This importation of
workers when there is already a stark unemployment problem serves to thwart the
real benefits emanating from these signed agreements. This realization is not
restricted to the Caribbean and this discussion has highlighted the importance of
examining the true nature of Chinese developmental assistance across the
developing world.

As such, an important extension of this discussion would be both deeper
analysis of the nature of these implicit conditionalities and a more in-depth
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examination of the actual spillover effects of these loans. This type of analysis
would have to address the importance of the political system in determining
foreign policy objectives. This dissertation has shown that the nature of the
political system in the Caribbean is to a large extent non-transparent and antidemocratic with the opposition leaders and the general public being unaware of
the details of Chinese loan agreements. This analysis of the domestic foundations
of foreign policy behavior can be extended to other small states in other regions to
better assess whether or not China’s engagement actually produces net benefits in
developing countries.

The reality is that these lack of spillovers are evident in Latin America and
parts of Africa—areas that do not have the Westminster political system. further
research is therefore necessary to identify the specific political and economic
structures and institutional framework that allows for a similar result in these
countries.

In a similar vein, additional research is necessary in relation to the notion
of implicit conditionalities. As noted in chapters 3 and 6, China often describes
itself as an aid donor that is fundamentally different from the IMF or World Bank.
China argues that their aid comes sans conditionalities such as fiscal austerity and
economic liberalization. But this dissertation has demonstrated that there are
indeed implicit conditions attached to Chinese aid and loans such as the
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importation of Chinese laborers. Further research across the developing world is
necessary to identify the range of implicit conditionalities that are attached to
Chinese aid.

The other pertinent extension relates to the idea of great power rivalry in
the Caribbean. The US is the leading power in the region, both at the economic
and military levels. The rise of China as an aid donor and trading partner can
possibly result in a return to the great power rivalry witnessed during the Cold
War. The extent to which this possibility exists is of importance to the Caribbean
and will have implications for the Caribbean’s relations with the US.

Great Power Rivalry in the Caribbean
The implications of the evolving relationship between Caribbean states
and China for the Caribbean’s relations with the world superpower and
neighbor—the United States must be addressed. In 2005 the construction of the
largest port in the Americas was completed in the Bahamas. The port construction
was contracted to Hutchison Whampoa (a Chinese company), which is the same
company that is currently controlling the Panama Canal. Hutchison Whampoa not
only built the Bahamas port, but is also currently managing it, and the company
also owns one of the main airports in the Bahamas. The port is important as it is
close to the US east coast and has the capacity to handle more freight than any
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other port in the region. The expected traffic through this port will provide the
Bahamas with significant amounts of revenue.

The Bahamas’ relations with China is very interesting and is a good point
to start future discussions of the implications of the Caribbean relationship with
China for the US. The US has in numerous fora shown its displeasure at a Chinese
company operating the Panama Canal. In addition, the US government believes
that the Company has ties with the Chinese military and is in fact a front for the
military.281

In spite of the US’ concerns about the Chinese company, in early 2006 the
US awarded Hutchison Whampoa a no-bid contract to operate a US radiation
detector used to scan freight destined for the US. This action set off a minifirestorm in the US because of the company’s ties with the Chinese military and
the fact that this particular company had important interests so close to the US.282
The fear was that the company could engineer the shipment of dangerous
weapons and chemicals into the US that could then be used by terrorists.

This incident is the first time that the US has shown much interest in
relation to a Caribbean state’s increasing relations with China. It is quite possible
281
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that as the relationship deepens, the US will become an important consideration
when discussing Caribbean-China relations.

In fact, David Jessop, the director of the Caribbean Council in Britain,
argues that China’s emergence in the region is a direct result of a vacuum left by
the US and Europe. Jessop argues that,
In taking forward an Americas policy, China has stepped into a
near vacuum. Both North America and Europe through disinterest, benign
neglect and more recently as a result of newer global priorities have
marginalized the Caribbean and, to an extent, even Latin America from
their strategic thinking. Both Europe and the United States remain
curiously silent about developments that suggest that the long-term
strategic balance of power in the Americas is changing, if, as seems likely,
Brazil continues to prosper and China emerges as a super power to rival
the Unites States.”283
Jessop’s discussion of the neglect of the region and China’s role in filling
that void is also seen in Peter Hakim’s discussion of the new alliance formation
developing in Latin America and the Caribbean with respect to China. He argues
that since 9/11, the US has lost interest in the region and the little attention shown
to the area, “has been sporadic and narrowly targeted at particularly troubling or
urgent situations.”284
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Hakim further notes that in recent years the region’s support for the US
has diminished significantly. In fact, of the 34 countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean, only seven supported the ongoing War in Iraq. In addition, the US is a
bit perturbed by the fact that no government has been willing to join in the US’
denouncement of Chavez.285

It is therefore evident that the increased engagement between China and
countries in the US’ backyard have become an area of concern for some in the US
government. Charles Shapiro, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Western Hemisphere Affairs in a presentation to the US Senate outlines much
of the prevailing negative perception of China in the US. Shapiro, however, in
effect dispels the China threat thesis pointing out that Chinese investments to
Latin America and the Caribbean only totaled US$8.3 billion, arguing essentially
that China’s role is actually quite limited.286 The major area of concern related to
military contacts. Military officials from China are increasingly visiting Latin
America and military personnel in Latin America are increasingly viewing China
as an alternative training site. Shapiro notes that the US is closely following the
military exchanges and will try to ensure that the contacts do not undermine
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democracy in Latin America and do not facilitate the flow of arms to rebel groups
that may threaten security in the Americas.287

What Shapiro fails to point out is that the move towards closer military
contact between China and Latin American and Caribbean states was a direct
offshoot of US actions. In 2002 the US passed the American Service Members
Protection Act. This Act resulted in an end to US military aid to 12 Latin
American countries because of their refusal to sign an exemption for US military
personnel from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.288 Latin
America and the Caribbean’s courting of China for military support is therefore
directly a result of US actions.

Shapiro, however, concludes with an optimistic outlook of Chinese
engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean. He argues that there can be
positive results from China’s engagement with the region, as it will result in
China becoming a stakeholder in the prevention of terrorism, transnational crime,
and counternarcotics.289
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In the Caribbean, the countries studied are not really using China as a foil
against the US. In fact, in interviews conducted across the Caribbean officials
made it clear that their actions were based on economic expedience and in no way
reflected a desire to alter the prevailing geopolitical reality. There is, however,
some danger to this increased relationship with China, and this must be studied in
greater detail.

FINAL SUMMATION
This dissertation has shown that the foreign policies of small states are not
unproblematic. Small state foreign policies are diverse, complex, dynamic and
active. There are in fact differences in the approaches to and actual foreign
policies pursued by even an ostensibly economically and politically homogenous
group such as the Caribbean states. The decision to increasingly engage with
China is not simply about bandwagoning with China or following the lead of
other Caribbean states; the decision is actually rooted in the economic adjustment
of Caribbean states.

The case studies have also pointed to significant disadvantages or limited
benefits associated with Chinese loans and investments. The identified
disadvantages relate to the widening trade deficit, the awarding of contracts to
Chinese firms, and the importation of Chinese workers. These disadvantages are
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not addressed because of the secrecy involved in the signing of agreements and
the power wielded by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet in making these
decisions.

Vaughan Lewis makes the case that, “Caribbean policy makers
have tended to depend on the empathy of ‘external others’ for supporting the
means of riding out structural economic shocks, seeking to an extraordinary
extent goodwill or ‘bankable assurances from others.”290 This dependence on
external assistance is a consistent component of Caribbean existence and China
represents the newest stage in this process.

It is imperative that Caribbean states use the benefits accruing from this
intensified relationship with China to their advantage. The problem is that their
adjustment strategies and foreign polices—consistent with other small states—is
highly ad hoc and reactive. Across the Caribbean, regional leaders have not
assessed the potential benefits and costs associated with this interaction with
China and as a result, they have been unable to develop strategies to mitigate
against some of the costs relating to the relationship.
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In order for the relationship with China to be of more benefit to the
Caribbean states, each country must spend more time analyzing the substantive
gains that have already accrued and the factors that have limited the attainment of
other potential benefits. The relationship with China must therefore be better
managed and closer attention must be paid to the net benefits of this engagement
with China, if it is to truly benefit these small Caribbean states.
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In recent years the relationship between Caribbean states and China has
intensified. This dissertation argues that the Caribbean’s increased engagement
with China is an important component of their economic adjustment strategy that
was necessitated after changes in the orientation of the international economic
system that they must operate within, particularly in relation to the loss of trade
preferences and the sharp decline in official development assistance.

Despite the seemingly homogenous nature of these Caribbean states there
is in fact significant foreign policy variation seen vis-à-vis engagement with
China. Some Caribbean states have consistently recognized China, while others
have vacillated between recognition of China and Taiwan. The source of this
variation lies in differences in endowment of resources that are of strategic
importance to China. The more resource-endowed countries demonstrate more
foreign policy consistency while the resource-poor countries have exhibited a less
consistent foreign policy towards China.

The dissertation also explores the extent to which the relationship with
China is beneficial for these states. It will be shown that despite the lack of
explicit conditionalities accompanying Chinese aid and loans, there are important
implicit conditionalities such as the awarding of contracts to Chinese firms and

the importation of Chinese laborers that thwart the potential benefits accruing to
Caribbean states from this relationship with China.

